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DOSSIER IRAKGATE

**LES CONNIVENCES DU GOUVERNEMENT AMÉRICAIN AVEC L'IRAQ DE SADDAM
HUSSEIN PENDANT LA GUERRE DE HUIT ANS IRAKO-IRANIENNE**

September 20, 2003

Colin Powell in Iraq --Exploiting the Dead of Halabja

By Kurt Nimmo

The Bushites love to visit the mass graves in Halabja. That's where about 7,000 Kurds died after a chemical weapons attack. "I can't tell you that Saddam Hussein was a murderous tyrant -- you know that," said Colin Powell with prosaic certainty. "What I can tell you is that what happen here in 1988 is never going to happen again."

No, probably not. But what Powell didn't bother to mention is the fact the US State Department "instructed its diplomats to say that Iran was partly to blame," according Joost R. Hiltermann of Human Rights Watch, which has extensively investigated the Halabja incident. "The result of this stunning act of sophistry was that the international community failed to muster the will to condemn Iraq strongly for an act as heinous as the terrorist strike on the World Trade Center."

Photo ops with disentombed corpses aside, Powell also didn't bother to mention that people connected to the US government at the time of the Halabja massacre believe Iran, not Iraq, committed the atrocity.

"We cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons killed the Kurds," <<http://www.joinarnie.com/>> insisted Stephen C. Pelletiere a few months ago in the *New York Times*. "I am in a position to know because, as the Central Intelligence Agency's senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army War College from 1988 to 2000, I was privy to much of the classified material that flowed through Washington having to do with the Persian Gulf. In addition, I headed a 1991 Army investigation into how the Iraqis would fight a war against the United States; the classified version of the report went into great detail on the Halabja affair."

In another article published in the *New York Times* last year, Col. Walter P. Lang, a senior defense intelligence officer during the Iran-Iraq war, said the CIA wasn't particularly concerned over the use of chemical weapons. "It was just another way of killing people -- whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn't make any difference." In fact, that was the idea -- to not only sit back while the Iranians and Iraqis killed each other off in huge numbers, but actively arm both sides.

Declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers reveal US intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in assisting Iraqi defenses in their efforts to resist "human wave" attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. Both the Reagan and Bush

administrations authorized the sale to Iraq of various items that had both military and civilian applications, **i.e., chemical and biological weapons**. "Fundamentally, the policy was justified," David Newton, a former US ambassador to Baghdad, told the *Washington Post*. "We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein's government would become less repressive and more responsible."

This is nonsense, of course -- the US policy was to make sure Iran and Iraq killed each other off in record numbers. Estimates of the **number of dead range up to 1.5 million**.

In 1983, Jonathan T. Howe, a senior State Department official, was filling in Secretary of State George P. Shultz on the "almost daily use of CW" against the Iranians. Nonetheless, the nurtured relationship with the Butcher of Baghdad was so important to the Reaganites that they appointed a special envoy to the Middle East -- none other than **Donald H. Rumsfeld, who flew off to Baghdad to shake Saddam's hand**. The so-called "talking points" the Reagan-Saddam relationship were contained within National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, the exact contents of which **remain classified**.

"The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the Iranians," writes Michael Dobbs of the *Washington Post*. "In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, particularly compared with the all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory."

Mr. Dobbs is being polite -- **the US sold chemical and biological weapons to Iraq** and through Israel Hawk missiles to Iran for the express purpose of making sure the two sides fought to a bloody stalemate. As for the Geneva Protocol, it means nothing to the Reaganites, the Bushites, or, for that matter, the Clintonites -- that is unless some official enemy engages in some nastiness.

"In May, 1986, West German authorities foiled an \$81 million ammunition deal and uncovered a tank deal in the process," writes the **Jane Hunter**, editor and publisher of *Israeli Foreign Affairs*. "Charged in the case were an Israeli and a former Israeli citizen. The West German weekly *Stern* said a telex from the state-owned Israeli Military Industries dated April 1 indicated official Israeli involvement... During the Reagan administration US policy has swung through various levels of support for Iraq. Israel's often-stated policy on the Gulf war is to keep it going as long as possible because the dreadful carnage ties up the combatants and prevents either from attacking Israel."

Moreover, when the Halabja massacre came to light a few years later, the Reagan administration opposed congressional efforts to respond by imposing economic sanctions, arguing that they would be contrary to US interests.

In fact, when Bush I came into office, his administration recommended assigning high priority to US-Iraq relations because Saddam Hussein was considered a potential "major

player" in regard to the development of political and economic relations. In 1989, Bush signed a National Security Directive (NSD) designating "economic and political incentives" supposedly designed to "moderate" Iraqi behavior and expand US influence. A few months before Bush signed this NSD, the FBI raided the Atlanta branch office of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and discovered there were off-the-books loans to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Production, including its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missile programs.

In other words, the officials in **the Reagan and Bush administrations are directly responsible for selling Iraq the weapons Bush Junior now carps about** so self-righteously and Colin Powell promises the Iraqis will never use on the Kurds or anybody else ever again -- not even the Iranians.

Naturally, none of this means diddly to the average American, who knows nothing about how Reagan and Bush's daddy armed Saddam to the teeth. After all, millions of Americans think Saddam is Osama, Saddam is responsible for the horrific events of 9/11, and the US found tons of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Colin Powell, standing before the headstones of Halabja, can easily perpetuate the outlandish myths and brazen lies that drive the Bush Doctrine of Total War forward in the Middle East, as the Likudite neocons deem necessary.

Powell's macabre stop at the mass graves of Halabja was stage managed to counter criticism over the United States' failure to find Saddam's illusory caches of chemical and biological weapons. "What happened over the intervening 15 years?" Powell asked rhetorically, referencing the period since the Halabja attack. "Did he suddenly lose the motivation?"

No, Colin. Saddam was no longer useful -- and there was no longer any reason to sell him weapons of mass destruction after the Iran-Iraq war was fought to a bloodstained draw. David Kay, the former UN inspector who is head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Iraq Survey Group, will not find any WMD in Iraq -- not because Saddam furtively hid them but rather because they don't exist.

And that's because the US stopped providing them soon after Iraq Invasion I.

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Chilean arms dealer, Carlos Cardoen, who was one of the biggest shippers of arms to Iraq in the world, and that Gates was intimately involved in the transfer of arms and technology to Iraq. As we told you at the time, the White House denied the charge; they denied it categorically: "Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen."

To this day our sources - and there are three of them - insist that the allegations are true. What we have learned, though, in the reporting we've done over the past two months, has failed to produce specific additional information directly implicating Robert Gates. With a man's career in the balance, that needs to be said.

There are still significant questions about what Mr. Gates knew or should have known about U.S. arms and technology going to Iraq, and specifically about the activities of Carlos Cardoen. More about that a little later.

When we broadcast our last report, the White House issued the following denial: "The whole story is unfounded. There were never any sales, covert or overt, to Iraq or Iran through a third country."

In this broadcast, we will tell you what we know about the transfer of arms to Iraq, but first you need to know the climate that was generated here in Washington towards Iraq during the early 1980s.

Howard Teischer is a Middle East specialist who served on President Reagan's National Security Council at the White House.

HOWARD TEISCHER, former Reagan NSC Official: There was no way that any casual observer who took any interest in Iraqi matters and the Arab-Israel situation, the Middle East situation, could but conclude that Iraq was an enemy of the United States.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] Caspar Weinberger was Ronald Reagan's secretary of defense. I told him a few days ago that we had learned of the shipment of U.S. artillery in the early 1980s from Jordan to Iraq, and that the U.S. was aware of the transfer.

CASPAR WEINBERGER, former Secretary of Defense: The idea of any re-transfer from Jordan out was strictly forbidden, completely forbidden and, had it happened, we would have had every possible sanction we could use to prevent it occurring again.

Mr. TEISCHER: In the Defense Department and the State Department I began to hear unconfirmed reports that transfers had taken place. Jordan denied it formally and vigorously, and the U.S. didn't press the case. This is a good example of a way that communications can be established and approvals can be given with winks and nods, without documentation and with plausible deniability.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] We had also learned, I told Mr. Weinberger, of the transfer of U.S. satellite intelligence to Iraq as early as 1982.

SEC. WEINBERGER: Well, they're quite wrong about that. There's no assistance given to Iraq and no intelligence that I know of given to Iraq, nothing that I recall in the way of any kind of affirmative support, technology, weapons or anything of that kind given to Iraq.

KOPPEL: That, of course, is Mr. Weinberger's recollection in the current climate of 1991, when the notion of assisting Iraq with weapons and military intelligence is far less palatable than it was, say, in 1987, when Secretary Weinberger testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEMBER: Mr. Secretary, following up the chairman's question, could you tell us about Iraq, what help did we give Iraq?

SEC. WEINBERGER: Iraq?

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEMBER: That's right.

SEC. WEINBERGER: Well, we've given very substantial help to -

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEMBER: Also intelligence -

SEC. WEINBERGER: -to Iraq, yes sir. Yes. We should go into that more in closed hearings, but we have, and we have also, I think, tried to be of assistance in a number of other ways. [*See J4JP Note #1 below]

Mr. TEISCHER: Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Haig first and then Secretary Schultz, MacFarlane, Clark, Poindexter, all had different views on what to do, how to do it, when to do it. And the President, for better or for worse, was unwilling to assert discipline over his cabinet officers in these matters.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] Richard Perle was an assistant secretary of defense under Secretary Weinberger.

RICHARD PERLE, former Assistant Secretary of Defense: When you lack clear guidelines, everybody becomes a policymaker on his own, and people sense things differently, they read them differently, they act differently, and then you get a breakdown of cohesive policy. [*See J4JP Note #2 below]

KOPPEL: [voice-over] William von Raab was U.S. commissioner of Customs.

WILLIAM von RAAB, former U.S. Customs Commissioner: Customs was extremely concerned on my watch, which ended in 1989, with weapons going to Iran. I would say that, except as a routine matter, weapons going to Iraq were off our screen entirely.

KOPPEL: When you say "off your screen," you mean you didn't care?

Mr. von RAAB: There were no special operations or special efforts underway to prevent arms

from going [from] the United States to Iraq.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] In 1982, the United States gave the world a clear signal that relations with Iraq were improving. It dropped Iraq from its list of states that support terrorism and, around the world, a variety of interested parties watched, listened and drew their own conclusions. Lebanese arms dealer Serki Saghanalian who claims to have worked with and sometimes in behalf of the CIA for many years, began selling Austrian artillery to Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard.

SERKI SAGHANALIAN, Arms Dealer: It's a long history, my friend. The 155mm. gun that went from Austria, you think the U.S. didn't know about it? I informed them. I told them what was happening. They said, "Sure, go ahead and help them as much as you can."

KOPPEL: It wasn't just a tilt toward Iraq, it was an opening of the floodgates. At times, U.S. laws were violated. There was an official atmosphere that ranged from indifference to tolerance and sometimes even outright cooperation. It was a perfect environment for a man like Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen. That story in a moment.

[Commercial break]

KOPPEL: Think about it for a moment. What was the biggest single scandal of the Reagan administration in which the will of Congress was circumvented by the use of private arms dealers selling weapons in the Middle East? Iran/Contra, right. It's a scandal that resonates to this day, that caused Robert Gates to withdraw his first nomination as CIA director and that still casts a shadow on his confirmation hearings that are due to begin on Monday.

But it is becoming increasingly clear that the issue of aid to Iraq will be another major focus of his hearings. The sheer quantity of technology, weapons and money that were transferred to Iraq over roughly the same period dwarfs anything that went to Iran. Remember, official U.S. policy was that no help should go to either side. In reality, the Reagan administration was split, some senior officials supporting Iran, others Iraq. And to those who wanted to see Iraq helped, the man you are about to meet was in a perfect position to be of assistance.

CARLOS CARDOEN, Chilean Arms Dealer: Of course, we couldn't be less than proud because we found that we were able to things that we didn't even dream that we were able to do.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] This is Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen, back in 1984, not long after he began a lucrative new business, the sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. Much has been made of the fact that cluster bombs are particularly nasty and deadly anti-personnel devices, designed to inflict maximum damage on heavy troop concentrations. Cardoen's cluster bombs depended on the transfer of a key weapons technology that was developed in the United States.

Steve Bryen is a former Pentagon official.

STEVE BRYEN, former Pentagon Official: If he didn't get it from the U.S. he may not have

been able to build the cluster bombs properly, so the answer to your question, how important were these transfers, they were probably very important. They may have been critical.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] Remember, Cardoen is from Chile. During the 1980s, the transfer of any kind of weapons technology from the United States to Chile was illegal.

The CIA's position on Cardoen is definitive. The agency told Nightline, "The CIA has never had a relationship of any type with Carlos Cardoen."

Somehow, though, Cardoen arranged for the transfer of cluster bomb technology to Chile, and set up his own factory to build them. As Nightline reported earlier, that technology came from ISC, International Signal and Control, of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. In October of 1984, ISC and Cardoen signed an agreement, in effect carving up the world's cluster bomb market. Cardoen would sell to all those countries with which ISC was prevented, under U.S. law, from doing business.

Could all this have gone on without the knowledge of the U.S. government? Senior Israeli officials have told Nightline that in the 1980s they were informed directly by the U.S. government that Carlos Cardoen was producing cluster bombs, using U.S. technology, and that these were being shipped to Iraq. Furthermore, several ISC executives claim a longstanding relationship with U.S. intelligence.

By 1988, Cardoen was not only selling cluster bombs to the Iraqis, he built them their own cluster bomb factory, like this one in Baghdad. He also provided the Iraqis with thousands of fuses to arm chemical weapons that were used in the Iran-Iraq war. And, according to foreign intelligence reports, Iraq was working on cluster bombs to dispense chemical and biological weapons with Cardoen's help.

By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, Cardoen was also finishing a plant to produce sophisticated fuses for artillery shells and fuel-air explosives. Some of that advanced technology also came from the United States.

Mr. BRYEN: [voice-over] Earlier in the decade, during the bloody Iran-Iraq war, Cardoen provided tens of thousands of low-tech bombs, again employing U.S. technology. Cardoen had purchased in the United States key equipment from two munitions factories, which he shipped to Chile. He did that at a time when the U.S. arms embargo against Chile was in effect.

This picture shows Cardoen inspecting one of the plants which produced artillery shells. Retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ricardson worked for Cardoen in the early '80s. He remembers what happened with that plant.

LT. COL. CARLOS RICARDSON, USAF (Ret.): He had a great deal of trouble with U.S. Customs. U.S. Customs stopped the shipment and held it up for, I guess, perhaps maybe even a year before it finally got broken loose and was shipped to Chile.

KOPPEL: [voice-over] The plant was designated as "scrap metal," and shipped from New Orleans. Another plant capable of producing aerial bombs came from Los Angeles.

INTERVIEWER: You saw the plant in L.A., you saw the plant in Chile. Would you consider that plant a scrap metal?

Lt. Col. RICARDSON: It's not hardly a scrap metal plant. He was very selective on the pieces of equipment that he took out of that plant, and mainly the presses, which are essential to making the casings. [*See J4JP Note #3 below]

KOPPEL: [voice-over] The reference is to bomb casings, Carlos Cardoen ultimately became one of Iraq's biggest sources of munitions during the '80s.

[On camera] With Robert Gates about to begin his confirmation hearings on Monday, the CIA in particular has taken great pains to emphasize that neither Gates personally nor the agency as a whole has had any type of relationship with Carlos Cardoen. The agency even faxed us a letter that Cardoen wrote last July to the U.S. ambassador in Chile. In that letter, Cardoen denies that he was a conduit for the agency and denies ever meeting Robert Gates.

[Voice-over] Indeed, Cardoen, who is currently facing several grand jury investigations, complains bitterly in his letter that he is being unjustly persecuted by the U.S. Government. He claims he has kept them thoroughly informed of all his commercial activities through the U.S. Embassy in Santiago.

Which brings us to James Theberge, who was, in the mid-1980s, U.S. ambassador to Chile. Shortly after leaving his post in 1985, Ambassador Theberge went to work for Carlos Cardoen, heading up one of his offices, Swissco Management Group, here in Washington.

LT. COL. RICARDSON: Ambassador Theberge's functions for Cardoen was probably one of opening doors, setting up marketing programs for Cardoen, and kind of the same thing that I did, except obviously at a little higher level.

KOPPEL: These days, as we've told you, the CIA is so eager to distance itself from Carlos Cardoen that it has issued a categorical denial that a relationship of any type existed between Cardoen and the agency. Such things are difficult to prove, but consider this.

[Voice-over] Ambassador Theberge went to work for Cardoen around October of 1985. A colleague, indeed the man who ultimately succeeded Theberge at Swissco, has consulted his records and tells us that the ambassador worked for Cardoen until February of 1987. Theberge died in January of 1988, but his widow tells us that before he died he took on another job. For a year to a year and a half, she told us, Ambassador Theberge worked for the CIA.

In other words, he worked for Cardoen until February of '87, and died 11 months later, in January of '88. But Mrs. Theberge recalls her husband serving on the CIA's senior review panel. She initially told us that her husband worked on the panel for the last 12 to 18 months of his life. Today she said she couldn't recall precisely how long Ambassador Theberge

worked for the agency.

At the very least, Theberge went directly from his job with Cardoen to a job with the agency. But there is reason to believe that he actually worked for both, for a few months at least, at the same time.

Incidentally, the function of the senior review panel is to advise one man - the director of Central Intelligence - and for at least part of the period in question there was an acting director of the CIA, Robert Gates.

We'll attempt to pull some of these threads together when we come back.

[Commercial break]

KOPPEL: When all is said and done, why should you or your representatives in Congress care? Eventually, after all, President Bush spoke and acted against Saddam Hussein more forcefully than anyone could have expected.

PRES. GEORGE BUSH (SR.): [October 23, 1990] We're dealing with Hitler revisited, a totalitarianism and a brutality that is naked and unprecedented in modern times.

GARY MILHOLLIN, Director, Wisconsin Project: The more we have Saddam, the more dangerous he got, and ultimately we had to go to war to destroy what we sold him.

KOPPEL: But it's not a question of holding the Bush or Reagan administrations to account for having made mistakes in regard to their policies toward Iraq. The issue is how those policies were implemented.

As we've reported over the past few months, the Atlanta branch of an Italian bank, BNL, was able to funnel billions, some of it in U.S. credits, to Iraq's military procurement network. The U.S. government knew and turned a blind eye.

Sophisticated military technology was illegally transferred from a major U.S. company in Lancaster, Pennsylvania to South Africa and Chile and, from there, on to Iraq. The Iraqi-born designer of a chemical weapons plant in Libya set up shop in Florida, producing and then shipping to Iraq chemical weapon components. The CIA, the FBI and other federal agencies were made aware of the operation and did nothing to prevent it.

During the 1980s and into the '90s, senior officials of both the Reagan and Bush administrations encouraged the privatization of foreign policy, certainly towards Iran and Iraq. The policy may have had merit, but they weren't willing or, in some instances, weren't successful in fighting it out on Capital Hill. So they found other ways. They made a mockery of the export control system, they found ways of encouraging foreign governments to do what our laws prohibited. They either knew or, if not, were guilty of the grossest incompetence, that U.S. companies were collaborating with foreign arms merchants in the illegal transfer of American technology that helped Saddam Hussein build his formidable arsenal.

This week, the CIA again told Nightline that our allegations over the past few months regarding covert operations to supply Iraq with U.S. arms and weapons technology were simply untrue. The CIA's inspector general, says a statement from the agency, "...has found no factual support whatsoever for such an operation or for the involvement of Mr. Gates."

At least one member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Bill Bradley of New Jersey, feels that there may be reason to doubt both those claims, and he'll raise the issues at the Gates confirmation hearings next week.

The CIA also told us that its inspector general has found no evidence of any off-the-books, illegal activities. But the CIA concedes that off-the-books activities are not documented, precisely so that deniability can be preserved.

One thing is undeniable--

[voice-over] - this gunsight video of a Stealth fighter-bomber from the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing last February attacking a bomb factory on the outskirts of Baghdad: U.S. technology in the air destroying U.S. technology on the ground. The factory was built by Carlos Cardoen.

[Commercial break]

KOPPEL: That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here at ABC News, good night.

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Justice4JP Notes

1. In light of this exchange what kind of credibility could Weinberger possibly possess? On the one hand, he secretly restricted the flow of critical intelligence to Israel, while simultaneously providing the Arabs with virtually everything they wanted to know about Israel's military capabilities and intentions. Then, during Operation Peace for Galilee, he tried to provoke the IAF into shooting down an American helicopter in order to have a complete arms embargo imposed on the Jewish state. And if this weren't bad enough, Weinberger was also quietly tilting US Middle East strategic policy in favor of a dictatorial, expansionistic Iraqi regime. A regime which was devoted to developing - and using weapons of mass destruction against Israel and Heaven knows who else! To top it all off, though, Weinberger has continued to deny he ever did anything "wrong". Would any honest person even consider believing a damage assessment of the Pollard case authored by this man? No? But, the court did, even though the presiding Judge acknowledged in writing that he knew that Weinberger - the government's star witness against Pollard - may not have been "neutral and detached." Truly an understatement!

2. This is how Inman and Weinberger instituted their undeclared intelligence embargo against Israel.

Powell, then the national security adviser, were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States decided it was imperative that Iran be thwarted, so it could not overrun the important oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf. It has long been known that the United States provided intelligence assistance to Iraq in the form of satellite photography to help the Iraqis understand how Iranian forces were deployed against them. But the full nature of the program, as described by former Defense Intelligence Agency officers, was not previously disclosed.

Secretary of State Powell, through a spokesman, said the officers' description of the program was "dead wrong," but declined to discuss it. His deputy, Richard L. Armitage, a senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to indicate his denial that the United States acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons.

The Defense Intelligence Agency declined to comment, as did Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots, retired, who supervised the program as the head of the agency. Mr. Carlucci said, "My understanding is that what was provided" to Iraq "was general order of battle information, not operational intelligence."

"I certainly have no knowledge of U.S. participation in preparing battle and strike packages," he said, "and doubt strongly that that occurred."

Later, he added, "I did agree that Iraq should not lose the war, but I certainly had no foreknowledge of their use of chemical weapons."

Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq's employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other poisonous agents, the American military officers said President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq.

Iraq shared its battle plans with the Americans, without admitting the use of chemical weapons, the military officers said. But Iraq's use of chemical weapons, already established at that point, became more evident in the war's final phase.

Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in pressing the Reagan administration to offer aid to Iraq out of concern that Iranian commanders were sending waves of young volunteers to overrun Iraqi forces. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, then and now, met with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and then told officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency that **Iraq's military command was ready to accept American aid.**

In early 1988, after the Iraqi Army, with American planning assistance, retook the Fao

Peninsula in an attack that reopened Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf, a defense intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Rick Francona, now retired, was sent to tour the battlefield with Iraqi officers, the American military officers said.

He reported that Iraq had used chemical weapons to cinch its victory, one former D.I.A. official said. Colonel Francona saw zones marked off for chemical contamination, and containers for the drug atropine scattered around, indicating that Iraqi soldiers had taken injections to protect themselves from the effects of gas that might blow back over their positions. (Colonel Francona could not be reached for comment.)

C.I.A. officials supported the program to assist Iraq, though they were not involved. Separately, the C.I.A. provided Iraq with satellite photography of the war front.

Col. Walter P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, said he would not discuss classified information, but added that both D.I.A. and C.I.A. officials "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose" to Iran.

"The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern," he said. What Mr. Reagan's aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Colonel Lang asserted that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival." Senior Reagan administration officials did nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the program said.

Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, but the intelligence officers say they were not involved in planning any of the military operations in which those assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major Iranian troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq's military command wanted assistance were on the southern war front.

The Pentagon's battle damage assessments confirmed that Iraqi military commanders had integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal and were adding them to strike plans that American advisers either prepared or suggested. Iran claimed that it suffered thousands of deaths from chemical weapons.

The American intelligence officers never encouraged or condoned Iraq's use of chemical weapons, but neither did they oppose it because they considered Iraq to be struggling for its survival, people involved at the time said in interviews.

Another former senior D.I.A. official who was an expert on the Iraqi military said the Reagan administration's treatment of the issue — publicly condemning Iraq's use of gas while privately acquiescing in its employment on the battlefield — was an example of the "Realpolitik" of American interests in the war.

The Truth About Jonathan Pollard

John Loftus - *Moment Magazine* - June 2003

When American intelligence broke the Soviet wartime code, we learned that the Soviets had infiltrated the American government. The American intelligence community's penchant for secrecy and its refusal to admit that it had been infiltrated was so great that it failed to disclose this to President Harry S. Truman. This is how Daniel Patrick Moynihan described it:

"The Soviets knew we knew they knew we knew. The only one who didn't know was the President of the United States. Our politics was injured for 30 years by this." — Quoted in the *New York Times*, March 30, 2002

There is a good reason why neither Congress nor the American Jewish leadership supports the release of Jonathan Pollard from prison: They all were told a lie—a humongous Washington whopper of a lie. The lie was first whispered in the "bubble," the secret intelligence briefing room on Capitol Hill, but it quickly spread.

Just before Pollard's sentencing, Senator Chic Hecht of Nevada, a senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, telephoned the leaders of every major Jewish organization to warn them not to support Pollard in any way. Pollard had done something so horrible that it could never be made public. Several senior intelligence sources confirmed the message: No matter how harsh the sentence, Jewish leaders had to keep their mouths shut; don't make a martyr out of Jonathan Pollard.

Washington insiders thought they knew the big, dark secret. David Luchins, an aide to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, announced to reporters that he had seen "secret documents confirming that Pollard's spying had resulted in the loss of lives of U.S. intelligence agents." Luchins later recanted his statement, but not until the damage had already been done.

Pollard had supposedly given Israel a list of every American spy inside the Soviet Union. On several occasions Soviet agents in New York had posed as Israelis. The CIA reasoned that that was also true in Israel: The Mossad had been infiltrated by one or more Soviet spies. In the trade this is called a "false flag" operation: Your enemy poses as your ally and steals your secrets. In this case, the CIA reasoned in attempting to explain its horrendous losses, Pollard had passed the information to Israel he had stolen, which in turn fell victim to the "false flag" operation. Soviet agents in Israel, posing as Israeli intelligence agents, passed the information to Moscow, which then wiped out American human assets in the Soviet Union.

Pollard hadn't meant for this to happen, but the result of the "false flag" mistake was mass murder. In a matter of months, every spy we had in Russia—more than 40 agents—had been

captured or killed. At least that was the accusation, but the basis for it had been kept secret from Pollard and his defense counsel.

The public could not be told the horrifying truth: American intelligence had gone blind behind the Iron Curtain—we had lost all our networks, as the intelligence community publicly admitted more than a decade later. The Soviets could have attacked the United States without warning. Everyone who knew at the time (including me) blamed Pollard.

On March 5, 1987, at 2:22 p.m., the sentencing hearing in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., began in Criminal Case No. 86-207, United States of America v. Jonathan Jay Pollard. The prosecutors produced a secret letter and memo from Secretary of Defense Caspar "Cap" Weinberger referring to the "enormous" harm that Pollard had done to our national security. In his memo, Weinberger directly accused Pollard of betraying America's "sources and methods," which is to say, he had betrayed our spies in foreign countries.

Weinberger publicly stated that Pollard was the worst spy in American history: "It is difficult for me, even in the so-called year of the spy, to conceive of a greater harm to national security than that caused by the defendant." Despite his plea agreement to the contrary with the government, Pollard was given the maximum sentence, life in prison. Weinberger later said that he wished Pollard had been shot.

A week after the sentencing, the Washington Times reported that the United States had identified Shabtai Kalmanovich as the Soviet spy in Israel who supposedly worked for the Mossad but was actually working for the KGB; he had betrayed American secrets to Moscow. Kalmanovich had been flying under a false flag. Washington insiders winked knowingly at one another: Pollard's contact in Israel had been caught.

Just to make sure that Pollard was blamed, U.S. intelligence sources, several months later, leaked word to the press of the Kalmanovich connection. "A Russian mole has infiltrated the Mossad and is transmitting highly sensitive American intelligence information to the Russians," was the report flashed around the world by United Press International on Dec. 14, 1987. Citing "American intelligence sources," the UPI announced that the "sensitive intelligence material relayed to Israel by Jonathan Pollard had reached the KGB."

But it was all untrue. Every bit of it. Pollard wasn't the serial killer. The Jew didn't do it. It was one of their own WASPs—Aldrich Ames, a drunken senior CIA official who sold the names of America's agents to the Russians for cash. Pollard was framed for Ames's crime, while Ames kept on drinking and spying for the Soviets for several more years. In fact, Israeli intelligence later suspected that Ames played a direct role in framing Pollard. But no one in America then knew the truth.

Ames was arrested in February 1994, and confessed to selling out American agents in the Soviet Union, but not all of them. It was only logical to assume that Pollard had betrayed the rest of them, as one former CIA official admitted shortly after Ames's arrest. Even one life lost was too many. So Pollard continued to rot in jail. No one dreamed that yet another high-level Washington insider had sold us out to Soviet intelligence. Years passed, and

eventually a Russian defector told the truth. A senior FBI official—Special Agent Robert Hanssen—had betrayed the rest of our agents. Hanssen was arrested in February 2001, and soon confessed in order to avoid the death penalty. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

Would the Americans now admit that they had been conned into blaming Pollard? Beltway bureaucrats do not readily admit to mistakes of this magnitude. Instead, they convinced themselves that Pollard might still be at least partly to blame for the worst debacle in U.S. intelligence history. One desperate analyst from the National Security Council, looking for something to pin on Pollard, had his own theory. Maybe the Russians didn't initially believe that their own spies (Ames and Hanssen) had procured all the names of U.S. agents in the Soviet Union. Maybe Pollard's list tipped the scales.

Such things had happened before. Once again, Washington insiders circled their alphabet agencies to fire back at the critics who dared to suggest that Pollard might have been innocent of the major charge against him.

Meanwhile, deep inside the Navy's intelligence service, a low-level decision was made to re-examine the Pollard case in view of the convictions of Ames and Hanssen. With sickening chagrin, the Navy discovered that the evidence needed to clear Pollard had been under its nose all along.

As my source in Naval intelligence explained, the list of our secret agents inside Russia had been kept in a special safe in a special room with a special "blue stripe" clearance needed for access. When I was a lawyer in the Justice Department and would be sent over to the CIA to do research, I was permitted to use only a blue-striped, CIA-issue legal pad for note-taking. Nothing with a blue stripe could leave the building without being scrutinized by CIA security.

But Jonathan Pollard didn't have "blue stripe" clearance, according to intelligence sources I spoke with. That was the bombshell that would clear him of any possible connection to the deaths of our Russian agents.

Just to make sure, I checked it out, even visiting Pollard in prison to confirm it. Sure enough, there is no way on earth Jonathan Pollard could have entered the file room, let alone the safe where the list was kept.

But the intelligence community's failure to catch this and thereby discredit a critical piece of prosecutorial evidence was, to put it mildly, a bit of an oversight. Some would say it was an obscene blunder. I regard it as an understandable mistake that was overlooked in the avalanche of phony evidence the KGB was planting that pointed to Pollard and away from Ames and Hanssen, whom the Soviets wanted to protect. Both of them had "blue stripe" clearance, as was well documented in several books that have been written on each man and his exploits.

The lack of "blue stripe" clearance was the final proof that Pollard could not possibly have

betrayed our Russian agents. It should certainly have gotten him a new hearing. As a former federal prosecutor, I can state that it would be hard to rebut this kind of evidence.

The Justice Department, in one of its briefs, had specifically mentioned the "false flag" theory as grounds to support Pollard's heavy sentence, arguing in part, that spying even for friendly countries can be damaging if information ultimately falls into the wrong hands. In this, the Justice Department had unwittingly misled the judge. Weinberger also raised the "false flag" issue in his top-secret memorandum to the judge.

The only possible way to uphold the sentence might be the "harmless error" doctrine. The government could admit that Pollard had never stolen the Russian agent list, but so what? Maybe he had passed other information that was equally damaging, so he would still deserve to remain in prison for the rest of his life.

The problem with the "harmless error" strategy is that the rest of the material that Pollard gave the Israelis was itself pretty harmless.

In fact, the original damage assessment from the intelligence community confirmed that the impact on our national security—of the release of information other than the agent names—was not serious. This assessment came after Pollard's initial grand jury appearance, but before the Soviets began to frame Pollard with the phony Kalmanovich connection. No less a figure than Assistant U.S. Attorney Charles Leeper had characterized damage caused by the release of the information that Pollard actually gave Israel as "minimal."

The reason America suffered so little harm is simple: Pollard was stealing Soviet secrets for Israel, not American secrets for the Soviets. Before the fall of communism, the Soviets were shipping guns to nearly every terrorist group in the Middle East. Pollard knew that U.S. intelligence had been ordered to share this information with Israel—under an executive order signed by President Reagan—but had not done so.

In fact, as Pollard himself admitted in one of my three prison interviews, many, if not most, of the documents he handed over were cover sheets showing the titles of files that the U.S. was supposed to share with Israel, but were holding back. (The U.S. government, according to Israeli intelligence sources, mistakenly counted the cover sheets as if they were full files and came up with the mythical "room full of stolen documents," instead of the small boxfuls or so that Pollard actually passed.) In the long run, though, the issue is not how many boxes Pollard passed, but whether anything he gave Israel did harm to America.

After the government's "false flag" theory was blown up by the "blue stripe" discovery, the anti-Pollard members of the intelligence community had to come up with a new PR campaign for damage control. In order to justify Pollard's life sentence, they had to show that he did do some potentially catastrophic damage to America. What they came up with was a bit of a stretch. Pollard had given Israel a set of radio frequency guidebooks, a worldwide listing of short-wave radio bands. It takes a lot of time and money to compile one of these guides, but essentially they are just publicly available information, openly deduced by listening to who is talking to whom on which radio bands.

Seymour Hersh is a famous reporter and long-time friend. (I was his secret source in his 1983 book *The Price of Power—Kissinger in Nixon's White House* (Summit Books). But Sy had his leg pulled on Pollard by his CIA sources, as a result of which Sy published a story in the *New Yorker* in January 1999 claiming that these radio guides were just about the crown jewels of U.S. intelligence. The truth is that certain portions of the guide had already been sold to the Soviets by the Walker spy ring, according to courtroom testimony, which also revealed that the Soviets thought so little of the guides' value that they did not even bother to ask their top spies, Ames and Hanssen, to steal the remainder of the set. Moreover, as previously noted, the government's own damage assessment report originally concluded that the loss of the guides was a minor matter.

So much for the crown jewels. If that is the best spin the intelligence community can come up with, Pollard is probably entitled to immediate release for time served. The truth is that without the "false flag" theory, and the accompanying "worst spy in history" hysteria, Pollard would probably have been served no more than five years in prison. He has already served 18 years.

After 9/11, though, I began to realize that Pollard's tale was only the beginning of a much bigger story about a major America intelligence scandal, which is the subject of a book I am now working on. Although Jonathan Pollard did not realize it, he had stumbled across the darkest secret in the Reagan administration's closet. It is one of the reasons that I am serving as the intelligence advisor on a trillion-dollar federal lawsuit filed in August 2002 against the Saudis on behalf of the victims of 9/11.

Pollard in fact did steal something that the U.S. government never wishes to talk about. Several friends inside military intelligence have told me that Pollard gave the Israelis a roster that listed the identities of all the Saudi and other Arab intelligence agents we knew about as of 1984. (This has been corroborated by Israeli sources, as well.) At that time, this list, known in intelligence circles as the "blue book," would have been relatively unimportant to the United States—but not to Israel.

Since 9/11, however, Pollard's "blue book" is of profound interest to everyone, including the U.S. These particular agents are now a major embarrassment to the Saudis and to the handful of American spy chiefs who had employed these Saudi intelligence agents on the sly. Some of the names on this list—such as Osama Bin Laden—turned out to be leaders of terrorist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and what we now call Al Qaeda.

In hindsight, we now know that Pollard stole the one book—that, incidentally, was alluded to in Weinberger's secret memorandum—that unquestionably proves that the Americans knew as early as 1984 about the connection between the Saudis and terrorist groups.

How does this all fit together? During the Reagan-Bush administrations, the National Security Council wanted to throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan using Arab soldiers instead of American. It seemed like a good idea at the time, but no one thought about the long-term consequences. In imitation of the Soviet strategy of hiring terrorists, we asked the Saudis to

recruit a proxy army of Islamic terrorists whom we would supply with guns and pay indirectly, according to intelligence sources. By having the Saudis hire the "freedom fighters," we could avoid embarrassing questions in Congress about giving the taxpayers money to known Arab terrorists.

In 1982, I went on "60 Minutes" to expose Nazi war criminals I had been assigned to prosecute who were then working for the CIA. It was one of those Cold War blunders. The CIA didn't have a clue it was dealing with Nazi war criminals. It thought they were "freedom fighters." In 1985, I ended up testifying before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee about Nazis on the intelligence payroll.

Sadly, the only lesson the intelligence bosses learned was to put the bad guys on someone else's payroll (the Saudis for one), and then reimburse them under the table. Because of my whistle-blowing during the early 1980s, the CIA was still pretty sensitive about hiring Nazi "freedom fighters" without background checks, so they were mostly kept out of the loop about the Arab terrorists hired clandestinely by the Saudis to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. The naive Americans walked away from the Frankenstein monster they had created, but the cynical Saudis kept the terrorists on the payroll. From the Saudi perspective, it was safer to keep paying the terrorists groups to attack Israel, Bosnia or Chechnya rather than letting them all back into Saudi Arabia. As one U.S. intelligence bureaucrat cynically confided to me, "Sure we knew that the Saudis were giving money to terrorist groups, but they were only killing Jews, they weren't killing Americans."

In this "Keystone Cops" affair, one wing of U.S. intelligence was hunting terrorists while another winked at the Saudis' recruitment of them. I have spoken to numerous FBI and CIA counter-terrorist agents, all of whom tell a similar story. Whenever the FBI or CIA came close to uncovering the Saudi terrorist connection, their investigations were mysteriously terminated. In hindsight, I can only conclude that some of our own Washington bureaucrats have been protecting the Al Qaeda leadership and their oil-rich Saudi backers from investigation for more than a decade.

I am not the only one to reach this conclusion. In his autobiography, Oliver North confirmed that every time he wanted to do something about terrorism, Weinberger stopped him because it might upset the Saudis and jeopardize the flow of oil to the U.S. John O'Neill, a former FBI agent and our nation's top Al Qaeda expert, stated in a 2001 book written by Jean Charles Brisard, a noted French intelligence analyst, that everything we wanted to know about terrorism could be found in Saudi Arabia.

O'Neill warned the Beltway bosses repeatedly that if the Saudis were to continue funding Al Qaeda, it would end up costing American lives, according to several intelligence sources. As long as the oil kept flowing, they just shrugged. Outraged by the Saudi cover-up, O'Neill quit the FBI and became the new chief of security at the World Trade Center. In a bitter irony, the man who could have exposed his bosses' continuous cover-up of the Saudi-Al Qaeda link was himself killed by Al Qaeda on 9/11.

guerre de huit ans, montrent une connivence militaire de haut niveau: planification et exécution des offensives, photos satellite, renseignements, équipements, etc. Dans les débuts de cette guerre atroce, les Israéliens avaient mis en place un système clandestin de fournitures d'armes à l'Iran, qui avait le dessous, pour faire durer la guerre autant que possible. Les connivences américaines sont rassemblées dans ce qu'on a appelé l'Irangate. Plusieurs livres ont raconté ces choses.

Mais il en est un qui va plus loin. Et il est justement rédigé (en 1992) par un participant de l'Irangate, un juif iranien recruté par le bureau du premier ministre israélien, pour contribuer à ce gigantesque trafic d'armes, qui allait engendrer des profits colossaux, réinvestis dans les opérations secrètes du terrorisme israélien. Ari Ben-Menashe, après avoir été mis à la porte assez ignominieusement des services de son pays d'adoption, a décidé, peut-être pour sauver sa peau, de croquer le morceau. Il a publié un livre, en Australie et à New York, intitulé *Profits of War, the sensational story of the world-wide arms conspiracy*. (Allen & Unwin, Sydney). Il y aurait beaucoup à dire ici, mais on se bornera à ce chapitre 17, intitulé "Agricultural project", où l'auteur raconte sa visite, au Paraguay, d'une usine isolée qui fabriquait (nous sommes dans les années 80) des "engrais", en réalité des composants d'armes chimiques. Ces éléments étaient destinés à l'Iraq en guerre, mais les Israéliens voulaient convaincre les Paraguayens de fermer cette usine, car ils redoutaient un renforcement de l'armée irakienne, dirigée par Saddam. Cette usine appartenait à un très riche homme d'affaire chilien, Carlos Cardoen, qui avait beaucoup fait dans les fournitures d'armes et qui avait même construit une usine pour fabriquer des bombes à fragmentation, vendables dans les pays où un embargo décidé par le Congrès empêchait les firmes américaines de vendre directement leur matériel de mort; ce qui était le cas de l'Iraq. Carlos Cardoen a été menacé par le Mossad, mais il s'en est apparemment bien sorti et continue à faire jaser la jet set de Santiago.

Cette petite histoire est suffisante pour donner à penser que l'essentiel de l'arsenal irakien, en termes d'"armes de destruction massive" était bien les gaz de combat (les armes biologique n'existent qu'à l'état de fioles de laboratoire, et l'Iraq n'avait pas d'armes atomiques du tout), et que ces gaz de combat étaient fournis par des agences privées, genre Cardoen, encouragées en sous-main par les autorités américaines. Du producteur au consommateur, par des chemins cachés et illégaux, mais très réels. On peut penser que le régime de Saddam n'a survécu à la contre-offensive iranienne, dans le sud, à la péninsule de Fao, comme dans le nord au Kurdistan, (Halabja) qu'en utilisant les gaz pour arrêter les assauts iraniens, qui se situaient alors *en territoire irakien*. Rappelons qu'à l'époque l'Occident tout entier et les régimes arabes pourris tous ensemble voulaient "contenir" l'Iran révolutionnaire. Saddam était le mercenaire de l'Occident, abondamment approvisionné en matériels de guerre. Mitterrand a prêté des avions **et des pilotes** pour aller bombarder les terminaux pétroliers iraniens... La presse française n'a pas encore donné cette "nouvelle"...

Quand donc les Américains ont affirmé l'existence d'armes de destruction massive en Iraq, ils étaient bien placés pour la connaître puisqu'ils l'avaient eux-mêmes mise en place. Ils pouvaient calculer la quantité déjà utilisée par les Irakiens; ils ont envoyés des officiers américains sur place pour inspecter le terrain et faire des rapports.

Il n'est pas difficile de deviner la suite. Quand les tambours de guerre ont commencé à résonner sur le thème de ces armes cachées, Saddam, qui savait bien qu'elles n'auraient pas le même effet sur des colonnes blindées et protégées, que sur des hordes de sacripants déguenillés cavant dans les marais du sud, a renoncé à leur usage. Il les a planquées dans un coin, sous

