

# THE REVISIONIST CLARION

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MONTHLY NEWSLETTER ABOUT HISTORICAL REVISIONISM  
AND THE CRISIS OF IMPERIAL POWERS

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**World Wars / Colonial Wars in the making / Future Wars**

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## **Solidarity with the people of Iraq in resistance**

**National Demonstration in Rome, Dec 13**

On December 13 2003 a national demonstration – summoned by an ad hoc committee – will be held to show solidarity with the Iraqi resistance.

1) The idea of demonstrating in favour of the Iraqi resistance arose out of a widespread desire to guarantee the right of the Iraqi people (like that of all other occupied peoples, including the Palestinians) to resist against an Anglo-American occupation which is contrary to every internationally recognised law, and to show that not all Italians believe in the fairytale of “terrorism” (including “Syrian terrorism”). In

other words, the promoters and those who will be demonstrating on December 13 (after a convention in a cinema in Rome) will be saying the most obvious thing in the world: there is an aggressor and there is a victim of the aggression.

In view of the direct involvement of Italy in the occupation of Iraq – a sovereign country which posed no danger to anyone, having been prostrated by a long embargo – the demonstrators will also be asking for the withdrawal of the Italian troops, although the pro-government media are trying to exploit the events of an-Nasiriyya (19 Italian casualties, including 17 military) in order to create a hypocritically consensus.

2) The demonstration will be non-partisan. This means that this initiative was not launched by any party or trade union. The easily expected result was that all political forces, right, centre and left, have been attacking this initiative through a wide range of initiatives: legal threats (on the right), talk of a terrible anti-Western conspiracy (on the centre) and defamation claiming that the idea of the initiative is in the hands of “Fascist infiltrators” (on the left).

The promoters and signatories – who have no TV or newspaper outlets – have answered, wherever they could, with arguments which are impossible to answer, and we can say that one important political result has been achieved: it has been shown that politicians and journalists, whatever minor clashes they may have, are all united in supporting a single pro-US regime which is actually in control in Italy. We can mention the case of the secretary of Rifondazione Comunista who has warned the members of his party to withdraw their support for the demonstration.

So, despite the concentrated attacks, the number of sponsors is increasing, and we can expect several thousand people to come to Rome. United not by any political ideology, but simply because they wish to emphasize the fact that “resisting”, in the manner the attacked deem best, is a basic right. Some of the sponsors are quite significant: some very well known scholars of the Arabic culture and language, Italy’s best known historian – paradoxically – of the Crusades, prof. Franco Cardini; and Angelo Del Boca, the most authoritative historian of Italian colonialism.

3) The demonstration will also be attended by some Iraqi (and Palestinian) representatives: Awni al-Kaleemji, international spokesman for the Iraqi National Alliance (Patriotic opposition), Jabbar al-Kubaysi (who will be coming from Baghdad), President of the Iraqi National Alliance, Ziyad Ahmed, official delegate of the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

This clearly shows that the Iraqi Resistance does not accept being labelled as “terrorism”. And this is a reason to expect intimidation from a small group of Iraqi collaborationists of the Anglo-American occupiers – there have already been signs of this, and not just in the press, in recent weeks.

4) It should be stressed that the demonstration is open to all, Italians and non-Italians, whatever their political opinions or religious beliefs may be. It is open to all those who are offended by the limitless arrogance shown by the US government and its stooges. In this sense, it will also be an “anti-USA” demonstration, if being “anti-USA” today means, as the promoters and the demonstrators believe, being on the side of international law.

We should remember in fact that the Charter of the United Nations states that armed resistance is legitimate in case of invasion. This principle has been repeated in UN Resolution 1514, which states that “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation”; and in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which in 1977 referred to “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”.

For further information:

<http://www.iraqlibero.net> (in Italian)

<http://www.antiimperialista.com/en/> (in English)

[http://www.antiimperialista.com/view.shtml?category=9&id=1065095885&keyword=+](http://www.antiimperialista.com/view.shtml?category=9&id=1065095885&keyword=) (Call for Action)

The demonstration actually took place and was a complete success. The conclusion has been: let's organize everywhere solidarity demonstrations with the Iraqi resistance

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## Primordial Illogic and Primitive Cruelty

Amira Hass

There is nothing more logical than setting arbitrary times of day when a Palestinian is allowed to leave his home and come back to it. There is nothing more logical than forbidding him to leave his field in a pickup truck to take his crops straight to market. It is logical to forbid him to receive guests, to take a donkey-drawn wagon, to ride a bicycle, to visit his parents a few kilometers away - or to bring a goat into his house "without coordination" so as to provide some fresh milk for his children.

There is nothing more logical than to fence the Palestinian into his village, neighborhood, and land, with an electronic barrier, and then set a minimum age to leave. It is logical to appoint 19-year-old soldiers to watch the gate, which is sometimes opened on time and sometimes not, and to impose the rules - 29-year-olds are not allowed out, 30-year-olds are, pregnant women are allowed out, non-pregnant women are not.

It is logical to forbid all crossing when the Shin Bet (Israeli secret service) suddenly requires it, leaving outside a 65-year-old man who went out to buy something a kilometer and a half away, or a young man who went for dental treatment, or a mother whose children stayed at home because only children under the age of 21 are allowed out.

It is so logical to forbid a Palestinian to go to the beach 300 meters from his home, and to prevent half a million people from nearby towns from going to the beach. It is so logical. After all, that's what army commanders and soldiers do, day in and day out, hour by hour, in Gaza, in the Sifa area in the north and the Mawassi in the center of the Strip.

It's logical, because the IDF's mission in the heart of Gaza - which it did not leave in 1994, despite the Oslo legend - is to guarantee the safety and security and lives of Israelis whose government continues to encourage in moving to occupied territory. It is logical because Israeli governments since the 1970s and on, Labor and Likud, decided to settle Jews in the main open areas in the narrow Gaza Strip, in the prettiest area of dunes and on the most spectacular beach, in an area blessed with fresh water compared to the rest of the Gaza area.

It is logical to lock people up in their homes and villages, and to sabotage the farming of their land because it is logical to subsidize the Jewish settlement in the land of the forefathers of Gush Katif and northern Gaza. It is logical to connect Jewish settler homes to electricity and water while forbidding Palestinian neighbors from connecting to the electricity grid and the water and sewage lines.

It sounds cruel to lock people up in their homes and uproot their groves and orchards that they spent decades nurturing. But it's a logical cruelty, Israel is convinced, if that is what it takes to foil the cruelty of others - to prevent an armed Palestinian attack on a nursery school or a plant nursery or to plant a landmine on the route of a tank that is patrolling to protect the nursery school and the plant nursery.

During the Oslo years, many good Israelis made do with the logical thought that "eventually" the settlements in Gaza would be dismantled. Logic and policy are two different things. Meanwhile, even before the bloodshed broke out in September 2000, the settlements in Gaza expanded, their infrastructures were improved and their security required the army to dictate various Draconian prohibitions of movement for a million Palestinians.

The northern Gaza Strip, with its minuscule settlements, was cut off from the rest of the strip and de facto annexed to Israel. Palestinian representatives tried to speak to the logical minds of their Israeli counterparts at the negotiating table. It didn't work. On the contrary, the number of settlements in Gaza only grew.

With subsidizes and expanding infrastructures and good roads and an expanding market for their worm-free lettuce - why should they leave? And why should the government dismantle the settlements when the Palestinians themselves signed the agreements that did

not require the settlements to be dismantled? The quiet that most Palestinians kept most of the time proved to Israelis that it was possible to get peace with the settlements.

That quiet relieved the Israelis of the duty to deal with the primordial illogic, the primordial cruelty - establishing the settlements. The governments used the Palestinian quiet to continue developing the settlements. And after September 2000, what the appeals to logic did not accomplish, the armed attacks certainly won't accomplish. After all, Israel will never give in to terror.

Even before any Qassam rockets were fired at Sderot, the army shot to death people who dared approach settlements and the fortifications that protect the settlements. Some were armed, but many were simply shepherds and peasants and their stone-throwing children. All the farmland around the settlements was shaved down to nothing - raked, flattened and demolished, to improve the vision of soldiers preserving the settlements. How logical.

Amira Hass is an award-winning Israeli journalist who lives in Ramalla in the West Bank. She is author of *Drinking the Sea At Gaza: Days and Nights In A Land Under Siege* (Owl Books, 2000). She writes for the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, where this article first appeared  
<<http://www.haaretz.com/>>

*Dissident Voice*, July 24, 2003

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THE ONE-STATE SOLUTION  
OR THE END OF ZIONISM

## Israel: The Alternative

By Tony Judt

The Middle East peace process is finished. It did not die: it was killed. Mahmoud Abbas was undermined by the President of the Palestinian Authority and humiliated by the Prime Minister of Israel. His successor awaits a similar fate. Israel continues to mock its American patron, building illegal settlements in cynical disregard of the "road map." The President of the United States of America has been reduced to a ventriloquist's dummy, pitifully reciting the Israeli cabinet line: "It's all Arafat's fault." Israelis themselves grimly await the next bomber. Palestinian Arabs, corralled into shrinking Bantustans, subsist on EU handouts. On the corpse-strewn landscape of the Fertile Crescent, Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and a handful of terrorists can all claim victory, and they do. Have we reached the end of the road? What is to be done?

At the dawn of the twentieth century, in the twilight of the continental empires, Europe's subject peoples dreamed of forming "nation-states," territorial homelands where Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Armenians, and others might live free, masters of their own fate. When the Habsburg and Romanov empires collapsed after World War I, their leaders seized the opportunity. A flurry of new states emerged; and the first thing they did was set about privileging their national, "ethnic" majority—defined by language, or religion, or antiquity, or all three—at the expense of inconvenient local minorities, who were consigned to second-class status: permanently resident strangers in their own home.

But one nationalist movement, Zionism, was frustrated in its ambitions. The dream of an appropriately sited Jewish national home in the middle of the defunct Turkish Empire had to wait upon the retreat of imperial Britain: a process that took three more decades and a second world war. And thus it was only in 1948 that a Jewish nation-state was established in formerly Ottoman Palestine. But the founders of the Jewish state had been influenced by the same concepts and categories as their fin-de-siècle contemporaries back in Warsaw, or Odessa, or Bucharest; not surprisingly, Israel's ethno-religious self-definition, and its

discrimination against internal "foreigners," has always had more in common with, say, the practices of post-Habsburg Romania than either party might care to acknowledge.

The problem with Israel, in short, is not—as is sometimes suggested—that it is a European "enclave" in the Arab world; but rather that it arrived too late. It has imported a characteristically late-nineteenth-century separatist project into a world that has moved on, a world of individual rights, open frontiers, and international law. The very idea of a "Jewish state"—a state in which Jews and the Jewish religion have exclusive privileges from which non-Jewish citizens are forever excluded—is rooted in another time and place. Israel, in short, is an anachronism.

In one vital attribute, however, Israel is quite different from previous insecure, defensive microstates born of imperial collapse: it is a democracy. Hence its present dilemma. Thanks to its occupation of the lands conquered in 1967, Israel today faces three unattractive choices. It can dismantle the Jewish settlements in the territories, return to the 1967 state borders within which Jews constitute a clear majority, and thus remain both a Jewish state and a democracy, albeit one with a constitutionally anomalous community of second-class Arab citizens.

Alternatively, Israel can continue to occupy "Samaria," "Judea," and Gaza, whose Arab population—added to that of present-day Israel—will become the demographic majority within five to eight years: in which case Israel will be either a Jewish state (with an ever-larger majority of unenfranchised non-Jews) or it will be a democracy. But logically it cannot be both.

Or else Israel can keep control of the Occupied Territories but get rid of the overwhelming majority of the Arab population: either by forcible expulsion or else by starving them of land and livelihood, leaving them no option but to go into exile. In this way Israel could indeed remain both Jewish and at least formally democratic: but at the cost of becoming the first modern democracy to conduct full-scale ethnic cleansing as a state project, something which would condemn Israel forever to the status of an outlaw state, an international pariah.

Anyone who supposes that this third option is unthinkable above all for a Jewish state has not been watching the steady accretion of settlements and land seizures in the West Bank over the past quarter-century, or listening to generals and politicians on the Israeli right, some of them currently in government. The middle ground of Israeli politics today is occupied by the Likud. Its major component is the late Menachem Begin's Herut Party. Herut is the successor to Vladimir Jabotinsky's interwar Revisionist Zionists, whose uncompromising indifference to legal and territorial niceties once attracted from left-leaning Zionists the epithet "fascist." When one hears Israel's deputy prime minister, Ehud Olmert, proudly insist that his country has not excluded the option of assassinating the elected president of the Palestinian Authority, it is clear that the label fits better than ever. Political murder is what fascists do.

The situation of Israel is not desperate, but it may be close to hopeless. Suicide bombers will never bring down the Israeli state, and the Palestinians have no other weapons. There are indeed Arab radicals who will not rest until every Jew is pushed into the Mediterranean, but they represent no strategic threat to Israel, and the Israeli military knows it. What sensible Israelis fear much more than Hamas or the al-Aqsa Brigade is the steady emergence of an Arab majority in "Greater Israel," and above all the erosion of the political culture and civic morale of their society. As the prominent Labor politician Avraham Burg recently wrote, "After two thousand years of struggle for survival, the reality of Israel is a colonial state, run by a corrupt clique which scorns and mocks law and civic morality." [1] Unless something changes, Israel in half a decade will be neither Jewish nor democratic.

This is where the US enters the picture. Israel's behavior has been a disaster for American foreign policy. With American support, Jerusalem has consistently and blatantly flouted UN resolutions requiring it to withdraw from land seized and occupied in war. Israel is the only Middle Eastern state known to possess genuine and lethal weapons of mass destruction. By turning a blind eye, the US has effectively scuttled its own increasingly frantic efforts to prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of other small and potentially belligerent states. Washington's unconditional support for Israel even in spite of

(silent) misgivings is the main reason why most of the rest of the world no longer credits our good faith.

It is now tacitly conceded by those in a position to know that America's reasons for going to war in Iraq were not necessarily those advertised at the time.[2] For many in the current US administration, a major strategic consideration was the need to destabilize and then reconfigure the Middle East in a manner thought favorable to Israel. This story continues. We are now making belligerent noises toward Syria because Israeli intelligence has assured us that Iraqi weapons have been moved there—a claim for which there is no corroborating evidence from any other source. Syria backs Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad: sworn foes of Israel, to be sure, but hardly a significant international threat. However, Damascus has hitherto been providing the US with critical data on al-Qaeda. Like Iran, another longstanding target of Israeli wrath whom we are actively alienating, Syria is more use to the United States as a friend than an enemy. Which war are we fighting?

On September 16, 2003, the US vetoed a UN Security Council resolution asking Israel to desist from its threat to deport Yasser Arafat. Even American officials themselves recognize, off the record, that the resolution was reasonable and prudent, and that the increasingly wild pronouncements of Israel's present leadership, by restoring Arafat's standing in the Arab world, are a major impediment to peace. But the US blocked the resolution all the same, further undermining our credibility as an honest broker in the region. America's friends and allies around the world are no longer surprised at such actions, but they are saddened and disappointed all the same.

Israeli politicians have been actively contributing to their own difficulties for many years; why do we continue to aid and abet them in their mistakes? The US has tentatively sought in the past to pressure Israel by threatening to withhold from its annual aid package some of the money that goes to subsidizing West Bank settlers. But the last time this was attempted, during the Clinton administration, Jerusalem got around it by taking the money as "security expenditure." Washington went along with the subterfuge, and of \$10 billion of American aid over four years, between 1993 and 1997, less than \$775 million was kept back. The settlement program went ahead unimpeded. Now we don't even try to stop it.

This reluctance to speak or act does no one any favors. It has also corroded American domestic debate. Rather than think straight about the Middle East, American politicians and pundits slander our European allies when they dissent, speak glibly and irresponsibly of resurgent anti-Semitism when Israel is criticized, and censoriously rebuke any public figure at home who tries to break from the consensus.

But the crisis in the Middle East won't go away. President Bush will probably be conspicuous by his absence from the fray for the coming year, having said just enough about the "road map" in June to placate Tony Blair. But sooner or later an American statesman is going to have to tell the truth to an Israeli prime minister and find a way to make him listen. Israeli liberals and moderate Palestinians have for two decades been thanklessly insisting that the only hope was for Israel to dismantle nearly all the settlements and return to the 1967 borders, in exchange for real Arab recognition of those frontiers and a stable, terrorist-free Palestinian state underwritten (and constrained) by Western and international agencies. This is still the conventional consensus, and it was once a just and possible solution.

But I suspect that we are already too late for that. There are too many settlements, too many Jewish settlers, and too many Palestinians, and they all live together, albeit separated by barbed wire and pass laws. Whatever the "road map" says, the real map is the one on the ground, and that, as Israelis say, reflects facts. It may be that over a quarter of a million heavily armed and subsidized Jewish settlers would leave Arab Palestine voluntarily; but no one I know believes it will happen. Many of those settlers will die—and kill—rather than move. The last Israeli politician to shoot Jews in pursuit of state policy was David Ben-Gurion, who forcibly disarmed Begin's illegal Irgun militia in 1948 and integrated it into the new Israel Defense Forces. Ariel Sharon is not Ben-Gurion.[3]

The time has come to think the unthinkable. The two-state solution—the core of the Oslo process and the present "road map"—is probably already doomed. With every passing year we are postponing an inevitable, harder choice that only the far right and far left have so far acknowledged, each for its own reasons. The true alternative facing the Middle East in coming years will be between an ethnically cleansed Greater Israel and a single, integrated,

binational state of Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. That is indeed how the hard-liners in Sharon's cabinet see the choice; and that is why they anticipate the removal of the Arabs as the ineluctable condition for the survival of a Jewish state.

But what if there were no place in the world today for a "Jewish state"? What if the binational solution were not just increasingly likely, but actually a desirable outcome? It is not such a very odd thought. Most of the readers of this essay live in pluralist states which have long since become multiethnic and multicultural. "Christian Europe," *pace* M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, is a dead letter; Western civilization today is a patchwork of colors and religions and languages, of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Arabs, Indians, and many others—as any visitor to London or Paris or Geneva will know.[4]

Israel itself is a multicultural society in all but name; yet it remains distinctive among democratic states in its resort to ethnoreligious criteria with which to denominate and rank its citizens. It is an oddity among modern nations not—as its more paranoid supporters assert—because it is a Jewish state and no one wants the Jews to have a state; but because it is a Jewish state in which one community—Jews—is set above others, in an age when that sort of state has no place.

For many years, Israel had a special meaning for the Jewish people. After 1948 it took in hundreds of thousands of helpless survivors who had nowhere else to go; without Israel their condition would have been desperate in the extreme. Israel needed Jews, and Jews needed Israel. The circumstances of its birth have thus bound Israel's identity inextricably to the Shoah, the German project to exterminate the Jews of Europe. As a result, all criticism of Israel is drawn ineluctably back to the memory of that project, something that Israel's American apologists are shamefully quick to exploit. To find fault with the Jewish state is to think ill of Jews; even to imagine an alternative configuration in the Middle East is to indulge the moral equivalent of genocide.

In the years after World War II, those many millions of Jews who did not live in Israel were often reassured by its very existence—whether they thought of it as an insurance policy against renascent anti-Semitism or simply a reminder to the world that Jews could and would fight back. Before there was a Jewish state, Jewish minorities in Christian societies would peer anxiously over their shoulders and keep a low profile; since 1948, they could walk tall. But in recent years, the situation has tragically reversed.

Today, non-Israeli Jews feel themselves once again exposed to criticism and vulnerable to attack for things they didn't do. But this time it is a Jewish state, not a Christian one, which is holding them hostage for its own actions. Diaspora Jews cannot influence Israeli policies, but they are implicitly identified with them, not least by Israel's own insistent claims upon their allegiance. The behavior of a self-described Jewish state affects the way everyone else looks at Jews. The increased incidence of attacks on Jews in Europe and elsewhere is primarily attributable to misdirected efforts, often by young Muslims, to get back at Israel. The depressing truth is that Israel's current behavior is not just bad for America, though it surely is. It is not even just bad for Israel itself, as many Israelis silently acknowledge. The depressing truth is that Israel today is bad for the Jews.

In a world where nations and peoples increasingly intermingle and intermarry at will; where cultural and national impediments to communication have all but collapsed; where more and more of us have multiple elective identities and would feel falsely constrained if we had to answer to just one of them; in such a world Israel is truly an anachronism. And not just an anachronism but a dysfunctional one. In today's "clash of cultures" between open, pluralist democracies and belligerently intolerant, faith-driven ethno-states, Israel actually risks falling into the wrong camp.

To convert Israel from a Jewish state to a binational one would not be easy, though not quite as impossible as it sounds: the process has already begun *de facto*. But it would cause far less disruption to most Jews and Arabs than its religious and nationalist foes will claim. In any case, no one I know of has a better idea: anyone who genuinely supposes that the controversial electronic fence now being built will resolve matters has missed the last fifty years of history. The "fence"—actually an armored zone of ditches, fences, sensors, dirt roads (for tracking footprints), and a wall up to twenty-eight feet tall in places—occupies, divides, and steals Arab farmland; it will destroy villages, livelihoods, and whatever remains of Arab-Jewish community. It costs approximately \$1 million per mile and will bring nothing but

humiliation and discomfort to both sides. Like the Berlin Wall, it confirms the moral and institutional bankruptcy of the regime it is intended to protect.

A binational state in the Middle East would require a brave and relentlessly engaged American leadership. The security of Jews and Arabs alike would need to be guaranteed by international force—though a legitimately constituted binational state would find it much easier policing militants of all kinds inside its borders than when they are free to infiltrate them from outside and can appeal to an angry, excluded constituency on both sides of the border.[5] A binational state in the Middle East would require the emergence, among Jews and Arabs alike, of a new political class. The very idea is an unpromising mix of realism and utopia, hardly an auspicious place to begin. But the alternatives are far, far worse.

September 25, 2003

#### Notes

[1] See Burg's essay, "La révolution sioniste est morte," *Le Monde*, September 11, 2003. A former head of the Jewish Agency, the writer was speaker of the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, between 1999 and 2003 and is currently a Labor Party member of the Knesset. His essay first appeared in the Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot*; it has been widely republished, notably in the *Forward* (August 29, 2003) and the *London Guardian* (September 15, 2003).

[2] See the interview with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in the July 2003 issue of *Vanity Fair*.

[3] In 1979, following the peace agreement with Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon did indeed instruct the army to close down Jewish settlements in the territory belonging to Egypt. The angry resistance of some of the settlers was overcome with force, though no one was killed. But then the army was facing three thousand extremists, not a quarter of a million, and the land in question was the Sinai Desert, not "biblical Samaria and Judea."

[4] Albanians in Italy, Arabs and black Africans in France, Asians in England all continue to encounter hostility. A minority of voters in France, or Belgium, or even Denmark and Norway, support political parties whose hostility to "immigration" is sometimes their only platform. But compared with thirty years ago, Europe is a multicolored patchwork of equal citizens, and that, without question, is the shape of its future.

[5] As Burg notes, Israel's current policies are the terrorists' best recruiting tool: "We are indifferent to the fate of Palestinian children, hungry and humiliated; so why are we surprised when they blow us up in our restaurants? Even if we killed 1000 terrorists a day it would change nothing." See Burg, "La révolution sioniste est morte."

*The New York Review of Books*, Volume 50, Number 16 · October 23, 2003

<<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16671>>

Responses to Tony Judt

<<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16824>>

An Israeli commentary in *Ha'aretz*:

## Who's in favor of annihilating Israel?

By Yoel Esteron

The most venomous and dangerous attack on the State of Israel's right to exist hails from New York, of all places. Tony Judt, a New York University history professor, has published an article in the prestigious *New York Review of Books* (October 23) in which he makes a seemingly well-defended case in favor of establishing a binational state on the ruins of the State of Israel.

In Judt's eyes, Israel is an anachronism from the late 19th century. In his brave new world, there is no longer room for such a thing as a nation-state. Germany, France, Italy, Japan and all the rest - none of these disturb his peace of mind. Only Israel.

Sixty years after the attempt to wipe out the Jewish people in Europe, after which the countries of the world were kind enough to allow Holocaust survivors to build a national home for themselves, along comes a historian who specializes in Europe and proposes that the Jews commit suicide. That they once again become a minority, only this time a minority in a Palestinian nation-state wedged between the Jordan and the Mediterranean.

Can an idea be ludicrous and dangerous at the same time? Judt proves that the answer is yes. His article, which tries to conceal his hatred of Israel within the folds of scholarly analysis, does not explain how two peoples who have not been able to talk to one another for generations, except through bombs, will suddenly be filled with love and establish a warm and courteous neighborly relationship. Sheikh Yassin is probably laughing his head off.

And yet the idea is also a dangerous one, because it is chalking up supporters in high places. The article is being talked about in intellectual circles in the United States as if it were some kind of bold attempt to defy convention. People who have despaired of any breakthrough in the Middle East stalemate are naively saying: Wait a minute, maybe there's something here. And they are being joined, of course, by certified anti-Semites, haters of Israel and other garden-variety Israel bashers. Even Amos Elon, the author of "Herzl" and "The Israelis," wrote a letter to the editor brimming with praise from his home in Buggiano, Italy. Judt "should be lauded for cutting through a forest of cliches," as Elon put it.

Of course, not everyone is in awe of this pseudo-erudite theory. Leon Wieseltier, one of America's leading intellectuals, has rescued the honor of those Americans who understand a thing or two about Middle Eastern affairs, easily crushing Judt's argument (The New Republic, October 27). But this idea, as often happens with ideas, is already living a life of its own. Some are for and some are against. **The debate is raging. There are people who think that the State of Israel has to go,** and others who believe in its continued existence. Not in the amnesia-struck cultural salons of Europe. In America.

The idea of a binational state is not new, of course. In the 1920s and 1930s, it was proposed in one form or another by intellectuals from across the spectrum, from Martin Buber to Ze'ev Jabotinsky (although scholars are divided over what he really meant). It reared its head again toward the end of the 20th century: Edward Said dreamed about it in New York and Azmi Bishara is still dreaming about it here. Meron Benvenisti has written about it on these pages. Maybe he is desperate, too.

There is no need for surveys to know that the overwhelming majority of Israelis and Palestinians reject the idea of a binational state. It is an amazingly bad idea for the Jews to become a minority under the wing of Hamas. As everyone knows, the Palestinians also want a state of their own - now, as soon as possible, not years from now when demography is victorious over the Apache helicopter gunship, as promised. But do we have a right to gamble with the future? Is it not better to snuff out the idea of a binational state before it flourishes?

At the moment, it is thriving not because of intellectuals and historians. Those responsible for making it bloom again are people who are actually appalled at the very thought. Ariel Sharon and Avigdor Lieberman and Effie Eitam and Yosef Lapid - they are the ones who are watering the idea of a binational state and bringing it back to life, by doing nothing to advance the one solution that could stand in its way: two states for two peoples.

The Israeli right and its government, along with tens of thousands of extremists who have put down stakes in the heart of Palestinian population centers, are responsible for the despair and hatred that have revived the debate over Israel's right to exist. The tanks of occupation have armed old-new anti-Semitism.

It is easy to say to Judt and his ilk that they should experiment with binational states elsewhere - in Germany and France, for example - before they start forcing it on Israel and the Palestinians. But what will we say to ourselves when one day historians ask what we did to avoid waking up in a nightmare? **Unless we go back to where we were in 1967, we may find ourselves back where we were before 1948.**

November 28, 2003 Kislev 3, 5764

Sooner than later, indeed !

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A TRADITION OF SAVAGERY

## The Scalping Party

By Mike Davis

In his dark masterpiece, *Blood Meridian* (1985), novelist Cormac McCarthy tells the terrifying tale of a gang of Yanqui scalp-hunters who left an apocalyptic trail of carnage from Chihuahua to Southern California in the early 1850s.

Commissioned by Mexican authorities to hunt marauding Apaches, the company of ex-filibusters and convicts under the command of the psychopath John Glanton quickly became intoxicated with gore. They began to exterminate local farmers as well as Indians, and when

there were no innocents left to rape and slaughter, they turned upon themselves with shark-like fury.

Many readers have recoiled from the gruesome extremism of McCarthy's imagery: the roasted skulls of tortured captives, necklaces of human ears, an unspeakable tree of dead infants. Others have balked at his unpatriotic emphasis on the genocidal origins of the American West and the book's obvious allusion to "search and destroy" missions à la Vietnam.

But *Blood Meridian*, like all of McCarthy's novels, is based on meticulous research. Glanton -- the white savage, the satanic face of Manifest Destiny -- really existed. He's simply the ancestor most Americans would prefer to forget. He's also the ghost we can't avoid.

Six weeks ago, a courageous hometown paper in rustbelt Ohio -- the *Toledo Blade* - tore the wraps off an officially suppressed story of Vietnam-era exterminism that recapitulates *Blood Meridian* in the most ghastly and unbearable detail. The reincarnation of Glanton's scalping party was an elite 45-man unit of the 101 Airborne Division known as "Tiger Force." *The Blade's* intricate reconstruction of its murderous march through the Central Highlands of Vietnam in summer and fall 1967 needs to be read in full, horrifying detail. *Blade* reporters interviewed more than 100 American veterans and Vietnamese survivors.

Tiger Force atrocities began with the torture and execution of prisoners in the field, then escalated to the routine slaughter of unarmed farmers, elderly people, even small children. As one former sergeant told the *Blade*, "It didn't matter if they were civilians. If they weren't supposed to be in an area, we shot them. If they didn't understand fear, I taught it to them."

Early on, Tiger Force began scalping its victims (the scalps were dangled from the ends of M-16s) and cutting off their ears as souvenirs. One member -- who would later behead an infant -- wore the ears as a ghoulish necklace (just like the character Toadvine in *Blood Meridian*, while another mailed them home to his wife. Others kicked out the teeth of dead villagers for their gold fillings.

A former Tiger Force sergeant told reporters that "he killed so many civilians he lost count." *The Blade* estimates that innocent casualties were in "the hundreds." Another veteran, a medic with the unit, recalled 150 unarmed civilians murdered in a single month.

Superior officers, especially the Glanton-like battalion commander Gerald Morse (or "Ghost Rider" as he fancied himself), sponsored the carnage. Orders were given to "shoot everything that moves" and Morse established a body-count quota of 327 (the numerical designation of the battalion) that Tiger Force enthusiastically filled with dead peasants and teenage girls.

Soldiers in other units who complained about these exterminations were ignored or warned to keep silent, while Tiger Force slackers were quickly transferred out. As with Glanton's gang, or, for that matter, *Einsatzgruppen*, the Nazi mobile extermination squads, in the western Ukraine in 1941, atrocity created its own insatiable momentum. Eventually, nothing was unthinkable in the Song Be Valley.

"A 13-year-old girl's throat was slashed after she was sexually assaulted, and a young mother was shot to death after soldiers torched her hut. An unarmed teenager was shot in the back after a platoon sergeant ordered the youth to leave a village, and a baby was decapitated so that a soldier could remove a necklace."

Stories about the beheading of the baby spread so widely that the Army was finally forced to launch a secret inquiry in 1971. The investigation lasted for almost five years and probed 30 alleged Tiger Force war crimes. Evidence was found to support the prosecution of at least 18 members of the platoon. In the end, however, a half dozen of the most compromised veterans were allowed to resign from the Army, avoiding military indictment, and in 1975 the Pentagon quietly buried the entire investigation.

According to the *Blade*, "It is not known how far up in the Ford administration the decision [to bury the cases] went," but it is worth recalling whom the leading actors were at the time: the Secretary of Defense, then as now, was Donald Rumsfeld, and the White House chief of staff was Dick Cheney.

Recently in the *New Yorker*, Seymour Hersh, who was instrumental in exposing the My Lai massacre, decried the failure of the corporate media, especially the four major television networks, to report the *Blade's* findings or launch their own investigations into the official cover-up. (Since then, ABC news and Ted Koppel's *Nightline* have both covered the subject.) He also reminds us that the Army concealed the details of another large massacre of civilians at the village of My Khe 4, near My Lai on the very day in 1968 when the more infamous massacre took place.

Moreover, the Tiger Force story is the third major war crimes' revelation in the last few years to encounter apathy in the media and/or indifference and contempt in Washington.

In 1999, a team of investigative reporters from the Associated Press broke the story of a horrific massacre of hundreds of unarmed Korean civilians by U.S. troops in July 1950. It occurred at a stone bridge near the village of No Gun Ri and the unit involved was Custer's old outfit, the 7th Calvary regiment.

As one veteran told the AP, "There was lieutenant screaming like a madman, fire on everything, kill 'em all. .... Kids, there was kids out there, it didn't matter what it was, eight to eighty, blind, crippled or crazy, they shot them all." Another ex-soldier was haunted by the memory of a terrified child: "She came running toward us. You should have seen guys trying to kill that little girl. With machine guns."

A reluctant Pentagon Inquiry into this Korean version of the Wounded Knee Massacre acknowledged that there was a civilian toll but cited very low figures for the dead and then dismissed it as "an unfortunate tragedy inherent in war," despite overwhelming evidence of a deliberate U.S. policy of bombing and strafing refugee columns. *The Bridge at No Gun Ri* (2001), by the three Pulitzer Prize-winning AP journalists, currently languishes at near 600,000 on the Amazon sales index.

Likewise there has been little enduring outrage that a confessed war criminal, Bob Kerrey, reigns as president of New York City's once liberal New School University. In 2001, the former Navy SEAL and ex-Senator from Nebraska was forced to concede, after years of lies, that the heroic engagement for which he received a Bronze Star in 1969 involved the massacre of a score of unarmed civilians, mainly women and children. "To describe it as an atrocity," he admitted, "is pretty close to being right."

The blue-collar ex-SEAL team member who revealed the truth about the killings at Than Phong under Kerrey's command was publicly excoriated as a drunk and traitor, while powerful Democrats -- led by Senators Max Cleland and John Kerry, both Vietnam veterans -- circled the wagons to protect Kerrey from further investigation or possible prosecution. They argued that it was wrong to "blame the warrior instead of the war" and called for a "healing process."

Indeed covering up American atrocities has proved a thoroughly bipartisan business. The Democrats, after all, are currently considering the bomber of Belgrade, General Wesley Clark, as their potential knight on a white horse. The Bush administration, meanwhile, blackmails governments everywhere with threats of aid cuts and trade sanctions unless they exempt U.S. troops from the jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court.

The United States, of course, has good reason to claim immunity from the very Nuremberg principles it helped establish in 1946-47. American Special Forces troops, for example, were most probably complicit in the massacres of hundreds of Taliban prisoners by Northern Alliance warlords several years ago. Moreover, "collateral damage" to civilians is part and parcel of the new white man's burden of "democratizing" the Middle East and making the world safe for Bechtel and Halliburton.

The Glantons thus still have their place in the scheme of Manifest Destiny, and the scalping parties that once howled in the wilderness of the Gila now threaten to range far and wide along the banks of the Euphrates and in the shadow of the Hindu Kush.

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<<http://www.nationinstitute.org/tomdispatch/index.mhtml?pid=1066>>

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# America's Ministry of Propaganda Exposed

Part One

By Gar Smith / The-Edge

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## A Strategy of Lies: How the White House Fed the Public a Steady Diet of Falsehoods

Colonel Sam Gardiner (USAF, Ret.) has identified 50 false news stories created and leaked by a secretive White House propaganda apparatus. Bush administration officials are probably having second thoughts about their decision to play hardball with former US Ambassador Joseph Wilson. Joe Wilson is a contender. When you play hardball with Joe, you better be prepared to deal with some serious rebound.

After Wilson wrote a critically timed *New York Times* essay exposing as false George W. Bush's claim that Iraq had purchased uranium from Niger, high officials in the White House contacted several Washington reporters and leaked the news that Wilson's wife was a CIA agent.

Wilson isn't waiting for George W. Bush to hand over the perp. In mid-October, the former ambassador began passing copies of an embarrassing internal report to reporters across the US. *The-Edge* has received copies of this document.

The 56-page investigation was assembled by USAF Colonel (Ret.) Sam Gardiner. "Truth from These Podia: Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations in Gulf II" identifies more than 50 stories about the Iraq war that were faked by government propaganda artists in a covert campaign to "market" the military invasion of Iraq.

Gardiner has credentials. He has taught at the National War College, the Air War College and the Naval Warfare College and was a visiting scholar at the Swedish Defense College.

According to Gardiner, "It was not bad intelligence" that led to the quagmire in Iraq, "It was an orchestrated effort [that] began before the war" that was **designed to mislead the public and the world**. Gardiner's research led him to conclude that the US and Britain had conspired at the highest levels to plant "stories of strategic influence" that were known to be false.

*The Times* of London described the \$200-million-plus US operation as a "meticulously planned strategy to persuade the public, the Congress, and the allies of the need to confront the threat from Saddam Hussein." The multimillion-dollar propaganda campaign run out of the White House and Defense Department was, in Gardiner's final assessment "irresponsible in parts" and "might have been illegal."

"Washington and London did not trust the peoples of their democracies to come to the right decisions," Gardiner explains. Consequently, "Truth became a casualty. When truth is a casualty, democracy receives collateral damage." For the first time in US history, "we allowed strategic psychological operations to become part of public affairs... [W]hat has happened is that information warfare, strategic influence, [and] strategic psychological operations pushed their way into the important process of informing the peoples of our two democracies."

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced plans to create an Office of Strategic Influence early in 2002. At the same time British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Strategy Director Alastair Campbell was setting up an identical operation in London. As soon as Pvt. Jessica Lynch was airlifted from her hospital bed, the first call from her "rescue team" went, not to military officials but to Jim Wilkinson, the White House's top propaganda official stationed in Iraq. White House critics were quick to recognize that "strategic influence" was a euphemism for disinformation. Rumsfeld had proposed establishing the country's first Ministry of Propaganda.

The criticism was so severe that the White House backed away from the plan. But on November 18, several months after the furor had died down, Rumsfeld arrogantly announced that he had not been deterred. "If you want to savage this thing, fine: I'll give you the corpse. There's the name. You can have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done -- and I have."

Gardiner's dogged research identified a long list of stories that passed through Rumsfeld's propaganda mill. According to Gardiner, "there were over 50 stories manufactured or at least engineered that distorted the picture of Gulf II for the American and British people." Those stories include:

- # The link between terrorism, Iraq and 9/11
- # Iraqi agents meeting with 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta
- # Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons.
- # Iraq's purchase of nuclear materials from Niger.
- # Saddam Hussein's development of nuclear weapons.
- # Aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons
- # The existence of Iraqi drones, WMD cluster bombs and Scud missiles.
- # Iraq's threat to target the US with cyber warfare attacks.
- # The rescue of Pvt. Jessica Lynch.
- # The surrender of a 5,000-man Iraqi brigade.
- # Iraq executing Coalition POWs.
- # Iraqi soldiers dressing in US and UK uniforms to commit atrocities.
- # The exact location of WMD facilities
- # WMDs moved to Syria.

Every one of these stories received extensive publicity and helped form indelible public impressions of the "enemy" and the progress of the invasion. Every one of these stories was false.

"I know what I am suggesting is serious. I did not come to these conclusions lightly," Gardiner admits. "I'm not going to address why they did it. That's something I don't understand even after all the research." But the fact remained that "very bright and even well-intentioned officials found how to control the process of governance in ways never before possible."

### **A Battle between Good and Evil**

Gardiner notes that cocked-up stories about Saddam's WMDs "was only a very small part of the strategic influence, information operations and marketing campaign conducted on both sides of the Atlantic." The "major thrust" of the campaign, Gardiner explains, was "to make a conflict with Iraq seem part of a struggle between good and evil. Terrorism is evil... we are the good guys.

"The second thrust is what propaganda theorists would call the 'big lie.' The plan was to connect Iraq with the 9/11 attacks. Make the American people believe that Saddam Hussein was behind those attacks."

The means for pushing the message involved: saturating the media with stories, 24/7; staying on message; staying ahead of the news cycle; managing expectations; and finally, being prepared to "use information to attack and punish critics."

### **Audition in Afghanistan**

The techniques that proved so successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom were first tried out during the campaign to build public support for the US attack on Afghanistan. Rumsfeld hired Rendon Associates, a private PR firm that had been deeply involved in the first Gulf War. Founder John Rendon (who calls himself an "information warrior") proudly boasts that he was the one responsible for providing thousands of US flags for the Kuwaiti people to wave at TV cameras after their "liberation" from Iraqi troops in 1991.

The White House Coalition Information Center was set up by Karen Hughes in November 2001. (In January 2003, the CIC was renamed the Office for Global Communications.) The CIC hit on a cynical plan to curry favor for its attack on Afghanistan

by highlighting "the plight of women in Afghanistan." CIC's Jim Wilkinson later called the Afghan women campaign "the best thing we've done."

Gardiner is quick with a correction. The campaign "was not about something they did. It was about a story they created... It was not a program with specific steps or funding to improve the conditions of women."

The coordination between the propaganda engines of Washington and London even involved the respective First Wives. On November 17, 2001, Laura Bush issued a shocking statement: "Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail polish." Three days later, a horrified Cherie Blaire told the London media, "In Afghanistan, if you wear nail polish, you could have your nails torn out."

### **Misleading via Innuendo**

Time and again, US reporters accepted the CIC news leaks without question. Among the many examples that Gardiner documented was the use of the "anthrax scare" to promote the administration's pre-existing plan to attack Iraq.

In both the US and the UK, "intelligence sources" provided a steady diet of unsourced allegations to the media to suggest that Iraq and Al Qaeda terrorists were behind the deadly mailing of anthrax-laden letters. It wasn't until December 18, that the White House confessed that it was "increasingly looking like" the anthrax came from a US military installation. The news was released as a White House "paper" instead of as a more prominent White House "announcement." As a result, the idea that Iraq or Al Qaeda were behind the anthrax plot continued to persist. Gardiner believes this was an intentional part of the propaganda campaign. "If a story supports policy, even if incorrect, let it stay around."

In a successful propaganda campaign, Gardiner wrote, "We would have expected to see the creation [of] stories to sell the policy; we would have expected to see the same stories used on both sides of the Atlantic. We saw both. The number of engineered or false stories from US and UK stories is long."

### **The US and Britain: The Axis of Disinformation**

Before the coalition invasion began on March 20, 2003, Washington and London agreed to call their illegal pre-emptive military aggression an "armed conflict" and to always reference the Iraqi government as the "regime." Strategic communications managers in both capitols issued lists of "guidance" terms to be used in all official statements. London's 15 Psychological Operations Group paralleled Washington's Office of Global Communications.

In a departure from long military tradition, the perception managers even took over the naming of the war. Military code names were originally chosen for reasons of security. In modern US warfare, however, military code names have become "part of the marketing." There was Operation Nobel Eagle, Operation Valiant Strike, Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Uphold Democracy and, finally, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**The "Rescue" of Jessica Lynch** The Pentagon's control over the news surrounding the capture and rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch receives a good deal of attention in Gardiner's report. "From the very beginning it was called an 'ambush'," Gardiner noted. But, he pointed out, "If you drive a convoy into enemy lines, turn around and drive back, it's not an ambush. Military officers who are very careful about how they talk about operations would normally not be sloppy about describing this kind of event," Gardiner complained. "This un-military kind of talk is one of the reasons I began doing this research."

One of the things that struck Gardiner as revealing was the fact that, as Newsweek reported: "as soon as Lynch was in the air, [the Joint Operations Center] phoned Jim Wilkinson, the top civilian communications aide to CENTCOM Gen. Tommy Franks."

It struck Gardiner as inexplicable that the first call after Lynch's rescue would go to the Director of Strategic Communications, the White House's top representative on the ground.

On the morning of April 3, the Pentagon began leaking information on Lynch's rescue that sought to establish Lynch as "America's new Rambo." The Washington Post repeated the story it received from the Pentagon: that Lynch "sustained multiple gunshot wounds" and

fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldier... firing her weapon until she ran out of ammunition."

Lynch's family confused the issue by telling the press that their daughter had not sustained any bullet wounds. Lynch's parents subsequently refused to talk to the press, explaining that they had been "told not to talk about it." (Weeks later, the truth emerged. Lynch was neither stabbed nor shot. She was apparently injured while falling from her vehicle.)

Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers let the story stand during an April 3 press conference although both had been fully briefed on Lynch's true condition.

"Again, we see the pattern," Gardiner observed. "When the story on the street supports the message, it will be left there by a non-answer. The message is more important than the truth. Even Central Command kept the story alive by not giving out details."

Gardiner saw another break with procedure. The information on the rescue that was released to the Post "would have been very highly classified" and should have been closely guarded. Instead, it was used as a tool to market the war. "This was a major pattern from the beginning of the marketing campaign throughout the war," Gardiner wrote. "It was okay to release classified information if it supported the message."

## Part Two

### Transforming Language to Market the 'Big Lie'

#### Iraq's 'Terrorist Death Squads'

Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the UN General Assembly that Iraq possessed chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Was Mr. Powell merely advancing "stories of strategic influence"? ©Michael Gross / State Department photo To Gardiner, the "most serious transformation of language" involved Washington's directive to refer to Iraq's irregular troops as "terrorist death squads." The order apparently came down on March 25.

Renaming the Iraqi defenders "terrorists" appears to have been part of the strategic influence campaign since it served to connect the Iraqi fighters with "one of the major themes of Gulf II -- Iraq = terrorist = 9/11."

Gardiner stressed the role repetition plays in the "effective implementation of creating memory in a population" and observed that "this theme was successful by US opinion polls" that show a majority of US citizens now believe, in the absence of evidence, that Iraq "was connected" to 9/11.

**Ansar al-Salam** The propaganda artists selected a small Kurdish splinter group called Ansar al-Salam and elevated it into an organized group of Al Qaeda "terrorists" who were "said to be" controlled by Saddam Hussein and "believed to be" producing ricin, a deadly biotoxin. Since Ansar al-Salam was formed shortly after 9/11, "it was tied to bin Laden." Because a single source claimed to have seen Republican Guard officers in the region, "it was tied to Saddam Hussein." "This was part of the 'big lie' to tie Iraq to 9/11," Gardiner wrote. "The 'terrorist' connection took many other forms, many forms but the truth. I don't see evidenced they cherished the truth."

#### Operation TELIC

In the first days of the invasion, a US Marine Corps spokesman made a prophetic statement: "The first image of the war will define the conflict." The attempts to control those "first images" were of overriding interest to the coalition's ministries of propaganda. Because it was believed that the city of Basrah would quickly fall to the coalition troops, the "Battle of Basrah" was heavily scripted long before the first soldiers even entered Iraq.

Marines were given food packets to hand out to Basrah children. Journalists were to be bused to the newly captured city and TV crews were to be flown in to film the "liberated" citizens welcoming coalition soldiers with smiles and flowers. The UK had expected to lead the attack on Basrah but, over Blair's objections, the US insisted on giving this plum assignment to the US Marines. Gardiner's sources in Britain told him that the sole reason was

that the US "wanted to have their forces lead the victory into Basrah." When the residents of Basrah refused to be "liberated," the carefully planned media event evaporated in a hail of gunfire. "It was about image," Gardiner marvels. "So much effort and money on image."

### **Salman Pak**

In a widely publicized September 12, 2002 briefing paper entitled, "Decade of Deception," the White House described "a highly secret terrorist training facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations." "This facility became a major part of the strategic influence marketing effort," Gardiner writes. Yet, in the invasions aftermath, the Pentagon offered no "compelling evidence" that such a site existed.

In his February 3 presentation to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell flashed a photo of an Ansar al-Salam "poison factory" in northern Iraq. In September 3, seven months after Powell's presentation, an Los Angeles Times reporter managed to reach the "poison factory," which he described as "a small cinderblock building bearing brown granules and ammonia-like scents." When the Times had the material tested, the granules turned out to be a commercial rat poison.

### **US Lied about Attacks on Iraq's Power Grid**

Secretary Powell claimed that Iraq possessed mobile trucks designed to produce biological weapons. When invading forces located the trucks it turned out they were actually designed to produce hydrogen for surveillance balloons and Iraq had bought the trucks from the Britain. When the capital city of Baghdad was blacked out by a power failure during the April bombardment, Pentagon spokesperson Victoria "Tori" Clarke rushed to assure the world that "We did not have the power grid as a target. That was not us."

The facts would subsequently show that the US had targeted portions of the power grid. In the North, a special operations team staged an attack on the Hadithah Dam on April 1 or 2. Human Rights Watch documented at least two attacks on the power grid south of Baghdad "along Highway 6 [that] included a Tomahawk [missile] strike using carbon fibers." The use of a sophisticated carbon-fiber weapons is significant since the deployment of these specialized devices required prior approval from Washington.

### **Iraq's "Dirty Bomb"**

In June 2002, an Iraqi expatriate named Khidhir Manza told the Wall Street Journal that the situation was "ideal for countries like Iraq to train and support a terrorist operation using radiation weapons." Manza's interview with the Journal was arranged by the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqi exiles that was set up by the Rendon Group and supported financially by agencies of the US government. (See Weapons of Mass Deception, by John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton.) Helping to make Manza's charges more credible, unnamed intelligence officials earlier had told the International Herald Tribune that "they are kept awake at night by the prospect of a dirty bomb." Astute readers will note that these anonymous sources never actually said Iraq had a dirty bomb. It was all managed through suggestion and innuendo.

### **American's Heroic Hostage**

In an episode that recalled the creation of the "Old Shoe, the fictitious hero concocted by Robert deNiro's ace "perception manager" in the film "Wag the Dog," Washington's propaganda artists literally brought someone back from the dead.

Lt. Commander Scott Speicher had been shot down during the first Gulf War in 1991. In an attempt to generate sympathy and support for Bush's pre-emptive war, "intelligence sources" began circulating a bizarre new story to the US media. In what Gardiner called "a pattern typical of created stories," these unnamed sources started a rumor that Commander Speicher had not only survived but that he had somehow spent the past decade trapped in an Iraqi prison.

Iraqi officials vehemently denied that they were holding Speicher or, for that matter, any Americans. When asked about the Iraqi denial at a press conference, Rumsfeld's response was calculatingly oblique. "I don't believe much the regime puts out," Rumsfeld stated. In

Gardiner's estimation, Rumsfeld's answer "was too clever not to have been formulated to leave the impression that [Speicher] was alive." Gardiner was troubled by Rumsfeld's apparent disinterest in the truth but, as a former military officer, there was another question that bothered Gardiner even more. "Why didn't [Rumsfeld] consider what he was doing to Speicher's family?"

On January 11, 2001, Speicher's status was changed from KIA (Killed in Action) to MIA (Missing in Action). As the invasion forces gathered in the Middle East, Speicher's status was changed once more, to "captured." Navy officials who contacted ABC News reported that they had been pressured to make this change.

In January, "intelligence officials" continued to leak information to the media that suggested Speicher was still alive. In April, the secretive ministry of propaganda leaked a report that his initials had been found on the wall of a cell in Iraq. Gardiner found this leak particularly strange since "Military POW recovery personnel are very careful about releasing information that would cause false hope in families." The release of such information would also, obviously, endanger the captives.

Long after Baghdad fell and the media's attention had been drawn to the fruitless search for weapons of mass destruction, a reporter thought to ask Rumsfeld about America's lost hero. The secretary replied vaguely that there was "nothing turned up thus far that I could elaborate on that would be appropriate." On July 16, a Washington Times investigation belatedly concluded that there was "no evidence" Speicher had survived or had been held captive in Iraq.

### **Chemical Cluster Bombs**

On March 10, administration officials attempted to discredit Hans Blix and UNMOVIC, the UN weapons inspection program. Administration officials told the Boston Globe that "Blix did not give details... of the possible existence of a cluster bomb that could deliver deadly poisons." Presidential spokesperson Ari Fleischer claimed that the US was "aware of UNMOVIC's discovery of Iraqi production of munitions capable of dispensing both chemical and biological weapons." Videotape was released allegedly showing the Iraqis testing a cluster bomb for dispersing chemical weapons.

"The chemical cluster bomb story certainly didn't linger," Gardiner wrote. "It was around only a couple of days, but it still served its purpose at the time."

Few newspaper readers or TV watchers realized that there was never any evidence that Iraq had such technologically complex weapons. Indeed, the Pentagon had dismissed the possibility of Iraq ever developing these weapons during the first Gulf War. Iraq's Planned Computer Attack on America An alarming White House paper presented by Paul Wolfowitz before a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that Iraqi engineers were preparing a vast attack on the country's computer networks.

The warning came from a single source who claimed that Iraq's Intelligence Service was working with the Babylon Software Company to break into US computers, steal documents and spread viruses. There were no such attacks. There was no such program.

**Iraqi Troops in US Uniforms** On March 7, White House Deputy Director of Communications Jim Wilkinson, described as "a senior US official," released a story about Iraq's alleged acquisition of US and UK military uniforms "identical down to the last detail." Wilkinson claimed Iraqis in US camouflage were planning to commit battlefield atrocities to cast discredit on coalition troops.

On March 26, Pentagon spokesperson Victoria "Tori" Clarke embellished the story. Clarke told reporters that "we knew they were acquiring uniforms that looked like US and UK uniforms. And the reporting was ... [that Saddam Hussein would] give them to the thugs, as I call them, to go out, carry out reprisals against the Iraqi people, and try to blame it on coalition forces."

Two days later, Rumsfeld added a new twist, claiming that Saddam Hussein's troops planned to don UK and US uniforms "to try to fool regular Iraqi soldiers into surrendering to them and then execute them as an example for others." There were never any reports of Iraq attempting such stunts. In his report, Gardiner concludes: "The way it was put by Jim Wilkinson (a name that keeps appearing in these questionable stories), it seems to fit a pattern of pre-blaming Iraq. It has the feel of being a created story."

### **Iraq's Scud Missiles**

In the lead-up to the war, the British and American people were told repeatedly that Iraq had Scud missiles capable of striking Israel. When the invasion began, Iraq began to fire what the Pentagon called "Scud-type missiles." As Gardiner discovered, these rockets "were not Scuds and we have found no Scuds, but for three days they kept the story alive."

In October 2002, a CIA report determined that evidence for the existence of Iraqi Scuds was inconclusive. Nonetheless, by the time Colin Powell stepped up to the plate at the UN, the missiles had become an accepted fact as far as Washington, London and Tel Aviv were concerned. During the invasion, "American officials" told the New York Times that "the sheer tenacity of the Iraqi fight" near a compound at Al Qa'im had led them to believe that "the Iraqis might be defending Scud missiles" hidden at the site. Gardiner notes laconically: "No Scuds or WMDs were found at Al Qa'im."

### **Saddam's Remote-Controlled Drones**

The CIA's October report also claimed that Iraq had converted some J-29 jet fighters to deliver chemical and biological weapons. George W. Bush quickly seized on this specter for a speech in Cincinnati, where he told the astonished crowd that Saddam's poison-laden aircraft were capable of hitting US soil.

By the time Powell testified before the UN, the threat had been measurably pared down -- the fighter jets had become smaller, remotely piloted drones. Mr. Bush went public with the extraordinary claim that these tiny drones could strike the US. On June 15, an Air Force team in Iraq finally seized the drones. The Los Angeles Times described them as "five burned and blackened 9-foot-wings." The Air Force captain in charge of the inspection concluded that the drones could have been "a student project or maybe a model."

A subsequent investigation by the USAF determined that the drones' only possible mission was to take pictures.

## **Part Three**

### **Targeting Critics, Spreading Lies, and PSYOPS**

Protesters in Baghdad lie down in the path of US armored vehicles. The White House Office of Global Communication is not interested in distributing photos of ordinary Iraqi citizens nonviolently demonstrating against the US occupation. The tools of strategic influence were not only wielded against Saddam Hussein, they were also turned against foreign allies and domestic critics who dared to question Bush's agenda. The French were among the first to feel the sting of these attacks.

Sam Gardiner's report notes that the French were clearly "the focus of punishment in the strategic influence campaign." He has identified "at least eight times when false stories or engineered stories were aimed at them, the majority appearing after their lack of support in the UN for US and UK actions."

In September, government sources informed the New York Times that the French and German governments had provided Iraq with precision switches that could be used to produce nuclear weapons. The Times ran the story before discovering that the France and Germany had both, in fact, refused to provide the switches.

"American intelligence sources" told the Washington Post that the French possessed illegal strains of smallpox virus. Again, the story was false. The Washington Times received a tip from "US intelligence sources" that two companies in France had sold equipment to Saddam. The companies denied the charge and no evidence was ever provided to sustain the charge.

On April 9, Brig. Gen. Brooks told the media that his troops had discovered "an underground storage facility containing... Roland-type air defense missiles." Lt. Greg Holmes, an army intelligence officer, told Newsweek that US soldiers had found "51 Roland-2 missiles, made by a partnership of French and German arms manufacturers." Holmes also stated that at least one of the Roland missiles "was manufactured last year."

The story served to further defame the irascible French but, Gardiner writes with a touch of sarcasm, the story "was not very well put together" since it turned out that "the production line for the Roland-2 was shut down in 1993."

### **Punishing the French**

For the French, the War of the Leaks was just beginning. On May 6, "US intelligence officials" were quoted as telling the Washington Times that "an unknown number of Iraqis who worked for Saddam Hussein's government were given passports by French officials in Syria." The story was kept alive by a succession of press leaks attributed to "State Department and intelligence officials," and a bevy of "Administration officials."

On May 6, Fox News reported that "Paris had been colluding with Baghdad before and during the coalition invasion." On May 7, the Washington Times, citing reports from "US officials," claimed that "officials of the Saddam Hussein government... fled Iraq with French passports."

The French government angrily denied the allegations and accused Washington of running a "smear campaign." But when the press confronted Rumsfeld about these accusations, he "followed pattern." Instead of confirming or denying the charges against the French, he simply smiled and said, "I have nothing to add."

As Gardiner sees it, the intended effect of that kind of non-answer was that "he wanted people to believe the stories." This campaign of Francophobe fibbing eventually contaminated the White House press briefings. On May 14, a reporter asked White House press officer Scott McClellan about the stories accusing the French of selling Iraq arms and issuing passports to fleeing Iraqi officials. "Are those charges valid?" the reporter asked.

McClellan's response: "Well, I think that those are questions you can address to France."

Reporter: On that point, Scott, do you have any information that the French did, in fact, issue passports to people so that...."

McClellan: I think -- no, I think that's a question you need to address to France."

Reporter: Well, no. It's information the US claims to have.

McClellan: I don't have anything for you.

"The Secretary of Defense told us before the war he was going to do strategic influence," Gardiner notes wryly. "It appears as if the French were a target."

### **Targeting Domestic Critics: The Galloway Forgeries**

The White House claimed that these aluminum tubes were proof that Iraq was attempting to produce nuclear weapons. US intelligence agents knew the truth: the tubes were useless for nuclear processing. In Britain, Labor Member of Parliament George Galloway became an open skeptic of Tony Blair's rhetoric. In a bold attempt to avoid war, Galloway had gone to Iraq to interview Saddam Hussein in hopes of promoting a diplomatic resolution to the crisis.

Galloway's skepticism began to gnaw away at Bush-and-Blair's broad-brush claims that Hussein was only months away from building a nuclear bomb or that he was capable of launching a WMD attack within 45 minutes. Galloway soon found himself under attack. Government officials leaked a packet of supposedly "classified documents" to the Daily Telegraph. The papers, which were represented as having been seized from Iraq's Foreign Ministry, suggested MP Galloway had accepted "payoffs" from the Iraqi government.

At the same time, in the US, a "retired general" contacted the Christian Science Monitor on April 25, with similar documents showing that Hussein had given Galloway \$10 million.

Galloway's reputation was seriously sullied. It wasn't until June 20, that the Monitor disclosed that the "general's" incriminating documents were forged. The documents released in Britain also turned out to be forgeries.

### **The White Flag Incidents**

On March 24, Pentagon briefing officer Tori Clarke told reporters that "the Iraqi regime is engaged in other deadly deceptions. They are sending forces out carrying white surrender flags... The most serious violations of the laws of war."

There were only two alleged incidents cited to support this story. One appeared engineered and Gardiner now believes that the other incident was "fabricated to cover a very serious friendly-fire event." On March 23, a Marine unit came under artillery fire near Nasiriyah in southern Iraq soon after some Iraqi soldiers had surrendered. Gen. Abizaid, the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM called the surrender "a ruse" to draw the Marines into an ambush. Gardiner finds this difficult to believe since it was well known that "the Iraqi Army had trouble coordinating artillery fire at all."

The other "White Flag" incident was a widely reported tragedy in which Iraqi soldiers shot civilians who were trying to flee to safety under a white flag. But the Iraqi soldiers were also killed, Gardiner notes. Other white flag incidents were not mentioned by the Pentagon or Messrs. Bush and Blair. Gardiner recalls one "memorable picture of the war" that showed "British troops standing over two dead Iraqis in a foxhole: they had been holding up a white flag."

George W. Bush repeated the white flag story on April 5. By then, Bush should have been aware of the real cause of those Marine deaths. Gardiner reports that, according to the surviving Marines, nine of those killed "may have been killed by an A-10 [a US military aircraft] that made repeated passes attacking their position."

A report released in October indicates that these deaths were being investigated as a "friendly fire accident." At least one of the young Marines caught in the supposed Iraqi "ruse" was, in fact, killed by a round fired from an A-10 gun that hit him directly in the chest.

### **The Execution of Prisoners**

At a joint news conference with Mr. Bush at Camp David on March 27, British PM Tony Blair informed the media that the Iraqis had executed two British prisoners. "If anyone needs any further evidence of the depravity" of Hussein's reign, Blair suggested, this was it. Unfortunately, further evidence was exactly what Blair lacked. The very next day the sister of one of the dead soldiers told the Daily Mirror that her brother's colonel "told us he was not executed. We just can't understand why people are lying."

Pentagon spokesperson Victoria Clarke also told reporters that the Iraqis had killed "Americans who had either surrendered or were attempting to surrender." This report turned out to be "unconfirmed." A week after the British press had attacked the "executions" story as a total fabrication, and Blair's press spokesperson had been forced to admit that there was no "absolute evidence" to support the story, George W. Bush told the American Forces Press Service: "They have executed prisoners of war." Bush repeated the falsehood on April 5 and Rumsfeld echoed the lie on April 7.

The US press attempted to catch up to their British counterparts by questioning Rumsfeld on April 7. As usual, Rumsfeld's defense was the non-answer.

Reporter: Mr. Secretary, you stated flatly that American POWs have been executed. On what basis do you make that statement?

Rumsfeld: I think I said they have executed prisoners of war.

Reporter: Are you saying that there have not been American prisoners executed then?

Rumsfeld: I'm not saying that either. There may very well have been, but I'm not announcing that, if that's what you're asking... We do know that they executed a lot of prisoners of war over the years."

### **The Shula District Bombing**

On March 29, an explosion in an open-air market in Baghdad's Shula District killed more than 50 Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi government condemned the attack and blamed it on

coalition bombers. US military spokespersons tried to turn the blame back on Iraq, suggesting that the civilians were killed by Iraqi artillery or anti-aircraft rockets that went awry. British journalist Robert Fisk reached the site soon after the massacre and uncovered a 30-centimeter shard of shrapnel that showed the serial number of the weapon that caused the massacre. It was a HARM missile built by the US military contractor Raytheon.

On April 3, CENTCOM issued a new story claiming to have received "reliable information" that the Hussein regime was planning to bomb Shiite Muslim neighborhoods in Baghdad so that it could blame the damage on the US-UK coalition.

"The CENTCOM cover story came from Jim Wilkinson," Gardiner discovered. The British, however, refused to support this argument. They continued to claim (rightly, it now appeared) that no British bombs had caused the death and devastation in the Shula District.

### **PSYOPS -- The Darkest Face of Deception**

"Strategic influence is aimed at international audiences (and maybe domestic audiences)," Gardiner explains, while PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) "are targeted at the bad guys." The disturbing thing about this war, Gardiner found, was that "PSYOPS became a major part of the relationship between the governments of the US and the UK and the free press."

The record reveals how the Pentagon, State Department and White House all relied on PSYOPS techniques to manipulate the media as a psychological weapon against the Iraqis. When Rumsfeld declared that "The days of Saddam Hussein are numbered," that the "regime is starting to lose control of their country," and that "The outcome is clear. The regime of Saddam Hussein is gone. It's over," he was really using the US media to send a message to the people in Iraq.

On March 24, British Air Marshall Brian Burridge told the press that the old regime was "crumbling" and encouraged Saddam's opponents to "develop greater levels of courage" and rise up against the dictator. There was no better example of PSYOPS "distorting the free press with false information," Gardiner claims, than the alleged surrender of Iraq's 51st Division.

On March 21, Reuters (citing "defense officials, who asked not to be identified") reported the stunning news that an entire Iraqi division had surrendered en masse to US Marines in southern Iraq. CBS News followed with a report the next day claiming that "an entire division of the Iraqi army, numbering 8,000 soldiers, surrendered to coalition forces." CBS's source: unnamed "Pentagon officials."

The surrender of the 51st became a major news story that truly seemed to confirm the Pentagon's predictions of a quick and easy victory. "It was told as if it were a truth," Gardiner writes. "It was told on both sides of the Atlantic. It had been coordinated. It was not true." The story was intended to break the fighting will of the Iraqi army. On March 23, reporters from Agence France-Presse and Al-Jazeera TV managed to reach Col. Khaled al-Hashemi, the commander of the 51st. He replied in no uncertain terms that he not only had not surrendered but he would remain in Basrah and "continue to defend the people."

The surrender of an entire division would have been a powerful blow to the will of the Iraqi army. The perception managers knew this. It is clear to Gardiner that this story "was not an intelligence failure. You would know if you have an entire division" suddenly surrendering. The story was a PSYOPS hoax.

Other PSYOPS hoaxes were to follow. Stories were leaked that Hussein had made secret plans to spirit his family out of Iraq to safety. It was rumored that Hussein had deposited \$3.5 billion in Libyan banks.

## **Part Four**

### **Black Programs and the Future of Propaganda**

Gardiner claims that the Pentagon was behind the creation of the "EmpowerPeace" website. Gardiner says the site was pulled because it violated US laws against domestic propaganda but the site can still be found on the Web

(<http://www.empowerpeace.org>). The-Edge has invited EmpowerPeace to respond to Gardiner's assertions. The bogus "surrender" of Iraq's 51st division raised a "profound question" for Gardiner: "If we would manipulate truth, would we also manipulate evidence? That would be very serious. Is that what the Secretary of Defense meant when he said he was going to be doing strategic influence?"

Milt Bearden, a former CIA manager for clandestine operations has a related question: "It will be important to learn who was behind the fake Niger document [alleging Iraq's attempt to obtain uranium ore] and why and what other information driving American policies might carry their fingerprints."

The falsehoods about Iraq's alleged attempt to purchase African uranium turned out to be based on a forged document. Gardiner wonders why no one in the administration is asking who forged the document? Who stood to gain from this unconscionable act of "creating evidence"? Gardiner believes that the American people have "a need to know."

Another probable "black program" identified by Gardiner involved the planting of a false story that Saddam Hussein had taken refuge in the Russian Embassy in Baghdad. The story served to slime the Russians, who had refused to back Bush's pre-emptive invasion.

In the oddest example of perception management, Pentagon media masters actually created a website to promote world peace. The "EmpowerPeace" website appeared to represent a citizen's anti-war movement. The goal seemed to be to foster the impression that the US people (and especially US children) were essentially peace-loving. "It looked like a grassroots effort," Gardiner recalls. "It seems to have been aimed at the Arab audience set."

The EmpowerPeace website didn't last long. The reason, Gardiner suspects, is that its creation probably violated the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which bans the domestic dissemination of government propaganda. Gardiner found another "strange website" called "The Iraq Crisis Bulletin," which offered daily updates and reports from around the world. The site was recommended by the American Press Institute but there was "absolutely no indication of the sponsor of the site." With a little research, Gardiner discovered that "the articles were [written] by Voice of America correspondents."

The problem with this, Gardiner notes, is that "the Voice of America is prohibited from doing communications for the American press. But, during Gulf II, it was getting the message to them." The VOA refused to respond to Gardiner's requests for information on "The Iraq Crisis Bulletin."

### **Collateral Damage**

Mapping the Ministry of Propaganda, a historic merging of politics, militarism and public "perception management." The Coalition Information Center with offices in the London, Islamabad and the White House started work in mid-2002 (six months before it was officially authorized by an Executive Order). In 2003, the CIC morphed into the Office of Global Communications, staffed by Tucker Eskew, Dan Bartlett, Jeff Jones, Peter Reid. The OGC works closely with the White House Iraq Group, which consists of Karl Rove, Condi Rice, Jim Wilkinson, Stephen Hadley, Scooter Libby, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, and Nicholas Callo. Gardiner wraps up his 56-page investigation with a series of charts that assess several Defense Department press briefings to determine the role played by PSYOPS, false or engineered information, and non-informative responses. His conclusion: "Even if you give them slack for not giving any information, it turns out that more than half the answers were not truth... Maybe a better way to say it would be that if an American (or Brit) were diligent about wanting to understand the war, he could not rely on the statements made by the US Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Perhaps the penultimate example of the non-responsive response came in an April 7 DOD press briefing when General Myers was asked about the status of the chemical missile unit cited by Secretary Powell during his UN testimony. Powell had told the world that Iraq had outfitted a group of rockets on the outskirts of Baghdad with warheads filled with WMD and was prepared to fire them at a moment's notice. According to Gardiner, Myers "was very evasive, saying that he did not recall ever having heard about such a unit."

### **The Future: The OGC, the Roadmap and 'Strategic Fusion'**

Perception management (the art of propaganda, misdirection and lies, if you will) is no longer discreetly hidden away in some dark wing of the intelligence or defense establishments: It has become firmly enshrined right down the hall from the Oval Office. The Office of Global Communications (OGC) is centered in the White House. If there is a Ministry of Propaganda in the Bush administration, the OGC is it. As Gardiner notes: "The White House is at the center of the strategic communications process."

The OGC has two components: One committee deals with conducting the perception of the war on terrorism while a second committee concentrates on "more general" propaganda projects. According to the Times of London, the exact dispensation of the OGC's \$200 million operating budget is largely a mystery. It is known that the OGC spent \$250,000 on its military pressroom in Doha.

Gardiner discovered that "at times there were as many as three Brits associated with the Office of Global Communications. These assets were networked. To insure the military would be a willing part of the network, three people from the White House Office of Global Communications were sent to work with Central Command. Jim Wilkinson became General Franks' Director of Strategic Communications.

"The war was handled like a political campaign. Everyone in the message business was from the political communications community. In London, there was a parallel organization and a parallel coordination process. They kept the coordination with secure video teleconferences." The system worked well but, as John Rendon revealed at a London conference on July 3, there was still room for improvement. Rendon told his fellow conferees that the idea of using "embedded journalists" was quite successful and worked just as they hoped it would from tests they had run to gauge how reporters would perform once they bonded with the soldiers in their assigned units.

One of the mistakes, Rendon said, was that while they had taken command of the story, they had "lost control of the context." The problem was the veteran newsmen in the networks: they had "too much control of context," Rendon complained. "That has to be fixed for the next war," Rendon declared.

At the same conference, Captain Gerald Mauer, the Joint Staff Assistant Deputy Director for Information Operations, observed that public diplomacy and public affairs are slowly morphing into a single combined information operation. Mauer envisions a Strategic Fusion Center that "brings everything together." The Pentagon is already hard at work crafting an Information Operations Roadmap.

Mauer also told his fellow perception managers that "We hope to make more use of Hollywood and Madison Avenue in the future." The overall goal remains the same Mauer explained: to allow the men who now control Washington to "disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial... decision-making."

Gardiner finds that the future envisioned by Rendon and Mauer is fundamentally "frightening." The phrase "adversarial... decision-making will be disrupted" reportedly was added by Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. What it means, Gardiner warns, is that "we will even go after friends if they are against what we are doing or want to do." Criticism, questioning and debate are now defined as "adversarial" and the new watchword out of Washington is: "If you don't agree with us, you could be the target of an information attack." The new reality is that "punishment of those who disagree is a dimension of the strategy."

"If the democracies of the United States and the United Kingdom are based upon informed, open debate of the issues," Gardiner states, "we've got some fixing to do. "It's not enough to look at the arguments about weapons of mass destruction before the war," Gardiner argues. "There needs to be an inquiry of the broader question of how spin got to be more important than substance. What roles did information operations and strategic psychological operations play in the war" What controls need to be placed on information operations?"

### **Solutions Are Needed to Control Information Warfare**

Sam Gardiner has become the Paul Revere of our generation. He has raised a cry: It is no longer "The Redcoats are coming!" but "The PSYOPS are coming!" "We need a major investigation," Gardiner insists. "We need restrictions on which parts of the government can

do information operations. We should not do information operations against friends. We have to get this back in control."

One remedy is the Smith-Mundt Act, which was created in the aftermath of WWII with the intent of protecting American citizens from brainwashing by covert government propaganda campaigns. Unfortunately, Gardiner has discovered, the Smith-Mundt Act "no longer works." We became collateral damage, a target group of messages intended for other groups."

Gardiner's findings have not yet received due attention from the US media and with good cause. Gardiner's investigation revealed that the mainstream media not only failed to stand up to the government and insist on the truth, they all too often submitted in complicit cooperation with the government. Even in peacetime, the corporate media is an "embedded" media. Gardiner has some hard questions for America's press barons:

- # "How was it that the Washington Post took classified information on
- # the Jessica Lynch story and published it just the way the individual
- # leaking it in the Pentagon wanted?"
- # "Why did the New York Times let itself be used by 'intelligence
- # officials' on stories?"
- # "Why did the Washington Times never seem to question a leak they were
- # given?"
- # "Why were newspapers in the UK better than those in the US in raising
- # questions before and during the war?"

Since releasing his study, Gardiner has had the opportunity to talk with many people in the print media. While many have appeared "quite interested" in his findings, Gardiner admits that he has "not heard any self-criticism from reporters to whom I have talked." In conversations with TV producers and reporters, Gardiner found the prevailing reaction was that "the whole story is just too complex to tell." Gardiner's most disheartening reaction came during a presentation at "a major Washington think tank." Most of the Washington veterans in the audience kept asking, "So, what's new?" And when Gardiner opined that there was "no passion for truth in those who were taking us to war," he distinctly heard callous laughter breaking out among his listeners.

It is the sound of that brittle laughter that keeps Sam Gardiner going. Things must be changed. The dragons of information warfare must be slain. As Gardiner says: "I pain for our democratic process when I find individuals not angered at being deceived."

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<<http://www.envirosagainstar.org>>

Sam Gardiner's complete report is available online in six PDF files at :  
<<http://www.indybay.org/news/2003/10/1653148.php>> He may be reached at: <[SamGard@aol.com](mailto:SamGard@aol.com)>

For more information on the Bush administration's use of propaganda to misinform the public and promote wars of domination, see Weapons of Mass Deception, by John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton and visit the website of PRWatch:

<<http://www.prwatch.org/books/wmd.html>>  
<<http://www.earthisland.org/project/newsPage2.cfm?newsID=491&pageID=177&subSiteID=44>>

Sam Gardiner's text appears to be here, linked from the usnews.com article:

[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_1.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_1.pdf)  
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_2.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_2.pdf)  
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_3.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_3.pdf)  
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_4.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_4.pdf)  
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_5.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_5.pdf)  
[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_6.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_6.pdf)

Sam Gardiner speculates that various stories in the media originated in what was to be called the Office of Strategic Influence. Here is an article from FAIR noting that Rumsfeld stated that while the Office of Strategic Influence was killed in name, its activities were going to be carried out:  
<<http://www.fair.org/press-releases/osi-followup.html>>

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**HOW ZIONISTS ARE FRIGHTENED BY THE SPREADING OF  
HOLOCAUST REVISIONISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST:**

**The Socio-historical Background of Holocaust  
Denial in Arab Countries: Arab reactions to Roger  
Garaudy's *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics***

By Goetz Nordbruch

For The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (A dying institution, probably running short of money, specialized in pseudo-scholarly Zionist propaganda)

**Roger Garaudy and Holocaust Denial in the Arab Media**

Six million Jews dead? No way, they were much fewer. Let's stop with this fairytale exploited by Israel to capture international solidarity. (*La Repubblica*, 24 March 2000)

This comment by Ikrima Said Sabri, the Palestinian Authority-appointed imam of the al-Aqsa mosque and Mufti of Jerusalem, is the anticipated harsh response to the Vatican document "We Remember," that asked forgiveness for actions committed by Roman Catholics during the Holocaust. In addition, French President Jacques Chirac's plea for forgiveness for French collaboration in the persecution and extermination of Jews during World War II, and statements made by the Pope during his visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in spring 2000, sparked negative reactions in the Arab media. Somewhat earlier, countless articles and comments in the Arab media on Roger Garaudy's *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics* (1996) depict the Holocaust as a "Zionist myth" or "Zionist lie" which has become a central issue in contemporary Arab political-historical discourse. While some journalists and academics (Hazem Saghiyeh and Azmi Bishara, for example) demand recognition of the Holocaust as an extraordinary crime against humanity, opponents of any concession to the Jewish or Israeli collective memory remain numerous and prominent. [1]

Well-documented studies have shown that Holocaust denial can be found in the majority of Arabic newspapers, but detailed surveys of the social and historical background of this phenomenon are still missing. Even though Holocaust denial (as with anti-Jewish stereotypes in articles and caricature) is identified as a manifestation of antisemitism, it is usually ascribed as merely an element of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, an instrument for delegitimizing the Israeli state. [2] Bernard Lewis, who has studied different facets of antisemitism in Arab countries, concludes that "[i]f mainstream Arab leaders can bring themselves to follow the example of Sadat and enter into a dialogue with Israel...then it is possible that the anti-semitic campaign will fade away, and be confined, as in the modern West, to fringe groups and fringe regimes." [3]

My aim is to reconsider this assumption. Given the presence and vigor of Holocaust negation in reactions to *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics*, and the wide range of voices from different religious and political spectra articulated within this debate, I will use this controversy as an example of different patterns of reception within the Arab political-historical discourse. [4] Contextualizing Holocaust denial within a wider framework of ideological and historical developments, the phenomenon appears as a specific expression of a cultural pattern of antisemitic thought. Far from being simply an arbitrary import from European antisemitism, the ideological basis for the adoption of European stereotypes into Arab societies should be scrutinized. The negation and questioning of German crimes against the European Jews — expressed within the context of the contemporary Arab-Israeli conflict— should thus be explained as a “most modern form of anti-Semitism.” [5] Hence, without neglecting the importance of the specific political conflict in which these articles are articulated, I will stress the historical formation of underlying thought patterns and ideological concepts in order to understand the attraction of Holocaust denial in Arab public discourse on Garaudy’s book.

Soon after the release of *The Founding Myths*, Arab newspapers published interviews with the author and reports on the charge of antisemitic incitement he was facing in the French courts. [6] His enormous popularity in the Arab countries obviously contributed to the intensive debate triggered by his book. In view of the numerous translations of his earlier writings about Marxism and Islam, it was only a question of time before Arab editors would find interest in his latest work. [7] In France, a first edition of *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics* was produced in French and distributed in late 1995 for subscribers of the French publishing house La Vieille Taupe. With extensive chapters about an alleged Holocaust myth and comparisons of Nazism and Zionism, Garaudy openly referred to Robert Faurisson and David Irving and their Holocaust denying publications. The beginning public controversy and the report to the police in January 1996 on his call for incitement forced him to rearrange for the already-envisioned second edition. Published as samizdat at his own expense, a slightly revised edition was released in spring 1996. Despite efforts by him and his lawyers to present his theses as directed against Zionism as a political movement, and not against Jews or Judaism as a religion, in February 1998 a Paris court ruled against him. Garaudy’s book questioned the number of Jewish victims during the Holocaust, and argued that there was no extermination policy as such, and therefore the court found his book to be in violation of the Gayssot Law, under which Holocaust denial and antisemitic incitement is a punishable offence.

Despite his obvious turn to the French extreme Right, the favorable reaction to Garaudy in Arabic newspapers and magazines was overwhelming. [8] Garaudy was invited to the Cairo International Book Fair in 1998, and during his visits to the Middle East, gained widespread public support and funding for his legal case, peaking in the weeks before the French court delivered its verdict. A number of Arabic translations of his book were offered by publishers such as Dar ash-Shuruq in Cairo and Beirut, and Dar al-Kitab in Damascus. [9] Protest letters on his behalf were written by the Palestinian Writers Association, the Arab Lawyers Federation, and other organizations. Well-known politicians and intellectuals, such as Shaykh Muhammad Al-Tantauwi of the al-Azhar University, former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, Egyptian author and Nobel laureate Nadjib Mahfus, and historian Muhammad Hassanin Haikal publicly commented in his favor. None of these figures questioned Garaudy’s claim that the Holocaust was a Zionist invention.

### **The “Holocaust Myth”: Turning Victims into Perpetrators**

A particular focus of the Arab media is Garaudy’s revisionist view of the history of Nazism. [10] The discussion centers on the historical roots of antisemitism in Germany and Europe, and charges that the Zionists collaborated with the Nazi anti-Jewish policy, and questions the existence of gas chambers, and claims that Israel invented the Holocaust in order to justify its occupation of Arab land.

### Origins of Antisemitism: Non-Jews reacting to Jews

Since many Arab authors believe that the Holocaust is used by Zionists as the primary argument for the legitimacy of the Jewish state, their writings therefore seek to explain the historical origins of anti-Jewish aggression in European societies, and go on to blame the Jews themselves for their being rejected and excluded from these societies. Hasan 'Alam, for example, writes of the "cancerous" spread of Zionism, which sparked riots and pogroms in nineteenth-century Europe against the "separatist" Jews. 'Alam suggests that the "defensive measures" taken by non-Jews were merely a response to the Jewish threat (al-Yassar, June 1998). Muhammad Ibrahim al-Fiyumi is quoted in a debate as speaking of the "hostility of Semites toward Western civilization" in al-Liwa' al-Islami (13 June 1996). Muhammad Barakat described the beginnings of the antisemitic movement in Germany founded by Wilhelm Marr in the 1870s in "Are you an antisemite?" He concluded that the Jewish war profiteers of the Franco-German war of 1871 contributed to the expansion of the movement of political antisemitism (al-Watan al-'Arabi, 23 January 1998).

In his extensive monograph about the Garaudy case, Saleh Zahr ad-Din also traces anti-Jewish measures to a Jewish threat. Among other things, he claims that the late nineteenth-century pogroms in Russia resulted from the assassination attempts against Tsar Alexander II, "which not only rendered impossible any further integration [of the Jews] but also brought antisemitism to the surface." (Zahr ad-Din, Background, 85). Zahr ad-Din also looked at the causes of the Reichskristallnacht pogroms of November 1938, and accepts the claim of Nazi propagandists that the disturbances were the result of the assassination in Paris of the German diplomat vom Rath by the Polish Jew Hershel Grynszpan (Zahr ad-Din, Background, 124).

One further example comes from the writings of Mahmud Fauzi, who speaks of a Jewish "declaration of war" on Germany, referring to Chaim Weizman's 1939 letter to the British prime minister, in which he expressed his support for Great Britain and democracy in their confrontation with Germany. [11] Fauzi concludes: "Naturally, the reaction of the Germans to the declaration of war by this people [the Jews] was the internment of the German Jews in concentration camps. The same thing happened to the American citizens of Japanese origin when America entered the war against Japan" (Fauzi, Garaudy, 100).

### Zionism as Nazism

Numerous articles in the Arab press link Zionism and Nazism. Because of supposedly similar ideological components, as well as historical connections with Nazism, Zionism is depicted as a racist colonial movement. This derives, in part, from perceived similarities between the Zionist definition of who is a Jew, and the Nazi definition of the Volk. 'Abd al-'Aziz Mauwafi (al-'Arabi, vol. 460 [1997]) sees an affinity in the "idea of purity of blood" as a fundamental trait of both. Zahr ad-Din (Background, 82) speaks of Zionism "as a spiritual heir of Nazism" while Radjab al-Bana, editor-in-chief of the Egyptian weekly *Uktubar* claims that "Judaism is the origin, the mother and pattern of all kinds of racism seen in the world" (*Uktubar*, 17 January 1998); Zionist crimes are said to top those of the Nazis.

Claims of Nazi-Zionist collaboration are made based on quotes from various Zionist representatives without taking into account the broader historical context in which such statements appeared. Thus, any of the negotiations of Jewish leaders with the Nazis is labelled "collaboration." To give only one example, a letter of the Zionist Association for Germany (ZVfG) written in June 1933 is without reservation viewed as an authentic expression of approval for the Nazi seizure of power (see al-Musawwar, 16 January 1998) . [12]

Another "proof" of Zionist-Nazi collaboration is offered by 'Anan Bardji and Fathi 'Amar, who quote from Alfred Rosenberg's *The Track of the Jews in Changing Times* (1919) to

show that the enforced emigration of German Jews to Palestine was a central aim of the Nazi movement (al-Mauqif, vol. 127 [1998]; al-'Arabi 19 January 1998). Thus, Rosenberg's writings of the 1920s, reflecting the aggressive antisemitism of the *völkische Bewegung*, is presented as the basis for Nazi-Zionist cooperation.

The character and aims of Nazism are further distorted in references to the "Haavara" agreement of August 1933 which permitted a number of German Jews to emigrate to Palestine. Zahr ad-Din calls the German Ministry of Economic Affairs (which organized the necessary financial transfers) the "backbone of Zionism" (Zahr ad-Din, Background, 107). Sharif ash-Shubashi and Ahmad 'Abd al-Ma'ata Hidjazi present the Zionists as unscrupulous in their pursuit of Jewish emigration (al-Ahram, 9 May 1996, al-Ahram, 16 October 1996), and like many authors, ignore the Nazi interest in "cleansing" Germany of its Jews, and the bypassing of the international economic sanctions on Germany.

Jews themselves are said to be responsible for the persecution and deportations. The Hungarian Zionist leader, Rudolph Kasztner, in an ill-fated attempt to get Jews released from concentration camps, is accused of "maintaining law and order in these camps out of which hundreds of thousands were deported to the gas chambers of Auschwitz" (Zahr ad-Din, Background, 124; with comparable stories in al-Wafd, 22 January 1998, ash-Shahid, vol. 151[1998]). Similarly, 'Abd as-Subur Marzuq concluded that "Zionist leaders played an important role in supporting the Nazi security service. The Jews could even gain supremacy during World War II" (al-Liwa' al-Islami, 13 October 1996).

Garaudy's arguments are adopted and extended when discussing the "Nazi" elements of Israeli politics. The Oslo agreement, for example, is depicted as mirroring the contract made by Adolf Hitler and France's Marshal Pétain that defined the status of occupied France (al-Ahram, 19 October 1996). Another article, in ash-Shahid, states that "place and time alone differ between Auschwitz and the Zionist camps in Palestine" (vol. 151 [1998]). George Sa'ad referred to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as another Reichskristallnacht (al-Tariq, vol. 5 [1996]), and Zahr ad-Din's book alludes to German terms like Judenfrage (the "Jewish Question," Background, 110), and Hasan Radjab cites a common charge that "the Palestinian people are the true victim of the Nazis" (al-Akhbar, 6 February 1998).

The Egyptian academic, 'Abd al-Wahab al-Missiri, well-known for his writings on the history of Zionism, also authored one of the first more comprehensive works in Arabic on National Socialist ideology. In *Zionism, Nazism, and the End of History* (1997), he attempts to prove the common ideological origins of Zionism and Nazism. [13] He criticized Garaudy for his "journalistic" research, doesn't share Garaudy's doubts about the existence of the gas chambers, nor is he outspokenly in agreement with Garaudy's minimizing of the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, al-Missiri joined the campaign to support Garaudy and edited a volume on various aspects of the controversy. [14]

Al-Missiri claims that the Holocaust can be understood as the inevitable consequence of modern Western thought, with its secularization and decline of values. Citing Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Zygmunt Bauman, al-Missiri depicts Western societies as a "civilization of extermination" (al-Djadid fi-l-'Alam al-Kutub wa-l-Maktabat, Winter 1997). Modernity, with its reverence for the human person, its claim of "objectivity" in science, and its neglect of God and religious values, is the source of Western destructiveness. Al-Missiri criticizes the denial of the Holocaust found in the Arab-Islamic world, for it prevents one from assessing the true danger of either Nazism or Zionism, and the impact of Western thought. Despite his acceptance that the anti-Jewish persecution and extermination did take place, al-Missiri's thesis represents a distorted and banal understanding of both Zionism and Nazism.

In addition, al-Missiri attempts to demonstrate a Western anti-Muslim bias. In the concentration camps, inmates who had lost all hope and became passive unto death were called *Muselmänner* (Muslims). Although a number of Holocaust historians have noted that

this designation reflects a European misunderstanding of the little-known Islamic culture, al-Missiri sees in it a clear anti-Muslim bias and says that the Jews were really “substitute Muslims” — ultimately, the “real” intended enemy and victims. [15]

To sum up, Zionist pressure to foster Jewish emigration to Palestine is claimed to be the driving force for the formulation and enforcement of anti-Jewish measures in Europe, thus reversing cause and effect. Responsibility for the extermination of European Jewry is shifted from the Nazis to the Zionists.

### **Denying the Holocaust**

Not surprisingly, articles denouncing Zionism as Nazism often include Holocaust denial as well. Besides pointing to “classic” revisionist writers such as Robert Faurisson, Paul Rassinier, and Henri Roques, who are quoted in Garaudy’s *Founding Myths*, one finds references to the writings of David Irving and others. Through questioning the existence of the gas chambers, minimizing the number of Jewish victims, and pointing to the thousands of non-Jewish victims, readers are led to doubt whether there was any specific antisemitic policy of extermination.

It is claimed that it was technically impossible to operate the gas chambers as such, and that they were merely crematoria and disinfection sites (*ash-Sha’ab*, 24 March 1998, *al-Ahram*, 20 May 1996, *al-Akhbar*, 14 July 1998). Noting that Garaudy stated there were no gas chambers in Dachau, Hilmi an-Namnam and others take this as evidence that no gas chambers existed anywhere (*al-Musawwar*, 16 January 1998, *al-Wafd*, 22 January 1998).

Accusations that the Zionists have magnified the number of Jewish victims follows Garaudy’s mixing up of the estimated number of victims in Auschwitz compared to or added to those of other concentration and death camps. Baha Tahir, for example, distorts the known statistics in order to “expose the lie” and cites the downward revision of the number of victims killed in Auschwitz (Tahir, 1996); and Sharif ash-Shubashi bases his articles on a claim that only three to four million Jews lived in Europe during the 1940s (*al-Ahram*, 12 May 1996; see also *al-Madjalla*, 1 March 1998, *ash-Sha’ab*, 24 March 1998). And by citing other victims of World War II, including Germans killed, several authors thereby diminish the importance of the Jewish victims (*al-Ahram*, 9 May 1996, *al-Ahram*, 4 April 1998, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 23 January 1998).

Even the use of the term “Holocaust” is questioned, particularly when denying the intent of the complete extermination of the Jews. Zahr ad-Din, for example, wrote that “this lie [of intending to murder all the Jews, G.N.] was unmasked by Americans after the arrest of a great number of black marketeers in Germany and Austria proved to be Polish Jews” (Zahr ad-Din, Background, 143).

In this false historiography of the Holocaust, the crimes of the Nazi era are viewed only as general “crimes against humanity” with no acknowledgement of the importance of the specifically anti-Jewish components within the National Socialist ideology and policy.

### **Instrumentalization of the Holocaust**

Revision of Holocaust historiography is the central aim of a number of writers, some of whom suggest that “genuine” historical research is banned. The French Loi Gayssot, under which Garaudy was tried and sentenced, is identified as a Zionist attempt to consolidate the “founding myth of Israeli politics.” The Holocaust is depicted as a manipulative forgery that was used to bring about the Israeli state and justify the politics of occupation.

In many articles, well-known revisionists like Henri Roques, Wilhelm Stäglich, and Gerd Honsik are presented as respectable historians and are cited as challenging the “forgeries of National Socialist history.” They are often prosecuted under the laws of their

countries, because “denying historical facts about the massacre of the Jews is more dangerous than an accusation of premeditated murder” (*al-Madjalla*, 25 January 1998). In the words of Ahmed Rami (who was himself sentenced in Sweden for racist incitement), this has led to the imprisonment of “hundreds of Germans as political detainees” (*ash-Sha’ab*, 24 March 1998). Rami clearly supports the European extreme Right, and popular columnists like Fahmi Huwaidi do not hesitate to cite representatives of the völkisch-antisemitic National Democratic Party of Germany (*al-Madjalla*, 1 March 1998). Laila ‘Inan assumes that the Loi Gayssot was passed in order to prevent further research on French collaboration under the Vichy regime (*ash-Sha’ab*, 22 January 1998). Most authors, however, stress the role of the Holocaust in legitimizing the establishment of the state of Israel, and thus they accuse Zionist lobbies of initiating this kind of legislation. “During the 20th century, the ‘Holocaust’ in the Zionist account was never more than a pretext used by international Zionism for a justification of the existence of Israel” (*Tarikh al-‘Arab wa-l-‘Alam*, vol. 2 [1998]). The Zionist lobby is also accused of imposing political pressure on the Pope, the United Nations, on France, and other countries to compel remembrance of the Holocaust (*al-Ahram*, 6 May 1996; Uktubar, 25 January 1998); the distorted and exaggerated narrative, the Zionist “forgery” was imposed not only on Germany, but even on countries unconnected with it.

Not surprisingly, it is suggested that financial interests are behind the “Holocaust lie” (*al-Ahram*, 20 May 1996). Zahr ad-Din (Background, 141) points to the “mentalities of ‘usury,’ ‘trading,’ and ‘business’ which are the eternal pillars of the Jews’ profit.”

At the same time, public awareness of the Holocaust has led to the claim that a Holocaust or genocide is being conducted against the Palestinian people. [16] The term Holocaust then is also applied to the increasingly unpopular UN embargo against Iraq, as seen in the article by Salama Ahmad Salama published in *al-Ahram* (25 February 1998).

Thus, we find a widespread acceptance of the assumptions upon which *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics* is based. Any special significance of the events of the Nazi era to the Jewish collective memory are rejected, for the Holocaust is seen as merely a myth used to justify Israel’s existence and to claim reparations payments.

### Images of the Jews

Articles by Arab authors provide a negative picture of the Jews that relies on well-known stereotypes. Popular perceptions of the Holocaust are tied to these stereotypes, and integrated into anti-Zionist statements.

While Garaudy, for his part, claimed that his book was a critique of the Zionist political movement, Arab authors reacting to *The Founding Myths*, frequently ignore any distinction between “Zionists” and “Jews”. Both Garaudy’s wife, Salma, and his defence attorney, no doubt concerned about the implications of this in the legal proceedings, complained vehemently about the interchangeable usage of the two terms in Arabic translations and quotes from the book (*al-Musawwar*, 16 January 1998). Yet Ahmed Rami insisted on synonymous usage of the terms, claiming that the Talmud calls on Jews to hate and commit crimes, which is evidence of the racism of all Jews that makes any distinction between Zionists and non-Zionists irrelevant (*ash-Sha’ab*, 24 March 1998).

Speaking of the Jews as differing like fingerprints, but all having an identical aim, Fauzi clearly identifies the Jews as a collective (Fauzi, Garaudy, 15). Other writers make the same point in headlines reading “Search the Jews” (*al-Ahram Hebdo*, 4 February 1998), “The Jews are ruling the world by law” (*Ruz al-Yussif*, 19 January 1998), and “Garaudy and the attack of the Jewish lobby” (*as-Safir*, 12 January 1998).

It is only a small step from this to the various imaginations of Jewish conspiracies, such as the charge that Jews control the media (i.a. *al-Ahram*, 24 February 1998). Suggestions that the Jews/Zionists operate a worldwide conspiracy to undermine Arab influence in the

world draws not only on classics of antisemitism like the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, but on analyses of contemporary events. For example, the United States supposedly appointed several secretaries of state who were of Jewish origin; [17] while perhaps the most original theory concerning a Jewish conspiracy centered on the Monica Lewinsky scandal: in an attempt to prevent U.S. President William Clinton from putting pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the affair and the Jewish origins of Monica Lewinsky were taken as evidence of a conspiracy against the Palestinians (*al-Ahram Hebdo*, 4 February 1998). [18]

The ultimate aim of the Jewish conspiracy was summed up by Ahmed Rami:

"The disastrous power of Jewish Zionism is not only aiming at an occupation of Palestine, but is in fact occupying all countries of the west, the world economy, the media and the international and regional organisations. It will be possible that Zionists are going to judaize Christianity. This judaization started with St. Paul and was extended by some judaized popes. Today we have reached a situation in which the head of the French Church is a Jew called Lustiger." (*ash-Sha'ab*, 6 February 1998).

However, even when describing conspiracy theories in which the Jews are not explicitly named, the underlying semantic construction of the Jews is revealed in the images of "Freemasons" and "Zionists."

Negative stereotypes of Jews as treacherous, cunning, and sly resemble classic anti-Jewish images found in European antisemitism. Appearing in the general context of widespread anti-Jewish stereotypes, these images are not limited to discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, they reflect the diversity of anti-Jewish accusations and conspiracy theories used to explain various unaccepted social phenomena in Arab societies that are said to result from Jewish influence.

#### **Reconstruction of a discourse**

Four basic patterns emerge within the discourse surrounding Garaudy's book:

An apologetic stance toward National Socialism. Emphasizing and extending Garaudy's doubts about the antisemitic motivations of Nazism, Mahmud Fauzi and Salah Zahr ad-Din's writings minimize Nazi crimes and the background to them. They assert that Hitler himself was not antisemitic, and go on to claim that the Zionists themselves were guilty of the crimes. Although the alleged Nazi-Zionist collaboration is primarily used to underline the "criminal essence" of Zionism, the delegation of Nazi crimes to the Zionists in fact stems from the desire to shift responsibility for those crimes away from the Nazis.

Anti-Zionism. Writers like Ahmed Rami and Muhammad Salmawi may make detailed reference to Garaudy's work. However, instead of focusing on the issues found in the book, they focus instead on the idea that there is a conspiracy on the part of Zionists and Jewish organizations to control Holocaust historiography as part of a drive to achieve contemporary political aims. These writers see a Jewish conspiracy behind the prosecution of Garaudy.

An Islamic Alternative. 'Abd al-Wahab al-Missiri writes that Zionism and Nazism share similar traits, leading to genocide, and promote a value system directly opposite to that of Islam. In this line of argument, the extermination of the Jews is not denied, but the Holocaust is seen as analogous to Israeli policies toward the Palestinians during the occupation. Only Islam offers an alternative to the Western model of modern civilization.

An Undifferentiated anti-Zionist/ anti-Nazi Pattern. Articles written from the perspective of the Arab Left often combine arguments that are anti-fascist and anti-Zionist, yet contain statements minimizing Nazi crimes. George Sa'ad, for example, criticized the European Right's support for Garaudy while walking a tightrope between his anti-fascist

and anti-Zionist stance. Accusing Israel of having a fascist or Nazi character enables one to avoid being charged with Rightist sympathies.

Similar to Lewis, Yehoshafat Harkabi, an Israeli scholar, wrote that “Arab anti-Semitism is the outcome of political circumstances,... not a cause of the conflict but a product of it. [19] In the following sections of my paper, I will argue that Holocaust denial is not to be understood as something that developed as part of anti-Zionist rhetoric within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but rather as a specific expression of antisemitic thinking.

### **Antisemitic Perceptions of the Outside World: On the Origins of Holocaust-Denying Anti-Zionism**

The development of popular perceptions of social change and conflict in patterns of antisemitic “cultural codes” — as described by Shulamit Volkov — has been worked out particularly for early twentieth-century Germany. [20]

The development of an antisemitic ideology is essentially bound to the modern transformation of social structures, along with fundamental changes in the individual's integration into society. The weakening of traditional relationships in kinship and religion decisively enforced the formation of substitute ideologies and patterns of perceiving the outside world. The rise of national movements during the late nineteenth century were meaningful expressions of the renewed sense of cultural and political identity. The antisemitism that emerged in that period served to explain otherwise incomprehensible social changes. The underlying patterns of antisemitic thought, then, are essentially “determined by a dual schematic which figured Judaism as the opposite or antithesis of one's own ideal and self-understanding and which — despite all specific ‘fillings’ in substance of the Jewish or one's own ‘nature’ — always formed the negative pole.” [21] As such, the content of antisemitic thought did not depend on the behavior of Jewish communities.

Having in mind the considerable research that has been done on antisemitism in European societies, we can compare and contrast what is known about the phenomenon in Arab-Islamic societies. Ideologies in general, and antisemitism in particular, should be understood in this regard not as authentic phenomena of specific cultures, but rather as certain patterns of thought originating in particular socio-historical contexts. Antisemitic stereotypes are often assumed to have been imported from Europe into Arabic societies, suggesting that this is an exclusively European phenomenon. [22] A survey into some of the parallel, though certainly not identical, social and historical developments should indicate something of the consistency and endurance of antisemitic thought. Leaving aside the psychological and socio-psychological background of antisemitism in Arab societies, I will focus on the historical context, to facilitate understanding of the Arab perceptions of the Holocaust within the debate on *The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics*. [23] Three aspects enable us to see the historical contexts of the development of contemporary antisemitic thought. First, there is the importance of Islamic and Christian religious thought in the formation of anti-Jewish stereotypes that were later transformed into racist antisemitism. A second area concerns the development of nationalism and its underlying patterns of thought. The third area is the recent emergence of Islamism. A survey of these three areas will provide a greater understanding of the pattern of antisemitic thought in Arab culture. Without assuming that nationalism and Islamism are necessarily expressed in antisemitic terms, the latent antisemitism of its ideological constructions should be stressed.

### **The Development of Anti-Judaic Images in the Arab-Islamic Context**

Bearing in mind the Christian anti-Judaic codes that were part of the European “teaching of contempt” toward Jews and Judaism, one may look for similar factors in the development of anti-Jewish attitudes in Islamic cultures. [24] However, the recent use of

negative images of Jews derived from classical Islam does not represent an unchanged continuity of Islamic anti-Judaic thought. [25]

A number of studies indicate that the Jews were for the most part tolerated in Islamic societies, with few episodes of persecution and pogroms similar to those known from European Jewish history. Viewed as the “People of the Book” in the Quran, both Jews and Christians obtained a position allowing for a certain amount of religious autonomy and security, albeit with a second-class status as dhimmis under the “protection” of Islam that was offered to religious believers whose faiths derived from the teachings of recognized prophets of Allah. [26]

Despite formal guarantees of tolerance, the fact remains that the Quran (the revealed word of Allah given to Muhammed) and the Hadith (the sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammed recorded during the early history of Islam) provide numerous negative images of the Jews, and castigates them for earning the wrath of Allah. Thus, we find that sura of the earlier period of revelation stressed the importance of Judaism as part of the divine messages, but those from the later period take a much more negative view of the Jews, due to the refusal of the Jewish communities of the Arabian peninsula to heed the call of Muhammed for their conversion. [27] Jews are depicted as cunning, deceitful, and cowardly; they are accused of intriguing against Muhammed and the early Muslim community; and they stand accused of deliberately distorting their own sacred texts. [28] Jews were not accused of “deicide” as happened in Christian lands, since Islam vigorously rejects claims that Jesus [the prophet Issa] was divine. However, classical Islamic literature does contain stories about Jewish attempts to poison the Prophet Muhammed; although such stories were of limited influence in Muslim-Jewish relations. [29]

In Greater Syria and Egypt, Muslim ambivalence toward the Jews were further enforced by the encounter with anti-Judaic thought among the local Christian minorities. The blood libel was spread in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and Christian monks disseminated ritual murder charges against the local Jewish population in Damascus on the eve of Passover in 1840 (the “Damascus Affair”). [30] In this period, too, Arabic translations of French antisemitic literature were produced, and European residents were responsible for the diffusion of anti-Jewish stereotypes found in European Christian culture. [31]

An important change in the history of Islamic anti-Jewish attitude took place in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. Religious stereotypes were “modernized” by the increasing integration of racial motifs. In the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution, a campaign against the so-called “hidden Jews” — Jews who had converted to Islam — rendered visible the increasing perception of the Jews along racial categories. Similarly, attacks against persons accused of Jewish origin further illustrated the transformation of religious into more essentialist approaches to Judaism and Jews.

Thus, the ambivalent attitudes toward Jews found in Islamic culture can be summarized as “benign contempt” (Gudrun Krämer). Despite having privileges and the limited protection which Jews enjoyed under Islamic rule, various ambivalences within the religious sources formed the basis for the development of distinct anti-Jewish sentiments among Muslim populations. Not surprisingly, similar to the tradition of Christian anti-Judaism, numerous references to stereotypes deriving from religious sources can be found in contemporary public discourse.

### **Patterns of Arab Nationalism and its Antisemitic Latency**

Understanding the relationship between antisemitic thought and various forms of European nationalism may provide a useful comparison when examining nationalist ideologies of the Middle East. As in Europe, specific socio-economic conditions led to a wide-ranging diversity of ideological expression — religious, secular, pan-Arab, local,

revolutionary, and liberal. It is important to look to the historical context of the formation and development of the various movements, as well as their religious and ideological aspects. George L. Mosse assumed that European nationalist movements contained a latent antisemitism. Along with this assumption, certain keywords and concepts of nationalist thought will be illustrated as they interrelate with and enforce antisemitic perceptions of society. [32]

The development of Arab nationalism is commonly perceived as a phenomenon that began in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the formation of specific Arab nationalist movements in the last decades of the Ottoman period should not lead us to ignore the earlier manifestations of an Arab “awakening” that flowered in a variety of nationalist ideologies. [33]

The nineteenth century was one of vast social and economic change in the Arab world, evident in the modernization within the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat (lit., reorganization, 1839–1879) and in Muhammed ‘Ali’s reforms in Egypt. Economic reform, including industrialization and the capitalization of trade and agriculture, coincided with Ottoman decline and the growing influence of the French and British governments in the region. The socio-economic changes were reflected in new perceptions of the outside world, while the sense of identity rested largely on traditional views from earlier periods. Any analysis of Arab nationalism must therefore take into account the origins of concepts like *umma* (the collective body of believers) and *watan* (identification with one’s place of living or home town) in Islamic sources. [34]

In the late nineteenth century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the disintegration of communities increasingly challenged the religion-based concepts of identity and belonging. [35] The revival of Arab art and literature during the *nahda* (“Renaissance”) in this period advanced by the various Christian minorities in the Greater Syria region further encouraged the perception of non-religious Arab identities. While previous religious fragmentation (evident in the tensions between the various non-Muslim minorities as well as between different groups within Islam) had helped to preserve Ottoman supremacy, the newly secularized Arab identities promised to guarantee a united stance towards external challenges.

Two popular moderate nationalist ideologies from the beginning of the twentieth century - that of Egyptian Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908) and the pan-Arabist Sati’ al-Husri (1882–1968) can illustrate the correlation between nationalist ideologies and antisemitic patterns of thought. Bearing in mind the diversity of nationalist ideologies in the Arab world, the common underlying structural patterns implied by nationalist thought in general are relevant within this context. [36]

### **Mustafa Kamil: wataniyya-Nationalism and the Fight for Arab Unity**

The Egyptian political situation of the late nineteenth century, characterized by a steady conflict with Britain’s colonial aspirations, provided the backdrop for the formulation of Mustafa Kamil’s *wataniyya* nationalism. Egypt was relatively autonomous within the Ottoman Empire, and thus, unlike the situation in Greater Syria, the nationalist resistance movement was directed against the colonial powers. Kamil acknowledged a certain support for the central Ottoman regime, and his nationalism combined a dual loyalty to both the Egyptian *watan* and Islam. [37] The Egyptian nation had developed in a particular way as a result of its unique geography, Kamil believed, and he believed that both the Muslim majority and its Christian and other minorities felt a strong loyalty to their homeland, “one *umma*, [which is] indeed one family.” [38] Individuals experience a natural need for social integration, and the nation can serve as a broader “family” to whom the individual has a fundamental obligation. [39]

Kamil depicted his concept of nationalism in mystical language, asserting that the individual possessed a strong emotional orientation toward his own distinct nation. [40] Although he rejected racial concepts of the nation, his thinking did demand enforced and unlimited loyalty from all citizens. The rights of individuals were subordinated to the needs of the state. Kamil used the term *ad-dukhala* (“intruders”) to refer to elements from within or without the nation who might threaten its unity or stability. [41] The term could be applied to different groups at different times in history. Kamil’s writings, for example, use it to refer to allegedly anti-Ottoman Syrian immigrants, whom he saw as collaborators of the British.

Kamil claimed that an authentic national consciousness derived from the watan itself. Religious cleavages within the community, for example, could be surmounted by the common striving against foreign rule. This sense of distinct national identity, however, led to the emphasis of a friend/enemy dichotomy. With the concept of *ad-dukhala* representing both internal and external “enemies,” Kamil’s nationalist *wataniyya* was directed against alleged threats both within and outside of Egypt.

### **Sati’ al-Husri and the Struggle for an “Arab 1871”**

In contrast to Kamil’s local Egyptian Arab nationalism, Sati’ al-Husri inspired a pan-Arab nationalist ideology. Al-Husri was a high-ranking official with the Iraqi and Arab League educational administration, whose thought influenced Iraqi, Syrian, and Egyptian nationalism.

Al-Husri placed great importance on the Arabic language as “the nation’s soul and her most important element.” [42] Language was not merely a means of communication, but the means of transmitting tradition, and the authentic expression of the Arab nation’s existence. Al-Husri himself was influenced by some aspects of German nationalism as formulated by Herder, Fichte, and Arndt. He looked to Bismarck’s example of uniting Germany as a model to be followed: “The organic unity of the Arab nation should find political expression by following the German example of 1871.” [43]

Al-Husri ostensibly rejected a racial basis for defining the Arab nation, rejecting theories of evolution and biological concepts of the nation, yet his own concept of *qaum* (which is best translated as the German *Volk*) is problematic. Al-Husri looks to language, however, as the unifying feature of the nation:

Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people, and every one who belongs to the Arab people is an Arab. But should he not know himself...or should he not cherish Arabism (*al-‘uruba*) ... then must we find out the reasons that make him adopt such a stand. It may be of ignorance, in which case it is our duty to teach him the truth...or it may be due to unawareness or credulity, and we must awaken him and direct him to the right path. [44]

The freedom of the individual is thus secondary to his function as part of the nation, with its “ties and chains of spiritual gold...of the gold of tradition, of history, and of duty.” [45]

This ultimate submission to the community and the primacy of cultural homogeneity implied by al-Husri’s pan-Arabism can hardly be distinguished from similar principles that underlie racial theories, even though his theory does not insist on common descent. Like Kamil, al-Husri rails against foreign influence which will weaken cultural ties. Looking to European history, al-Husri saw a parallel in the situation of German lands occupied by Napoleon in the early nineteenth century; territorial fragmentation, he felt, was the reason for the decline of the Arab nation and its *‘uruba*.

### **Anti-Jewish Objectivizations of Nationalist Thought**

As seen in these two different examples of Arab nationalist ideas, the definition of national belonging essentially presupposes the construction of an “enemy” or “outsider” of some sort. As George Mosse put it, “the fight for the nation’s unity requires enemies.” [46] The preservation of national characteristics is achieved by facing whatever may be seen as fragmenting cultural homogeneity from within or outside the community. [47]

Notwithstanding the historical changes in stereotypes, the underlying patterns of nationalist ideologies coincided to a large extent with anti-Jewish depictions and made Jews latent representatives of these “others.” Commonly perceived as both a nation and a religious group and assumed to be living without ties to a specific country, they were seen as anti-national cosmopolitans, by definition excluded from being part of Arab or Egyptian nations. Anti-Jewish perceptions are further implied in the dichotomy of self and “other” found in the constructions of various nationalist ideologies as exemplified here. The adoption of anti-modern Romantic thought thus comes close to the German nationalist concept of the *Gegenrasse*, that “viewed as alien a whole series of phenomena and ideas which would become increasingly important in the course of the nineteenth century, such as capitalism, liberalism, democracy, and socialism.” [48] In light of existing Christian and Islamic anti-Jewish depictions and the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the identification of this *Gegenrasse* with the Jews became more than just an option. The transformation of religious differences into a national antagonism between Arabs and non-Arabs thus based on new patterns of thought which took on some anti-Jewish aspects.

### **Islamic Awakening and the Imagination of an Overall Cultural-Religious Confrontation**

Rooted in the decline of nationalist ideologies and the de-facto defeat of Arab armies in the wars with Israel, Islamist movements, calling for *as-sahwa al-islamiyya* (Islamic awakening), have integrated the essential currents of previous intellectual debates and the popular mood. The failure of the most promising nationalist reform projects in Nasser’s Egypt and Ba’athist Syria and Iraq led to an increasing attraction to religious renewal movements. The romantic images of collective cooperation envisioned by nationalist ideologues who modernized the Islamic concept of the *umma*, and the call for *al-wahda al-arabiyya* (Arab unity), has been replaced by the slogan *Islam huwa al-hal* — Islam is the solution. Unlike the nineteenth-century reform movements and the Arab *nahda*, Islamism in the second half of the twentieth century has tended to interpret the defeat and decline of Arab societies as the result of more existential threats:

While earlier generations were responding to problems of internal decay and foreign intervention, the current challenge is perceived as coming from more overbearing, coercive, and intrusive quarters. [49]

The religious distinction between *dar al-islam* (the house of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the house of war) posits the ultimate opposition and conflict between Islam and the non-Islamic world. [50] Islamists likewise refer to *jahiliyya* (the “time of ignorance”) and *hakimiyya allah* (the rule of God) not in their historic sense of the time before and after the promulgation of Islam, but rather, referring to the present confrontation between the “degenerate” Western world and Islam. Among those who spoke of *jahiliyya* as a cultural, psychological, and social state of anomie illustrated by the antagonism between Islam and Western societies was the well-known Islamic philosopher Sayyid Abu l’Ala Maududi (1903–1979). [51]

The perception of social and political conflicts as religious-cultural confrontations is increasingly articulated after the loss of Palestine in 1948 and the Israeli occupation of Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem after 1967. Islamist groups interpreted the establishment of the state of Israel as a God-given punishment for the Arabs’ adoption of alien ideologies, estrangement from Islamic belief and practice, along with the unchallenged menace of socialism, capitalism, and nationalism, and social disintegration. A radical rejection of all things “Western” — including the integration of any European elements within Arab

nationalist movements — is accompanied by an insistence on a return to the religious foundations of Arab society. The Arab-Israeli conflict is thus raised to an eternal and spiritual dimension, “a struggle between truth, represented by Islam, and falsehood, represented by total disbelief, by Zionism and its supporters: Crusaderism and atheism.” [52] Regarded as an aspect of colonial aspirations of the first half of the twentieth century, and dependent on European and American support, Zionism was thus perceived primarily as a tool for Western expansion. The Jews were no longer the “wretched” of the Quranic image, but began to symbolize the eternal opponent within this conflict. Various interpretations assumed that “the interests of both Jewish and European consciousness were joined,” [53] with its mutually reinforced racist attitude toward Islam, along with the depiction of Judaism and Zionism as the embodiment of the “enemy.” [54] Quotations from the Quran were drawn on to demonstrate the inherent characteristics of both the Jews and the Zionist state. Western support for Israel seemed to place the Jews at the center of harmful developments within many Muslim nations. Israel, depicted as a “cancerous tumor” and “parasite” is thus associated with a “Westoxication,” the threat of disintegrating and destructive influences onto Arab-Islamic societies. [55] While similar to stereotypes found within nationalist thought, the widespread interpretation in antisemitic terms of troubling social phenomena such as family disintegration or the spread of disease clearly demonstrates that these charges are not connected to the Arab conflict with the Israeli state.

The virulence of conspiracy theories in Islamist thought is linked to its common perception of social change and development as expressions of overall cultural-religious confrontations. [56] . Regarding actual trajectories and substantial conflicts in contemporary Middle Eastern societies, their causes are shifted onto abstract powers and mysterious plots as a functional explanation. Taking up the religious-based dichotomy of a two-sided antagonistic world and its existential conflict between good and evil helps to reduce social complexities. The anti-Jewish stereotypes within Islamist thought thus contributes to antisemitic codes prevalent in Arab-Islamic societies.

## Conclusion

My intent in this analysis of current patterns of thought was aimed at indicating the socio-historical backgrounds of antisemitic codes within Arab public discourse. Similar to the situation with Christian anti-Judaism, Islamic anti-Judaic stereotypes are interrelated with contemporary perceptions of social conflict within the context of Arab-Islamic societies. Arab nationalist ideologies construct an image of some essential threat to the theoretically homogeneous national unity in which the category of “intruder” shows structural affinities to antisemitic patterns of thought. The Islamist perception of reality and its depiction as an existential confrontation between antagonistic civilizations further emphasizes similar interpretations of conflicts and strongly propagates conspiratorial views of the outside world. The vigor of Islamist belief and nationalist ideologies in contemporary Arab societies, finally, demonstrates how fundamental these assessments are to society. In this regard, the dissemination of anti-Jewish stereotypes and accusations can be understood as consequence of various ideologies contributing to the formation of consistent antisemitic codes within Arab-Islamic societies.

The public controversy over Garaudy’s *Founding Myths of Israeli Politics* with its manifest denial of the Holocaust, gives reason to consider it one of the most significant contemporary expressions of antisemitic thought. Despite fundamental ideological gaps between the contributors to the debate, a common perception of the Holocaust and the Jews became evident. Having made the negation of Nazi antisemitism and the Holocaust a central issue in reviews and commentary on Garaudy, Holocaust denial is revealed as a binding interest between various political spectra. As such, Helen Fein’s conclusion holds:

“there is no reason why the attackers’ justification should define the phenomenon to be explained in a scientific explanation. The alleged justification [i.e., anti-Judaic, anti-capitalist, or antisemitic by its own profession] or ideology is not an explanation of an antisemitic movement or behavior but an example of the data to be explained.” [57]

Whatever the specific contexts and the expressed aims of certain articles, the interpretations of Nazism and its crimes against the European Jews can be traced back to common antisemitic premises.

Two years after the height of the repercussions, Garaudy and his works remain visible in the Arab media. Far from being an argument applied temporarily within the Arab-Israeli conflict, various forms of Holocaust denying statements remain widespread. Even though public figures have renewed their calls on the public to acknowledge the Holocaust as a historical fact, others persistently continue to support Garaudy’s theses. [58] With media coverage of the libel of the British writer David Irving against historian Deborah Lipstadt in spring 2000, and the publication of Norman Finkelstein’s *The Holocaust Industry* by Lebanese publisher Dar al-Adab later that year, the topic remains omnipresent in Arab media.

[1] Hazem Saghiyeh and Saleh Bashir, “Universalizing the Holocaust,” *Palestine Israel Journal*, no. 3-4 (1998-9): 90-97. For latest insight into the debates see Rainer Zimmer-Winkel ed., *Die Araber und die Shoah* (Trier: Aphorisma, 2000), 9-33 and especially Esther Webman, “Rethinking the Holocaust: An Open Debate in the Arab World,” in *Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9* (Tel Aviv: Stephen Ross Institute, 1999). Within the debate on Garaudy, Hasan ash-Shami was one of the most profound critics of Holocaust denial in Arab media, *al-Hayat*, 29 March 1998.

[2] See Edmond Cao-Van-Hoa, “Der Feind meines Feindes...” *Darstellungen des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands in ägyptischen Schriften* (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Hochschulschriften, 1990). Other approaches neglected in this paper assume a determinist and by this timeless antisemitic attachment of Muslims and Arabs. By suggesting a monolithic essence of Islam and an almost essentialist understanding of Arab societies, these efforts prevent any substantial insight into the origins of antisemitic thought and its interrelation with specific historical contexts.

[3] Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 259.

[4] The material I used consisted in 150 articles from newspapers, magazines and scientific journals, most published in Egypt and Lebanon. In addition I examined two monographs, Saleh Zahr ad-Din, *Historical Background of the Process against Roger Garaudy* (in Arabic) (Beirut: al-Markaz al-‘Arabi li-l-Idjat wa-t-Tawthiq, 1998) and Mahmud Fauzi, *Garaudy, Islam and the Rage of Zionism* (in Arabic) (Cairo: Dar ash-Sha’ab, 1996?). Selections from Fauzi’s book appeared in the Egyptian magazine *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*. In the appendix of Zahr ad-Din’s work several newspaper articles on Garaudy, as well as an Arabic translation of the chapter “The Holocaust Myth” are reprinted.

[5] See Klaus Holz and Elfriede Müller, “Die Affäre Rkungen zum Revisionismus in Frankreich,” in *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, edited by Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1997), 157. Cf. Pierre-André Taguieff, “L’Abbé Pierre et Roger Garaudy. Négationisme, Antijudaïsme, Antisionisme,” *Esprit*, no. 8-9 (1996): 215.

[6] For details on the Garaudy affaire in France, see: Valérie Igounet, *Histoire du Négationisme en France* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), 472-83.

[7] More than a dozen of Garaudy’s books were translated into Arabic, including many from his communist period up to the early 1960s when he began to distance himself from the French Communist Party. Other books written after his conversion to Islam in 1981 were translated during the 1980s and 1990s.

[8] Examples for the support Garaudy gained in Arab countries are given by Mouna Naim, “Critiqué, jugé, sanctionné pour ses thèses en France, l’ancien théoricien du PC, Roger Garaudy, est décoré et louangé dans les pays arabes,” *Le Monde*, 1 March 1998.

[9] Additional complete or abridged Arabic versions were published in Cairo by Dar agh-Ghad al-‘Arabi and in Morocco by Edition Ezzaman. Translations of some chapters appeared in various newspapers.

[10] I understand Holocaust denial not only as a negation of the extermination as such, but more generally as any attempt to distort the origins and the reality of Nazism and the Holocaust.

[11] See Barnet Litvinoff, ed., *The Essential Chaim Weizmann* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 125ff.

[12] For an overview of these charges, see Francis Nicosia, "Victims as Perpetrators: German Zionism and Collaboration in Recent Historical Controversy," in *Remembering for the Future*, edited by Yehuda Bauer (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), 2134-2148.

[13] 'Abd al-Wahab al-Missiri, *Zionism, Nazism and the End of History* (in Arabic) (Cairo and Beirut: Dar ash-Shuruq, 1997).

[14] 'Abd al-Wahab al-Missiri, ed., *Garaudy — Forged Myths and the Victory of Man* (In Arabic) (Cairo: Itihad al-'Am li-l-Fananin al-'Arab, 1996).

[15] Al-Missiri, *Zionism*, 228.

[16] As a prerequisite for an Arab recognition of the Holocaust against the Jews, the editor of the London-based al-Hayat demanded an acknowledgment "of the other Holocausts committed by Israel against the Arab world," al-Hayat, 15 January 1998.

[17] Accusing someone of being Jewish is common in Arab public discourse. Interestingly, Garaudy himself was accused of having a Jewish origin and thus a potential agent against Islam. His Muslim critic 'Adil at-Tal, suspects that Garaudy's "materialistic approach to Islam" is an indication of Jewish origins ('Adil at-Tal, *The Thinking of Garaudy — Between Materialism and Islam — A Critique of His Writings in the Light of Quran and Sunna* (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Bayyina, 1997), 19). A Jordanian journalist explained Zionists' attacks against Garaudy as a response to his alleged conversion from Judaism to Islam, *The Star*, 22 January 1998. Because of a widespread antisemitic belief linking Jews to Communism, both authors probably are alluding to Garaudy's communist period.

[18] Further details are summarized in P. R. Kumaraswamy, "Monica Lewinsky in Middle Eastern Eyes," *Middle East Quarterly* (March 1999): 57-66.

[19] Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Contemporary Arab Anti-Semitism: its Causes and Roots," in *The Persisting Question. Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern Antisemitism*, edited by Helen Fein (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 412-27, here 420.

[20] Shulamit Volkov, *Antisemitismus als kultureller Code* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2000).

[21] Christard Hoffmann, "Das Judentum als Antithese. Zur Tradition eines kulturellen Wertungsmusters," in *Antisemitismus in Deutschland: Zur Aktualität eines Vorurteils*, edited by Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 25.

[22] This argumentation is common in most of the literature, which suggests and supports the conclusion that the use of these stereotypes depends on an instrumental application. Similarly, the history of Arab nationalism is often presented as a European import. Although Arab writers found inspiration in European nationalism, one should not conclude that the nationalist idea was foreign to the Arab world.

[23] A rare article that discusses the specific psychological background of antisemitism in the Arab Middle East, related to conspiracy theories is Marvin Zonis and Craig M. Joseph, "Conspiracy Thinking in the Middle East," *Political Psychology*, no. 15 (1994): 443-59.

[24] Yehuda Bauer, "In Search of a Definition of Antisemitism," in *Approaches to Antisemitism. Context and Curriculum*, edited by Michael Brown (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1994), 17.

[25] See Esther Webman, *Anti-Semitic Motifs in the Ideology of Hizbollah and Hamas* (Tel Aviv: Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism, 1994), 18f.

[26] A short discussion of the limitations of the legal definition and the de-facto dhimmi-status is given by Gudrun Krämer, *Gottes Staat als Republik. Reflexionen zeitgenoessischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechte und Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 162-73.

[27] See Léon Poliakov, *Geschichte des Antisemitismus. Religiöse und Soziale Toleranz im Islam*, vol. 3 (Worms: Verlag Georg Heintz, 1979), 21f and 58-85.

[28] See Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes towards Israel* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1972), 266, in which he notes the relevant sura; also Bernard Lewis, "Muslim Anti-Semitism," *Middle East Quarterly* (June 1998): 43.

[29] Ronald Nettle, "Islamic Archetypes of the Jews: Then and Now," in *Present-day Antisemitism*, edited by Yehuda Bauer (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988), 65; see also Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites*, 150.

[30] Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes*, 270f.

[31] On Arabic translations of antisemitic “classics,” see Sylvia Haim, “Arab Antisemitic Literature,” in *Jewish Social Studies*, no. 4 (1956): 307-309; on the influence of European residents in the development of anti-Jewish attitudes in the Arab Middle East and Maghreb see Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 19-22.

[32] On the relationship between nationalism and antisemitism, see Shmuel Almog, *Nationalism and Antisemitism in Modern Europe 1815-1945* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990), 14; Peter Alter and Claus-E. Bärsch et al., eds., *Die Konstruktion der Nation gegen die Juden* (Duisburg: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1999), 9.

[33] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 260-323.

[34] See Sylvia Haim, “Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism,” in *Die Welt des Islam*, no. 2-3 (1955): 131; Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 32.

[35] Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Berkshire, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 1997), 189ff.

[36] Intentionally, I did not choose the ideas of Sami Shawkat, Michel ‘Aflaq, Zaki al-Arsuzi or Antun Sa’ada, for it might be argued that they are only representing the most radical spectra of Arab nationalism. In this context, however, it is possible to illustrate the problematic patterns of thought as reflected in more moderate nationalist ideologies.

[37] Fritz Steppart, “Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der ägyptischen Nationalbewegung,” *Die Welt des Islam*, no. 4 (1956): 267.

[38] Kamil, cited in Israel Gershoni, *Egypt, Islam and Arabs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.

[39] Steppart, “Nationalismus und Islam,” 263.

[40] *Ibid.*, 264f.

[41] *Ibid.*, 258f; Gershoni, *Egypt*, 16f.

[42] Sati’ al-Husri cited by Bassam Tibi, *Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat. Islam und panarabischer Nationalismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), 134.

[43] Tibi, *Gottesreich*, 143.

[44] Husri, cited by Haim, “Islam,” 144.

[45] *Ibid.*, 126.

[46] George Mosse, “Jews in the Age of Modern Nationalism,” in *Konstruktion der Nation*, 23.

[47] This view strongly coincide with the depiction of the Jews as constituting “a state within a state,” an idea especially relevant for the national thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte; see Jacob Katz, “‘A State within a State.’ The History of an Anti-Semitic Slogan,” in *Zur Assimilation und Emanzipation der Juden*, edited by Jacob Katz (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982), 124ff.

[48] Almog, *Nationalism*, 14.

[49] Yvonne Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening,” *Middle East Journal*, no. 2 (1992): 272f.

[50] Rivka Yadlin, *An Arrogant Oppressive Spirit — Anti-Zionism as Anti-Judaism in Egypt* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), 113; Larbi Sadiki, “Occidentalism: The ‘West’ and ‘Democracy’ as Islamist Constructs,” *Orient*, no. 39 (1998): 112f.

[51] Another important source for today’s Islamists are the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna. See Israel Gershoni, “Rejecting the West: The Image of the West in the Teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1939”, in *Great Powers in the Middle East*, edited by Uriel Dann (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1998) and Ronald L. Nettler, “Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist Speaks on the Jews,” in *Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*, edited by Michael Curtis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), 97-106.

[52] Ziad Abu Ghanima, cited in Haddad, “Islamists,” 268.

[53] Referring to the well-known Egyptian intellectual, Hasan Hanafi, Rivka Yadlin analyzes the Islamic Left’s perception of conflict; Yadlin, *Arrogant Oppressive Spirit*, 43.

[54] See especially the analysis of Hamas and Hizballah by Webman, “Hizballah.”

[55] See Emmanuel Sivan, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism," in *Antisemitism*, 74.

[56] Yadlin, *Arrogant Oppressive Spirit*, 75.

[57] Helen Fein, "Dimensions of Antisemitism: Attitudes, Collective Accusations, and Actions," in *Persisting Question*, 69.

[58] In spring 2000, Garaudy was again invited to participate at the International Cairo Book Fair; and he was also scheduled to address the annual conference of the California-based extreme Right Institute for Historical Review in Beirut. This was the first time the extreme Right openly undertook to address the Arab-Islamic world, using figures such as Garaudy, Robert Faurisson, and Horst Mahler.

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