

THE USA IN BED WITH SADDAM

From US sources

**Robert Parry
Joyce Battle
Richard Sale
Michael Moore
Joe Conason
Israel Shahak
Jim Crogan
April Gaspie / Saddam Hussein
US companies involved in arming Iraq**

GGB REPRINTS/ Jan. 2004

MATERIAL FOR THE INDICTMENT OF SADDAM'S ACCOMPLICES

«As with all nations, we respect Iraq's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.»
Donald Rumsfeld to Tareq Aziz in Baghdad, Dec. 1983.

Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. government approved 771 licenses for exports of biological agents, high-tech equipment and military items to Iraq.

One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full understanding of many matters in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein to US envoy, 1990

THE USA IN BED WITH SADDAM

Missing U.S.-Iraq History

By Robert Parry

With all the hoopla surrounding the capture of Saddam Hussein - "caught like a rat," read the *Chicago Tribune* headline - it is time to take a step back and consider the full story of the Saddam Hussein and his long time relationship with the U.S. government, beginning in 1959, when the CIA put Saddam on its covert operations payroll in a plot to assassinate then Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim.

In almost all of the instant histories that filled the news pages and the airwaves after his capture, the relationship between Saddam and successive U.S. presidential administrations has been ignored. *National Public Radio*, *the Washington Post*, *the New York Times*, all ignored the documented fact that for the decade of the 80s, Saddam was a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.

What follows is an article by investigative reporter Bob Parry, in which he fills in some of the missing pieces. It originally appeared February 23, 2003, before the war started, on <Consortiumnews.com>. As a correspondent for the *Associated Press* and *Newsweek* in the 1980s, Robert Parry broke many of the stories now known as the Iran-Contra Affair. His latest book, *Lost History*, is available on the <Consortiumnews.com> order page. - Joel Bleifuss

Before George W. Bush gives the final order to invade Iraq - a nation that has not threatened the United States - the American people might want a few facts about the real history of U.S.-Iraq relations. Missing chapters from 1980 to the present would be crucial in judging Bush's case for war.

But Americans don't have those facts because Bush and his predecessors in the White House have kept this history hidden from the American people. When parts of the story have emerged, administrations of both parties have taken steps to suppress or discredit the disclosures. So instead of knowing the truth, Americans have been fed a steady diet of distortions, simplifications and outright lies.

This missing history also is not just about minor details. It goes to the heart of the case against Saddam Hussein, including whether he is an especially "aggressive" and "unpredictable" dictator who must be removed from power even at the risk of America's standing in the world and the chance that a war will lead to more terrorism against U.S. targets.

For instance, George W. Bush has frequently cited Saddam Hussein's invasions of neighbors, Iran and Kuwait, as justification for the looming U.S. invasion of Iraq. "By defeating this threat, we will show other dictators that the path of aggression will lead to their own ruin," Bush declared during a speech in Atlanta on Feb. 20.

Leaving aside whether Bush's formulation is Orwellian double-speak - aggression to discourage aggression - there is the historical question of whether Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush actually encouraged Saddam's aggressions for geopolitical reasons or out of diplomatic incompetence.

Carter's 'Green Light'?

This intersection of Saddam's wars and U.S. foreign policy dates back at least to 1980 when Iran's radical Islamic government held 52 Americans hostage in Tehran and the sheiks of the oil-rich Persian Gulf feared that Ruhollah Khomeini's radical breed of Islam might sweep them from power just as it had the Shah of Iran a year earlier.

The Iranian government began its expansionist drive by putting pressure on the secular government of Iraq, instigating border clashes and encouraging Iraq's Shiite and Kurdish populations to rise up. Iranian operatives sought to destabilize Saddam's government by assassinating Iraqi leaders. [For details, see "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003.]

On Aug. 5, 1980, as tensions mounted on the Iran-Iraq border, Saudi rulers welcomed Saddam to Riyadh for the first state visit ever by an Iraqi president to Saudi Arabia. During meetings at the kingdom's ornate palaces, the Saudis feted

Saddam whose formidable Soviet- supplied army was viewed as a bulwark against Iran.

Saudi leaders also say they urged Saddam to take the fight to Iran's fundamentalist regime, advice that they say included a "green light" for the invasion from President Carter.

Less than two months after Saddam's trip, with Carter still frustrated by his inability to win release of the 52 Americans imprisoned in Iran, Saddam invaded Iran on Sept. 22, 1980. The war would rage for eight years and kill an estimated one million people.

The claim of Carter's "green light" for the invasion was made by senior Arab leaders, including King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, to President Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, when Haig traveled to the Middle East in April 1981, according to "top secret" talking points that Haig prepared for a post-trip briefing of Reagan.

Haig wrote that he was impressed with "bits of useful intelligence" that he had learned. "Both [Egypt's Anwar] Sadat and [Saudi then-Prince] Fahd [explained that] Iran is receiving military spares for U.S. equipment from Israel," Haig noted. "It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd."

Haig's "talking points" were first disclosed at [Consortiumnews.com](http://www.consortiumnews.com) in 1995 after I discovered the document amid records from a congressional investigation into the early history of the Reagan administration's contacts with Iran. At that time, Haig refused to answer questions about the "talking points" because they were still classified. Though not responding to direct questions about the "talking points," Carter has pooh-poohed other claims that he gave Saddam encouragement for the invasion.

But before the U.S. heads to war in 2003, both Carter and Haig might be asked to explain what they know about any direct or indirect contacts that would explain the Saudi statements about the alleged "green light." Saudi Arabia's longtime ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar also might be asked to give a complete account of what the Saudi government knows and what its leaders told Saddam in 1980.

[Haig's "top secret" talking points have been posted on the Web for the first time here. See:

<http://www.consortiumnews.com/2003/haig-docs.html>]

Reagan's Iraqi Tilt

Through the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, as first one side and then the other gained the upper hand, the Reagan administration was officially neutral but behind the scenes tilted from one side to the other.

When Iran appeared to be winning in 1982, Reagan and his advisers made a fateful decision to secretly supply Saddam's military, including permitting shipments of dual-use technology that Iraq then used to build chemical and biological weapons. Tactical military assistance also was provided, including satellite photos of the battlefield.

While congressional inquiries and press accounts have sketched out some of these facts over the years, the current Bush administration continues to plead ignorance or question the reliability of the stories.

Last September, for example, *Newsweek* reported that the Reagan administration in the 1980s had allowed sales to Iraq of computer databases that Saddam could use to track political opponents and shipments of "bacteria/fungi/protozoa" that could help produce anthrax and other biological weapons. [*Newsweek* issue dated Sept. 23, 2002]

Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about the *Newsweek* story at a Senate hearing on Sept. 19. "Did the United States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war?" Byrd inquired. "Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of reaping what we have sown."

"Certainly not to my knowledge," Rumsfeld responded. "I have no knowledge of United States companies or government being involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons."

So even the current U.S. secretary of defense - who served the Reagan administration as a special envoy to the Middle East in 1983-84 and personally met with Saddam - says he doesn't know about this secret history. Promises of further investigation last September also haven't brought answers to Byrd's questions.

Senior Bush's Advice

Beyond those "dual-use" supplies, other unanswered questions relate to whether then-Vice President George H.W. Bush urged Saddam to use greater ferocity in waging his war with Iran, advice that led the Iraqi air force to bomb civilian centers in Tehran and other Iranian cities in 1986.

A lengthy article by Murray Waas and Craig Unger in the *New Yorker* in 1992 described the senior Bush passing on advice to Saddam, through Arab intermediaries, for this more aggressive bombing campaign. Yet the historical question has never been settled. The senior Bush has never been subjected to a careful questioning, though it is true that Saddam did intensify his air campaign after Bush's trip.

The answer would be relevant now as the younger Bush asserts that Saddam's penchant for military aggression justifies a new war. If Bush's father actually was counseling Saddam to be more aggressive, that's a fact that the American people ought to know.

Waas and Unger described the motive for the Reagan administration's tactical advice as a kind of diplomatic billiard shot. By getting Iraq to expand use of its air force, the Iranians would be more desperate for U.S.-made HAWK anti-aircraft missile parts, giving Washington more leverage with the Iranians. Iran's need to protect their cities from Iraqi air attacks gave impetus to the Reagan administration's arms-for-hostage scheme, which later became known as the Iran-contra affair. [See *The New Yorker*, Nov. 2, 1992.]

Another "Green Light"?

The devastation from the Iran-Iraq war, which finally ended in 1988, also set the stage for the Gulf War of 1990-91. The eight-year war had crippled the Iraqi economy and left Saddam's government deeply in debt.

Having been egged on by the oil-rich sheikdoms to blunt the revolutionary zeal of Iran, Saddam felt betrayed when Kuwait wouldn't write off Iraq's debts and rejected a \$10 billion loan. Beyond that, Saddam was furious with Kuwait for driving down world oil prices by overproducing and for slant-drilling into Iraqi oil fields. Many Iraqis also considered Kuwait, historically, a part of Iraq.

Before attacking Kuwait, however, Saddam consulted George H.W. Bush's administration. First, the U.S. State Department informed Saddam that Washington had "no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait." Then, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam, "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

As *Foreign Policy* magazine observed, "the United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did." [*Foreign Policy*, Jan.-Feb. 2003]

While Glaspie's strange diplomacy drew some congressional and press attention during the previous Gulf crisis, the full context of George H.W. Bush's relationship with Saddam - which might help explain why the Iraqi dictator so disastrously misread the U.S. signals - has never been made explained.

A Clinton Cover-up?

Beyond that missing history of U.S.-Iraq relations, there's the secondary issue of cover-ups conducted by the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

Democratic sources say Clinton heeded personal appeals from the elder Bush and other top Republicans to close the books on the so-called "Iraqgate" investigation - as well as probes into secret Reagan-Bush dealings with Iran - soon after the Democrat defeated Bush in the 1992 election. Some Democrats say Clinton agreed to shelve the investigations out of concern for national security and the country's unity. Others suggest that Clinton was tricked by the wily elder Bush with promises that a pullback on the Iran-Iraq investigations might win Clinton some bipartisanship with the Republicans in Congress, a tantalizing prospect that turned out to be a mirage.

Whatever the reasons, Clinton's Justice Department did bail out the Reagan-Bush team in the mid-1990s when more disclosures about the secret dealings with Iraq flooded to the surface. Perhaps the most important disclosure was an affidavit by former Reagan administration official Howard Teicher that was filed in connection with a criminal trial in Miami in 1995. The Teicher affidavit was the first sworn public account by a Reagan insider of the covert U.S.-Iraq relationship.

Teicher, who served on Reagan's National Security Council staff, traced the U.S. tilt to Iraq to a turning point in the war in 1982 when Iran gained the offensive and fears swept through the U.S. government that Iran's army might slice through Iraq to the oil fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

"In June 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran," Teicher wrote in his affidavit. Teicher

said he helped draft a secret national security decision directive that Reagan signed to authorize covert U.S. assistance to Saddam Hussein's military.

"The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified," Teicher wrote in 1995.

The effort to arm the Iraqis was "spearheaded" by CIA Director William Casey and involved his deputy, Robert Gates, according to Teicher's affidavit. "The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non- U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq," Teicher wrote.

In 1984, Teicher said he went to Iraq with Rumsfeld to convey a secret Israeli offer to assist Iraq after Israel had concluded that Iran was becoming a greater danger. "I traveled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance," Teicher wrote. "Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so."

Another key player in Reagan's Iraq tilt was then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, according to Teicher's affidavit.

"In 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran," Teicher wrote. "This message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam Hussein.

"Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to Saddam Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern heads of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting with Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was communicated."

Teicher's affidavit represented a major break in the historical mystery of U.S. aid to Iraq. But it complicated a criminal arms-trafficking case that Clinton's Justice Department was prosecuting against Teledyne Industries and a salesman named Ed Johnson. They had allegedly sold explosive pellets to Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Cardoen, who used them to manufacture cluster bombs for Iraq.

Red-Faced Prosecutors

Prior to trying the Teledyne case, Clinton's Justice Department declared that its investigation "did not find evidence that U.S. agencies or officials illegally armed Iraq." But the review noted, curiously, that the CIA had withheld an unknown number of documents that were contained in "sensitive compartments" that were denied to the investigators. Despite that denial of access, the Clinton investigators expressed confidence in their conclusions.

Two weeks after that exonerating report, however, Teicher's affidavit was filed in federal court in Miami, embarrassing senior Justice Department officials. After taking the word of former Reagan-Bush officials and agreeing not to examine the CIA's "sensitive compartments," the Justice Department officials looked gullible, incompetent or complicit.

They took their fury out on Teicher, insisting that his affidavit was unreliable and threatening him with dire consequences for coming forward. Yet, while deeming Teicher's affidavit false, the Clinton administration also declared the document a state secret, classifying it and putting it under court seal. A few copies, however, had been distributed outside the court and the text was soon posted on the Internet.

After officially suppressing the Teicher affidavit, the Justice Department prosecutors persuaded the judge presiding in the Teledyne-Johnson case to rule testimony about the Reagan-Bush policies to be irrelevant. Unable to mount its planned defense, Teledyne agreed to plead guilty and accept a \$13 million fine. Johnson, the salesman who had earned a modest salary in the mid-\$30,000 range, was convicted of illegal arms trafficking and given a prison term.

Before a U.S. invasion of Iraq begins, former President Clinton might be asked whether he was approached by George H.W. Bush or a Bush emissary with an request to drop investigations into Reagan-Bush policies in the Middle East.

Teicher, who has since 1995 refused to discuss his affidavit, could be given a congressional forum to testify about his knowledge. So could other surviving U.S. officials named in Teicher's affidavit, including Gates and Rumsfeld. Foreign leaders mentioned in the affidavit also could be approached, including former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Mubarak and Aziz.

Junior Bush's Hidden Records

George W. Bush also has some questions he should answer before missiles start crashing into Baghdad. When he took office in 2001, one of his first acts as president was to block the legally required release of documents from the Reagan-Bush administration.

Then, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as a stunned nation rallied around him, Bush issued an even more sweeping secrecy order. **He granted former presidents and vice presidents or their surviving family members the right to stop release of historical records**, including those related to "military, diplomatic or national security secrets." Bush's order stripped the Archivist of the United States of the power to overrule claims of privilege from former presidents and their representatives. [For details on Bush's secrecy policies, see the *New York Times*, Jan. 3, 2003]

By a twist of history, Bush's order eventually could give him control of both his and his father's records covering 12 years of the Reagan-Bush era and however long Bush's own presidential term lasts, potentially a 20-year swath of documentary evidence.

As the junior Bush now takes the nation to war in the name of freedom and democracy, he might at least be challenged to reverse that secrecy and release all relevant documents on the history of the Reagan-Bush policies in the Middle East. That way, the American people can decide for themselves whether Saddam Hussein is an aggressive leader whose behavior is so depraved that a preemptive war is the only reasonable course of action.

Or they might conclude that Saddam, like many other dictators through history, operates within a framework of self-preservation, which means he could be

controlled by a combination of tough arms inspections and the threat of military retaliation.

Without the full history - as embarrassing as that record might be to the last five U.S. presidents - the American people cannot judge whether the nation's security will be enhanced or endangered by Bush's decision to put the United States on its own aggressive course of action.

[As a correspondent for the *Associated Press* and *Newsweek* in the 1980s, Robert Parry broke many of the stories now known as the Iran-Contra Affair.]

In These Times -- Dec. 16, 2003

<http://www.inthesetimes.com/comments.php?id=498_0_1_0_C>

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L'AMOUR ENTRE LES USA ET SADDAM HUSSEIN

<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>>

The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. **Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person ...**" January 10, 1984.

Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein:
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82

Edited by Joyce Battle

February 25, 2003

Washington Post "Live Online" chat with Archive Middle East Analyst Joyce Battle, "Iraq: Declassified Documents of U.S. Support for Hussein," February 27, 2003

Video Clip: "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein," Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. [Windows Media Video (WMV). Opens in Windows Media Player] (Iraqi television; courtesy CNN)

The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of crises during an era of upheaval in the Middle East: revolution in Iran, occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by militant students, invasion of the Great Mosque in Mecca by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, and internecine fighting among Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians in Lebanon. The war followed months of rising tension between the Iranian Islamic republic and secular nationalist Iraq. In mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked, in the mistaken belief that Iranian political disarray would guarantee a quick victory.

The international community responded with U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing in any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to Iraq, its ally under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries resumed in 1982). The U.S. had already ended, when the shah fell, previously massive military sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Iran because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis; Iraq had broken off ties with the U.S. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran depended on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq started the war with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.

Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)

Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.

The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available **only in a highly redacted**

version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the directive.

By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the international community respond to chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council investigation.

The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].

What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW [Chemical Weapons] and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the issue.

Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].

Soon thereafter, **Donald Rumsfeld** (who had served in various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour

of regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president [Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the meeting [Document 31].

Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document 37].

Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].

Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]

During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its "preliminary results favor[ed]

expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)

In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41]. On March 3, the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document 42].

The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].

Later in the month, the State Department briefed the press on its decision to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence and media reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations," the department's spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document 52].

Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision" on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of both France and Britain.

A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this effect" [Document 50].

Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions on the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].

On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State Department memo circulating the draft text observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].

On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives." The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq [Document 53].

A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].

Conclusion

The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a preemptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be supported as a "just war." The documents included in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that determined this country's policies during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently not perceived to serve U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from its determination that Iraq was to serve as the instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi government's repressive internal policies, though well known to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all in the presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.

Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines, has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few investigative reporters uncovered much more - especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed to the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000), Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the 1980s and who would not be deterred from making information available to the public [Note 2]. Almost all of the primary documents included in this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995 [Note 3].

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.

Access the document through:

<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/#docs>>

Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the Department of State. "Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq," November 21, 1980.

Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for "Islamic belligerents," including Israeli chemical products for Iran. It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both Iran and Iraq.

The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. It was sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum of foreign governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African, Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc., who found both combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition, and military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons compatible with the military

infrastructure created by the U.S. during the shah's reign, could not buy them directly, and had to rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the Department of State. "Conversation with [Excised]," December 12, 1980.

A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers were providing it with weapons with or without government approval.

(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September 1979 to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for medical treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response, the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 3: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for Iran and Iraq," February 16, 1981.

A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the "U.S. position has been to avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an end to the fighting and restore stability to the area."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 4: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4, 1981.

The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations at this time - they were restored in November 1984 - they were represented in each other's capitol by interests sections) says that the U.S. now has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis overthrew the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit Baghdad, "the first visit by a senior department official since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 5: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi Foreign Minister," April 8, 1981.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important that "our two countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis," paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's meetings in Baghdad.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 12, 1981.

As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more information from Washington "so as to be able to take up with the Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide array of issues of mutual interest."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper's visit, supports discussion of strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 20, 1981.

After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter" from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig, the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way correspondence had been established between the U.S. and Iraq.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in the United States. "Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar" [For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.

Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased trade. He takes the opportunity to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S. company bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State. "Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28, 1981.

Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary Command Council representative Tariq Aziz, the "highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations." Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's satisfaction with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After the meeting, he tells Washington that "we are in a position to communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly important message to convey."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 11: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.

Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it "has no specific information" regarding Iran's reported acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks the interests section head to assure Iraqi officials that "the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales to Iraq or Iran."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 12: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the Department of State. "Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad," September 27, 1981.

A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's parliament, and has discussions during which "the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly," reflected in expressions of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 13: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq as Supporter of International Terrorism," February 27, 1982.

The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions regarding removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support international terrorism. The guidance says that the decision has no implications for U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 14: National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia," March 19, 1982.

President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement, arms transfers, and intelligence planning. Revised guidelines are needed because of regional diplomatic and global oil market developments.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 15: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of Commerce. "Helicopters and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," September 20, 1982.

Iraq's director of agricultural aviation invites U.S. crop-spraying aircraft manufacturers to provide information about helicopters and pilot training, noting problems with its existing equipment because pilots have been inhaling insecticide fumes.

Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by this time. According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times, American-built helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical weapons attacks; according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq experimented with using commercial crop sprayers for biological warfare.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 16: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister," January 15, 1983.

The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of State George Shultz would welcome a visit by Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, but notes congressional criticism of Iraq and the "sensitivity of the terrorism issue" (Iraq supported several Palestinian nationalist factions.) The department suggests Iraq "contribute to the positive

atmosphere of the visit" by curtailing its support for terrorism, mentioning specifically the Palestinian groups Black June and May 15.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 17: Department of State, Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George P. Shultz to the Department of State. "Secretary's May 10 Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11, 1983.

Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He says that the U.S. is neutral toward the war but observes that Aziz knows that "we had been helpful to Iraq in various ways."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 18: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Message from the Secretary for FON MIN Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.

Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, commenting on the "very important common interests" between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz obliquely encourages Iraq to disassociate itself from the Palestinian groups it supports by evoking conservative Shiite militants opposed to both the U.S. and to Iraq's secular government: it "appears that at least the inspiration for certain terrorist acts against Iraq and against the U.S. emanates at times from the same sources. By working together to combat terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In observing Iraqi policy, it had begun to appear to me that Iraq was approaching the conclusion that its national interests are never served by international terrorists."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence Appraisal. "The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks," June 1983.

In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq "has made a few moves that could take it in that direction," while noting the difficulty of clandestine research and development and procurement of the necessary technology and fissile materials.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 20: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Bodine to the Department of State. "Militarization of Hughes Helicopters," June 8, 1983.

Tells the State Department that a government official from (presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in 1983. The request was turned down.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 21: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Reagan. "United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia" [Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July 12, 1983.

Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action plans for the Middle East (most content is excised).

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983.

Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and related practical concerns. The analysis notes that the U.S. "policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We assume that other actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.)"

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information Service Transcription. "IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV," October 22, 1983.

Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.

Document 24: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz. "Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons," November 1, 1983.

Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional information confirming Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons. They note, "We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, presumably from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary." The issue is to be added to the agenda for an upcoming National Security Council meeting, at which measures to assist Iraq are to be considered. The officials note that a response is important in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on chemical warfare.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 25: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" [Includes Cables Entitled "Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" and "Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons"], November 21, 1983.

State Department officials recommend discussing the use of chemical weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order to deter further use and "to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public positions we may have to take on this issue." A background cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and August 1983 "and more recently against Kurdish insurgents."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 26: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26, 1983.

President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin with regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on measures to protect Persian Gulf oil production and its transshipment infrastructure. The U.S. will give the highest priority to the establishment of military facilities allowing for the positioning of rapid deployment forces in the region to guard oil facilities.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 27: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7, 1983.

Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan, but notes that he does not think his visit will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam Hussein.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 28: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State [et al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 10, 1983.

The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that "perhaps the greatest benefit" of Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming visit to Baghdad "will be the establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein." The planned topics of

discussion are the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any other issues that the Iraqis might want to raise.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 29: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United States Embassy in Jordan. "Talking Points for Amb. [Ambassador] Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein," December 14, 1983.

A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be Saddam Hussein's first with a representative of the U.S. executive branch; therefore, a major goal will be "to initiate a dialogue and establish personal rapport." In the meeting, "Rumsfeld will want to emphasize his close relationship with President Reagan . . ." Talking points for the meeting include the Iran-Iraq war (the U.S. "would regard any major reversal of Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West"), expansion of Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon, Syria, strengthening of Egyptian and Iraqi ties, and the threat of terrorism, which targets both countries.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld's Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19," December 20, 1983.

During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S. and Iraq have both differences and "a number of areas of common interest." Aziz says that he was heartened by a line in President Reagan's letter to Saddam Hussein stating, "The Iran-Iraq war could pose serious problems for the economic and security interests of the U.S., its friends in the region and in the free world."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983.

At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein evinces "obvious pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld brought from President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss common U.S.-Iraqi interests, including Lebanon, Palestine, opposition to an outcome of the Iran-Iraq war that "weakened Iraq's role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran," and U.S. efforts to cut off arms sales to Iran. Rumsfeld says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly about terrorism and says that it has a home -

in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and that it is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages arrangements that might provide alternative transshipment routes for Iraq's oil, including pipelines through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State Department calls the meeting a "positive milestone."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 32: United States Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.

Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet for two and one-half hours and agree that "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests," including peace in the Persian Gulf, the desire to diminish the influence of Iran and Syria, and support for reintegrating Egypt, isolated since its unilateral peace with Israel, into the Arab world. Rumsfeld comments on Iraq's oil exports, suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition to international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli peace. He and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war "in detail." Rumsfeld says that the administration wants an end to the war, and offers "our willingness to do more." He mentions chemical weapons, possible escalation of fighting in the Gulf, and human rights as impediments to the U.S. government's desire to do more to help Iraq, then shifts the conversation to U.S. opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 33: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq" [Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated December 24, 1983], December 22, 1983.

Pursuant to the Reagan administration's policy of increasing support for Iraq, the State Department advises Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to urge the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financial credits. Eagleburger signs a letter to Eximbank saying that since Saddam Hussein had complied with U.S. requests, and announced the end of all aid to the principal terrorist group of concern to the U.S., and expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), "The terrorism issue, therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM financing for U.S. sales to Iraq." The financing is to signal U.S. belief in Iraq's future economic viability, secure a foothold in the potentially large Iraqi market, and "go far to show our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context."

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 34: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London," December 23, 1983.

Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says they had "more areas of agreement than disagreement." He also reviews the status of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq's oil.

The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several years during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq war.

The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations in planning the project. International financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. (The final report of the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra "arms for hostages" scandal cites reports indicating that Rappaport's bank in Geneva was the recipient of a mysterious \$10 million payment from the Sultan of Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared. Rappaport denied this; the final report says that the issue remained unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House Banking committee hearing on corruption in Russian financial transactions, but declined.) The project was complicated by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage.

All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest in the project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq relations - they wanted as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the proposed deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and created a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to create a wider consortium of Arab countries that would cooperate with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new oil facilities in its vicinity, and won points with the Reagan administration. Also, according to internal documents from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his Israeli ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.

Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties dragged on, until the several private companies that had been brought in to plan the project backed out, questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however, revived the concept in 2000, presumably for its own strategic interests.

Source: Court exhibit

Document 35: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," December 26, 1983.

William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit. Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq's oil exports increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the degree of U.S. interest in Iraq's economic situation, mentioning the "high level policy review which had established the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld."

Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important and practically helpful."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 36: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq's Oil Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.

During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq Aziz tells William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased with the visit and with the positive atmosphere it created.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan," January 10, 1984.

The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 38: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General, Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran" [Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.

The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country. However, it does not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.

The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin armored ambulances, communications gear, and electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam Hussein's personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing efforts to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide financing for Iraq -- a positive Eximbank determination would improve Iraq's credit rating and make it easier for it to obtain loans from international financial institutions.

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 39: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to George P. Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq," January 30, 1984.

The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls on exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The department is concerned specifically with an application to export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to either Iran or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration Act. Secretary of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa and Middle East Division, Board of Directors. "Country Review and Recommendations for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract; Includes Document Entitled "Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.

The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because of its very high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq if credits were available, including Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 41: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive," February 22, 1984.

Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits to Iraq to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures to assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement declaring that "the invaders should know that

for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 42: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq," March 4, 1984.

Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of "concern over Iraq's possible intention to use the chemical in the manufacture of chemical weapons." Washington asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern about chemical weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will publicly condemn their use in the near future. The interests section is to reiterate the request that Iraq not use chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq's attempts to acquire chemical weapons related material from the U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 43: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.

The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The statement says that "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 44: Department of State Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale," March 5, 1984.

The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff member that the department has not objected to the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S. is that it does not export military related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended for military purposes, the official responds, "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 45: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.

Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State Department's condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests section comments that "The Iraqis apparently have been stunned by our public condemnation."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of State. "Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.

The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a Belgian laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the blood of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical treatment.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 47: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations. "U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14, 1984.

The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United Nations to get the support of other Western missions for a motion of "no decision" regarding Iran's draft resolution condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.

The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department press conference, including the assertion that "The USG evenhandedly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 48: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page Missing]," March 24, 1984.

A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials by the U.S.'s public condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons "despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later." Most of the cable is concerned with the Reagan administration's interest in reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might

be available for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests. The cable notes that Iraqi officials are "confused" by the administration's "means of pursuing our stated objectives in the region."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department of State. "Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to Iran," March 24, 1984.

In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that the U.S. has approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms sales to Iran.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 50: Mission to the United Nations Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. "U.N. Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council," March 28, 1984.

Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation by a U.N. official that "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if international community does not condemn Iraq."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 51: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised Working Paper], March 30, 1984.

Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as a presidential statement. "The statement, by the way, contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 52: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. "Department Press Briefing, March 30, 1984," March 31, 1984.

The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors. It responds to questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and a department

spokesperson says Iraq's chemical weapons use will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq relations.

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 53: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan. "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.

Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S. military capabilities and "intelligence collection posture" in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government's condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while placing "equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 54: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge," April 6, 1984.

Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke discussed a draft United Nations' resolution on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi interests section representative Nizar Hamdoon on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution. Placke indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals regarding points that should be included in the resolution if the Security Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the Iraqi government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that would lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]" regarding chemical weapons use, but noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see war brought to [an] early end."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 55: United States Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Bell Discusses Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq," April 12, 1984.

The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised of developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter Textron about its sale of helicopters to Iraq's Ministry of Defense that "can not be in any way configured for military use."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.

Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan, his former aide and chief of staff, and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export to Iraq.

Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had exported weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed to have connections with former U.S. government officials.

Source: Court exhibit

Document 57: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions" [Includes Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to Iraq" Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.

An internal State Department paper indicates that the government is reviewing policy for "the sale of certain categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities," and the review's "preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities."

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. "Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects for Iraq," September 25, 1984.

The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic, and military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue to develop its conventional and "formidable" chemical capabilities, and will "probably pursue nuclear weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, including its aid for Iraq.

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.

Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq had used "domestically produced lethal CW" in the Iran-Iraq war, developed in part through "the unwitting and, in some cases, we believe witting assistance" of numerous Western firms. The State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in response to a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed their use in February 1984.

Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 60: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Iraq. "Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.," November 29, 1984.

Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz and emphasizes "the U.S. desire to base these relations on the presumption of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity." After Aziz says that Iraq's advantage in weaponry was enabling it to defend itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz comments "that superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense. Aziz acknowledged that this may be true." (The U.S. had been secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support for several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming the candor of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that "Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of chemical weapons. This position is not directed specifically at Iraq . . ."

Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 61: United States District Court (Florida: Southern District) Affidavit. "United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that Teledyne Wah Chang Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance, Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31, 1995.

Former Reagan administration National Security Council staff member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan signed a national security decision directive calling for the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to ensure that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs, and that the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits, intelligence, and strategic military advice. The CIA also provided Iraq, **through third parties that included Israel** and Egypt, with military hardware compatible with its Soviet-origin weaponry.

This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a number of prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, of U.S. companies charged with illegally delivering military, dual-use, or nuclear-related items to Iraq. (In this case, a Teledyne affiliate was charged will illegally selling zirconium, used in the manufacture of explosives, to the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries,

which used the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.) Many of these firms tried to defend themselves by establishing that providing military materiel to Iraq had been the actual, if covert, policy of the U.S. government. This was a difficult case to make, especially considering the rules of evidence governing investigations involving national security matters.

Source: Court case

This particular document is especially interesting by its admission that providing all sorts of military equipment was the official but hidden policy of the US government. It further vouch for the extraordinary admissions made by a former Israeli intelligence and arm seller Ari ben-Menashe, Profits of War, published in 1992 in Australia, detailing, among other revelations, that a Chilean enterprise headed by a Carlos Cardoen, was making and selling to Iraq cluster bombs, toxic gases, and so on. The affidavit of Howard Teicher, a long time staff member of the US National Security Council, mentions Cardoen and confirms Ben-Menashe's assertions. This book should be part of the material for indictment of the US Government as accomplice of Saddam Hussein's regime crimes against humanity. Here are some extracts of Teicher's affidavit:

3. In the spring of 1982, Iraq tethered on the brink of losing its war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the Iranians discovered a gap in the Iraqi defences along the Iran-Iraq border between Baghdad to the north and Basra to the south. Iran positioned a massive invasion force directly across from the gap in the Iraqi defences. An Iranian breakthrough at this spot would have cut off Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in Iraq's defeat.

4. United States intelligence, including satellite imagery, had detected both the gap in the Iraqi defences and the Iranian massing of troops across from the gap. At the time, the United States was officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

5. President Reagan was forced to choose between (a) maintaining strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat Iraq, or (b) intervening and providing assistance to Iraq.

6. In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC staff member, Geoff Kamp. The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified.

7. CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to the secret NSDD, the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credit, by providing US military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required.

The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their arms in combat. For example, in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran. [...]

8. I personally attended meetings with CIA Director Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off the Iranian attacks. When I joined the NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director Casey was adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier" that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the "human waves" of Iranian attackers. [...]

10. The United States was anxious to have other countries supply assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel's existence due to the growing Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I travelled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarek Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israeli's letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so. [...]

16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq.

18. [...] Specifically, CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licences required by Cardoen were not to be denied. [...]

This gives an interesting vista into the secret policy of the US: a system of deception, mass murder, hidden military intervention, hardly a recipe for moral behavior and the giving of lessons. The war launched by Saddam against Iran was typically an aggression war, unprovoked, and bloody. But when Saddam repeated this feat, without spilling blood, by entering Kuwait, some years later, he was written off the CIA books, like Noriega before him.

Notes

1. <<http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/Geneva.htm>>
2. <<http://www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp>>
3. <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>>; (see below)
<<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/introx.htm>>

Voir aussi la photo de Tarek Aziz à la Maison Blanche reçu par cet imécile de Reagan:

Ronald Reagan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meet at the White House on November 26, 1984, as the U.S. and Iraq restore diplomatic relations.

<<http://www.gwu.edu/%7Eensarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/igpic.html>>

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I R A Q G A T E, 1980-1994

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops rolled across the border into neighboring Kuwait. The invasion prompted outrage and action from the White House where Iraq's President Saddam Hussein was reviled as a modern day Hitler, potentially more dangerous by virtue of his nuclear weapons ambitions. But Washington's view had not always been so negative....

<<http://www.gwu.edu/%7Eensarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>>

Praise for Iraqgate, 1980-1994

"This set is the most comprehensive collection of documentation on recent U.S.-Iraq relations available to the public, providing invaluable insights into decision-making at the highest levels during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

Combining documents from a wide variety of U.S., British and other sources, this set is an excellent resource for researchers trying to understand a broad range of subjects, from U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf to the dynamics of international military, technological and economic aid programs."

Alan Friedman

International economics correspondent of the International Herald Tribune (Paris) and author of Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq.

C'est un site de l'Université George Washington, à Washington, qui joue un peu le rôle de l'ENA pour les petits ambitieux qui veulent entrer dans les cecles du pouvoir.

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SADDAM AND AMERICAN MANOEUVERS : A LONG STORY

Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot

By Richard Sale

U.S. forces in Baghdad might now be searching high and low for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, but in the past Saddam was seen by U.S. intelligence services as a bulwark of anti-communism and they used him as their instrument for more than 40 years, according to former U.S. intelligence diplomats and intelligence officials.

United Press International has interviewed almost a dozen former U.S. diplomats, British scholars and former U.S. intelligence officials to piece together the following account. The CIA declined to comment on the report.

While many have thought that Saddam first became involved with U.S. intelligence agencies at the start of the September 1980 Iran-Iraq war, his first contacts with U.S. officials date back to 1959, when he was part of a CIA-authorized six-man squad tasked with assassinating then Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim.

In July [14] 1958, Qasim had overthrown the Iraqi monarchy in what one former U.S. diplomat, who asked not to be identified, described as "a horrible orgy of bloodshed."

According to current and former U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, Iraq was then regarded as a key buffer and strategic asset in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. For example, in the mid-1950s, Iraq was quick to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact which was to defend the region [and threaten USSR] and whose members included Turkey, Britain, Iran and Pakistan.

Little attention was paid to Qasim's bloody and conspiratorial regime until his sudden decision to withdraw from the pact in 1959, an act that "freaked everybody out" according to a former senior U.S. State Department official.

Washington watched in marked dismay as Qasim began to buy arms from the Soviet Union and put his own domestic communists into ministry positions of "real power," according to this official. The domestic instability of the country prompted CIA Director Allan Dulles to say publicly that Iraq was "the most dangerous spot in the world."

In the mid-1980s, Miles Copeland, a veteran CIA operative, told UPI the CIA had enjoyed "close ties" with Qasim's ruling Baath Party, just as it had close connections with the intelligence service of Egyptian leader Gamel Abd Nassar. In a recent public statement, Roger Morris, a former National Security Council staffer in the 1970s, confirmed this claim, saying that the CIA had chosen the authoritarian and anti-communist Baath Party "as its instrument."

According to another former senior State Department official, Saddam, while only in his early 20s, became a part of a U.S. plot to get rid of Qasim. According to this source, Saddam was installed in an apartment in Baghdad on al-Rashid Street directly opposite Qasim's office in Iraq's Ministry of Defense, to observe Qasim's movements.

Adel Darwish, Middle East expert and author of "Unholy Babylon," said the move was done "with full knowledge of the CIA," and that Saddam's CIA handler was an Iraqi dentist working for CIA and Egyptian intelligence. U.S. officials separately confirmed Darwish's account.

Darwish said that Saddam's paymaster was Capt. Abdel Maquid Farid, the assistant military attach at the Egyptian Embassy who paid for the apartment from his own personal account. Three former senior U.S. officials have confirmed that this is accurate.

The assassination was set for Oct. 7, 1959, but it was completely botched. Accounts differ. One former CIA official said that the 22-year-old Saddam lost his nerve and began firing too soon, killing Qasim's driver and only wounding Qasim in the shoulder and arm. Darwish told UPI that one of the assassins had bullets that did not fit his gun and that another had a hand grenade that got stuck in the lining of his coat.

"It bordered on farce," a former senior U.S. intelligence official said. But Qasim, hiding on the floor of his car, escaped death, and Saddam, whose calf had been grazed by a fellow would-be assassin, escaped to Tikrit, thanks to CIA and Egyptian intelligence agents, several U.S. government officials said.

Saddam then crossed into Syria and was transferred by Egyptian intelligence agents to Beirut, according to Darwish and former senior CIA officials. While Saddam was in Beirut, the CIA paid for Saddam's apartment and put him through a brief training course, former CIA officials said. The agency then helped him get to Cairo, they said.

One former U.S. government official, who knew Saddam at the time, said that even then Saddam "was known as having no class. He was a thug -- a cutthroat."

In Cairo, Saddam was installed in an apartment in the upper class neighborhood of Dukki and spent his time playing dominos in the Indiana Café watched over by CIA and Egyptian intelligence operatives, according to Darwish and former U.S. intelligence officials.

One former senior U.S. government official said: "In Cairo, I often went to Groppi Café at Emad Eldine Pasha Street, which was very posh, very upper class. Saddam would not have fit in there. The Indiana was your basic dive."

But during this time Saddam was making frequent visits to the American Embassy where CIA specialists such as Miles Copeland and CIA station chief Jim Eichelberger were in residence and knew Saddam, former U.S. intelligence officials said.

Saddam's U.S. handlers even pushed Saddam to get his Egyptian handlers to raise his monthly allowance, a gesture not appreciated by Egyptian officials since they knew of Saddam's American connection, according to Darwish. His assertion was confirmed by former U.S. diplomat in Egypt at the time.

In February 1963 Qasim was killed in a Baath Party coup. Morris claimed recently that the CIA was behind the coup, which was sanctioned by President John F. Kennedy, but a former very senior CIA official strongly denied this.

"We were absolutely stunned. We had guys running around asking what the hell had happened," this official said.

But the agency quickly moved into action. Noting that **the Baath Party was hunting down Iraq's communist**, the CIA provided the submachine gun-toting Iraqi National Guardsmen with lists of suspected communists who were then jailed, interrogated, and **summarily gunned down**, according to former U.S. intelligence officials with intimate knowledge of the executions.

Many suspected communists were killed outright, these sources said. Darwish told UPI that the mass killings, presided over by Saddam, took place at Qasr al-Nehayat, literally, the Palace of the End.

A former senior U.S. State Department official told UPI: "We were frankly glad to be rid of them. **You ask that they get a fair trial? You have to get kidding. This was serious business.**"

A former senior CIA official said: "It was a bit like the mysterious killings of Iran's communists just after Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979. All 4,000 of his communists suddenly got killed."

British scholar Con Coughlin, author of "Saddam: King of Terror," quotes Jim Critchfield, then a senior Middle East agency official, as saying the killing of Qasim and the communists was regarded "as a great victory." A former long-time covert U.S. intelligence operative and friend of Critchfield said: "Jim was an old Middle East hand. He wasn't sorry to see the communists go at all. Hey, we were playing for keeps."

Saddam, in the meantime, became head of al-Jihaz a-Khas, the secret intelligence apparatus of the Baath Party.

The CIA/Defense Intelligence Agency relation with Saddam intensified after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in September of 1980. During the war, the CIA regularly sent a team to Saddam to deliver battlefield intelligence obtained from Saudi AWACS surveillance aircraft to aid the effectiveness of Iraq's armed forces, according to a former DIA official, part of a U.S. interagency intelligence group.

This former official said that he personally had signed off on a document that shared U.S. satellite intelligence with both Iraq and Iran in an attempt to produce a military stalemate. "When I signed it, I thought I was losing my mind," the former official told UPI.

A former CIA official said that Saddam had assigned a top team of three senior officers from the Estikhbarat, Iraq's military intelligence, to meet with the Americans.

According to Darwish, the CIA and DIA provided military assistance to Saddam's ferocious February 1988 assault on Iranian positions in the al-Fao peninsula by blinding Iranian radars for three days.

The Saddam-U.S. intelligence alliance of convenience came to an end at 2 a.m. Aug. 2, 1990, when 100,000 Iraqi troops, backed by 300 tanks, invaded its neighbor, Kuwait. America's one-time ally had become its bitterest enemy.

And here are some of the American corporations who helped to prop Saddam up by doing business with him: AT&T, Bechtel, Caterpillar, Dow Chemical, Dupont, Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM (for a full list of companies and descriptions of how they helped Saddam,

<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php>>click here.

We were so cozy with dear old Saddam that we decided to feed him satellite images so he could locate where the Iranian troops were. We pretty much knew how he would use the information, and sure enough, as soon as we sent him the spy photos, he gassed those troops. And we kept quiet. Because he was our friend, and the Iranians were the "enemy." A year after he first gassed the Iranians, we reestablished full diplomatic relations with him!

Later he gassed his own people, the Kurds. You would think that would force us to disassociate ourselves from him. Congress tried to impose economic sanctions on Saddam, but the Reagan White House quickly rejected that idea -- they wouldn't let anything derail their good buddy Saddam. We had a virtual love fest with this Frankenstein whom we (in part) created.

And, just like the mythical Frankenstein, Saddam eventually spun out of control. He would no longer do what he was told by his master. Saddam had to be caught. And now that he has been brought back from the wilderness, perhaps he will have something to say about his creators. Maybe we can learn something... interesting. Maybe Don Rumsfeld could smile and shake Saddam's hand again. Just like he did when he went to see him in 1983

Maybe we never would have been in the situation we're in if Rumsfeld, Bush, Sr., and company hadn't been so excited back in the 80s about their friendly monster in the desert.

Meanwhile, anybody know where the guy is who killed 3,000 people on 9/11? Our other Frankenstein?? Maybe he's in a mouse hole.

So many of our little monsters, so little time before the next election.

Stay strong, Democratic candidates. Quit sounding like a bunch of wusses. These bastards sent us to war on a lie, the killing will not stop, the Arab world hates us with a passion, and we will pay for this out of our pockets for years to come. Nothing that happened today (or in the past 9 months) has made us ONE BIT safer in our post-9/11 world. Saddam was never a threat to our national security.

Only our desire to play Dr. Frankenstein dooms us all.

Yours,

Michael Moore

mmflint@aol.com

<http://www.michaelmoore.com/>

For a look back to the better times of our relationship with Saddam Hussein, see the following:

Patrick E. Tyler, "Officers say U.S. aided Iraq in war despite use of gas," *New York Times*, August 18, 2002.

<<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0818-02.htm>>

"U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their possible impact on health consequences of the Gulf War," 1994 Report by the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

<http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/medsearch/FocusAreas/riegle_report/report/report_index.htm> [Link dubious]

William Blum's cover story in the April 1998 issue of *The Progressive*, "Anthrax for Export."

<<http://www.progressive.org/0901/anth0498.html>>

"Iraq: U.S. military items exported or transferred to Iraq in the 1980s," United States General Accounting Office, released February 7, 1994.

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"Iraqgate: Saddam Hussein, U.S. policy and the prelude to the Persian Gulf War, 1980-1994," The National Security Archive, 2003

<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>>

The links are live at : <<http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/message/index.php>>

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Who Will Testify At Saddam,s Trial?

by <<mailto:jconason@observer.com>>Joe Conason

December 19, 2003

President George W. Bush and the provisional Iraqi authorities have promised that before Saddam Hussein is executed, he will most certainly receive a fair trial. Conveniently enough, the Iraqis set up a war-crimes tribunal in Baghdad for this

purpose just last week. So sometime after Saddam's Army interrogators are finished sweating the old monster, the preparations shall begin for what promises to be a courtroom spectacular.

Advocates of human rights and international law hope that the prosecution of Saddam will improve somewhat upon his regime's standard of criminal justice, which generally entailed horrific torture followed by confession and punishment. They have urged that Saddam's trial be conducted with complete fairness and transparency. Ahmed Chalabi, the Pentagon's favorite member of the Iraqi Governing Council, says that Saddam must be afforded the lawful treatment he denied his victims.

Those laudable aims presumably require that he be permitted to defend himself legally, no matter how indefensible he actually is. Human Rights Watch, which demanded action against Iraqi atrocities before such concerns became fashionable in Washington, now insists that the captured dictator "must be allowed to conduct a vigorous defense that includes the right to legal counsel at an early stage."

Apart from blaming his underlings for the genocidal crimes on his indictment, what defense can he (or his lawyers) offer? Following in the style of Slobodan Milosevic, he may well wish to spend his final days on the public stage bringing shame to those who brought him down.

Unfortunately, it isn't hard to imagine how he might accomplish that if he can call witnesses and subpoena documents.

Charged with the use of poison gas against Kurds and Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam could summon a long list of Reagan and Bush administration officials who ignored or excused those atrocities when they were occurring.

An obvious prospective witness is Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who acted as a special envoy to Baghdad during the early 1980's. On a courtroom easel, Saddam might display the famous December 1983 photograph of him shaking hands with Mr. Rumsfeld, who acknowledges that the United States knew Iraq was using chemical weapons. If his forces were using Tabun, mustard gas and other forbidden poisons, he might ask, why did Washington restore diplomatic relations with Baghdad in November 1984?

As for his horrendous persecution of the Kurds in 1988, Saddam could call executives from the banks and defense and pharmaceutical companies from various countries that sold him the equipment and materials he is alleged to have used. He might put former President George Herbert Walker Bush on the witness stand and ask, "Why did your administration and Ronald Reagan's sell my government biological toxins such as anthrax and botulism, as well as poisonous chemicals and helicopters?"

Saddam could also subpoena Henry Kissinger, whose consulting firm's chief economist ventured to Baghdad in June 1989 to advise the Iraqi government on restructuring its debt. "After my forces allegedly murdered thousands of Kurdish civilians in 1988," he might inquire, "why would you and other American businessmen want to help me refinance and rearm my government?"

Indeed, Saddam could conceivably seek the testimony of dozens of men and women who once served in the Reagan and Bush administrations, starting with former Secretary of State George Shultz, and ask them to explain why they opposed

every Congressional effort to place sanctions on his government, up until the moment his army invaded Kuwait during the summer of 1990. Pursuing the same general theme, he might call Vice President Dick Cheney, who sought to remove sanctions against Iraq when he served as the chief executive of Halliburton Corp.

The long, shadowy history of American relations with Saddam would be illuminated not only through witness testimony but literally thousands of documents in U.S. government files. Memos uncovered by the National Security Archive show that Reagan and Bush administration officials knew exactly how the Iraqi government was procuring what it needed to build weapons of mass destruction, including equipment intended for construction of a nuclear arsenal.

From time to time, during those crucial years when Saddam consolidated his power and prepared for war, U.S. diplomats issued rote condemnations of his worst actions. Then, as the record shows, they would privately reassure Saddam that the United States still desired close and productive relations. The other governments that were Saddam's accomplices include both opponents and supporters of this administration's pre-emptive war~from France, Germany and Russia, to Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Pertinent as these issues are to Saddam's case, they do not mitigate his record of murder and corruption. And the man dragged from his pathetic hideout near Tikrit hardly seems to possess the will or the capability to raise them. Either way, he will get what he deserves. Yet it will be hard to boast that justice and history have been fully served if his foreign accomplices escape their share of opprobrium.

This column ran on page 5 in the 12/22/2003 edition of The New York Observer

Joe Conason is the author of *The Hunting of the President: The Ten-Year Campaign to Destroy Bill and Hillary Clinton*

<<http://www2.observer.com/observer/pages/conason.asp>>

<http://www.observer.com/pages/author_look.asp?Author=Joe%20Conason>

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Extract of Open Secrets by Israel Shahak

Past contacts between Israel and Saddam Hussein 10 November 1990

In the middle of the present Gulf crisis it is worth recalling that until a few months ago Saddam Hussein persistently offered to make peace with Israel on the latter's terms. One of his attempts took place about a year ago. The then Defence

Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was during one of his visits to the US then approached with an offer that he meet Saddam Hussein. Information to this effect appeared in two articles by the senior strategy and military correspondent of *Haaretz*, Ze'ev Shiff, who in matters of historical fact can be considered quite reliable (*Haaretz*, 5 and 6 November 1990). Interestingly, Rabin refused to either confirm or deny the revelations, after *Haaretz* accorded them publicity by printing them on its front page.

The middleman chosen by Saddam Hussein was 'an American businessman of Arab descent ... Bob Abud. At present he is the president of the First City Bank of Texas. In the past he presided over the oil company owned by the multi-millionaire Armand Hammer ... He is 62, well-known for his good relations with some heads of Arab states, for whom he arranges personal loans on easy terms. He also maintains good relations with the Arab-American community. After twelve years of heading Hammer's oil company 'Occidental Petroleum', he became president of a Chicago bank', where 'he developed an interest in advancing the cause of peace between Israel and the Arab states' (Shiff, 6 November). It is not irrelevant to note that Armand Hammer, who is Jewish, has for many years been a fervent Israel supporter, a generous contributor to United Jewish Appeal (of the US) and a major investor in Israel, in addition to being used by Israeli diplomacy as a middleman in political ventures, for example arranging the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel through his contacts with top Soviet leaders.

As Shiff reports it (5 November) the offer was made by Saddam Hussein, who proposed through Abud 'to meet with Yitzhak Rabin, then [Israeli] Defence minister. The dates of two meetings, to be held in Europe were already fixed, although the Iraqis requested to reschedule them. A secret meeting between Rabin and the middleman was held in Philadelphia.' According to Shiff, Abud, 'was held by the Israelis in respect, as somebody with useful connections. Considering this, Rabin expressed his desire to meet him in order to hear directly about the Iraqi proposal.' Prior to meeting Rabin, Mr Abud met several times 'an Israeli businessman living most of his time abroad, Azriel Einav', known for having good connections within the Israeli Defence Ministry and other components of the Israeli Security System. When those meetings proved successful and the consent of Rabin to establish contacts with Saddam Hussein was obtained, an influential aide and personal friend of Rabin, Eytan Haber 'was appointed as a go-between in charge of arranging the meetings' of Rabin with Saddam Hussein. When confronted by Shiff with the evidence, Haber responded that "'something like that" had indeed occurred', but refused to provide any further information.

The Philadelphia meeting of Abud with Rabin was held when the latter attended the opening of an Israeli Bonds convention in that city. Haber and the military secretary of Rabin, Kuti Mor were present during a part of the meeting with Abud. To prevent the press from noticing the meetings, Mr Abud 'entered the hotel through the kitchen door and proceeded to Rabin's suite by a service elevator'. On the agenda was, first, 'the proposal [of Saddam Hussein] to meet in order to talk about reconciling the interests of the two states', and, the second, means of averting an Israeli attack on Iraq which was rumoured to be under preparation: 'Rabin accepted the proposal to meet Saddam Hussein at a location to be determined, but

rejected the proposal to include a PLO representative during part of these talks.' After this agreement, Mr Abud suggested in the name of Saddam Hussein, that 'Rabin may be invited to a meeting in Baghdad', instead of a meeting in Europe. There is no information about how Rabin responded to this interesting suggestion, except that he 'opined that all leads toward peace with all the Arab states deserve to be examined'.

Contacts between Israel and Iraq and the timing of various meetings were negotiated and renegotiated by Israel and Iraq through the above mentioned go-between during several subsequent months, 'but when the tension between [Israel] and Iraq began to mount after Saddam Hussein's speech at the last February's conference of the Council for Economic Cooperation between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen, the idea of meeting was shelved', apparently by Israel. Shiff (5 November) writes in conclusion: 'Supposedly, the American businessman was reporting all the details of the negotiations to the White House.'

Open Secrets, Israeli nuclear and foreign policies, by Israel Shahak, Pluto Press, London, UK & Chicago, Il., US, 1997. pp.193.

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Article in three parts

Made in the USA

A guide to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction

by Jim Crogan

As U.S. and British fighter jets and bombers knife through Iraqi airspace to pound targets in and around Baghdad, attacking pilots will challenge an air-defense system updated with fiber-optic equipment installed by a Chinese corporation and supported by American high-end technology.

At every turn of the war against Iraq, U.S. and British forces will face weapons systems largely developed and supplied to Iraq by American, European, Russian and Chinese companies.

Airmen will seek to evade anti-aircraft missiles, designed by Russian, German, Chinese, Egyptian and Argentine engineers, and controlled by American, British and French supercomputers and navigational systems.

Ground forces will gird themselves against the risk of germs and viruses supplied by American companies, or chemical weapons manufactured with German, Swiss, American and British technology and supplies. So-called dirty bombs, which use conventional explosives to spread deadly radiation, would be the direct result of French- or Japanese-based engineering.

Call it globalization at its worst.

Most of the technology was sold to Iraq in the decade before the 1991 Gulf War, but not all.

A case in point is Huawei Technologies. Between 2000 and 2002, this leading Chinese communications company upgraded Saddam's air-defense system. Huawei's actions, which violated the international embargo against military sales to Iraq, used good old American know-how. AT&T helped "optimize" this Chinese company's products, and IBM supplied Huawei with switches, chips and processing technology. Texas Industries helped set up a lab in 1997 to train Huawei engineers and develop signal-processing systems, according to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit foundation that monitors the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile technology. Records indicate that Huawei built another joint lab with Motorola in 1997.

That same year the Chinese company received U.S. Department of Commerce approval to buy supercomputers from Digital Equipment Corporation, IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Sun Microsystems. Huawei also purchased large amounts of telecommunications equipment from Qualcomm, again approved by the Commerce Department.

Gary Pitts, a Houston attorney, has sued American and European companies for supplying Iraq's program to build weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations and the United States have so far refused to disclose publicly all the companies named by Iraq in U.N. documents as suppliers for its weapons programs. Pitts then sent his consultant, Scott Ritter, a former U.N. weapons inspector, to Baghdad. Ritter returned with a copy of Iraq's 1997 weapons declaration to the U.N., which Pitts is now incorporating into his lawsuit.

Iraq's 1997 declaration was supplanted by its December 2002 declaration. Again, the suppliers' names were not revealed, but the information was leaked to Andreas Zumach, a Swiss-based reporter who published company names in the Berlin newspaper Die Tageszeitung. The Weekly was unable to verify the list, but Zumach, who spoke with the Weekly, identified 24 American-based corporations and 50 American subsidiaries of foreign corporations. The names include several California-based corporations: Rockwell, Hewlett-Packard, Bechtel, Axel Electronics Inc. and Spectra Physics. None of these companies other than Bechtel returned calls for comment to the Weekly. (Bechtel confirmed that it helped design a petrochemical plant outside Baghdad, but a spokesperson added that the company's actions were legal at the time.) Zumach's list also identified three Chinese companies, including Huawei, and eight from France, 17 from Britain, six from Russia, five from Japan, three from Holland, seven from Belgium, three from Spain and two from Sweden.

In his speech before the United Nations, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that "To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons program, Iraq procures needed items from around the world, using an extensive clandestine network." But Powell has been notably silent on issues of U.S. culpability, corporate profiteering or violations of international chemical, nuclear and biological

treaties. Powell, for instance, neglected to mention that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta sent Iraq three shipments of West Nile virus for medical research in 1985.

Powell also failed to acknowledge that Iraq obtained some of its initial anthrax bacilli from American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a Maryland/Virginia-based nonprofit bio-resource center that supplies viruses and germs to governments, companies and academic institutions worldwide. Between 1985 and 1989, ATCC sent Iraq deadly shipments that included a variety of anthrax bacteria and germs that cause meningitis, influenza, botulism, lung failure and tetanus, according to media reports and U.N. records. ATCC did not respond to a request for an interview.

Thiodiglycol, a substance needed to manufacture deadly mustard gas, made its way to Iraq via Alcolac International, Inc., a Maryland company, since dissolved and reformed as Alcolac Inc., and Phillips, once a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum and now part of ConocoPhillips, an American oil and energy company.

The Weekly contacted the Texas law firms representing Alcolac Inc. and ConocoPhillips for comment, but only Ronald Welsh, Alcolac's lawyer responded. "I have no personal knowledge that Alcolac supplied Iraq" with a component of mustard gas, said Welsh. Alcolac's attorney also claimed he didn't know that Gary Pitts had obtained Iraq's 1997 Weapons Declaration, but said he intends to challenge its authenticity in court.

Alcolac was one of a handful of corporations prosecuted by the U.S. Justice Department for illegal exports. Although Alcolac allegedly supplied its mustard-gas ingredient to Iraq and Iran, the Justice Department indicted the company in 1988 only for its illegal exports to Iran, via a German company, Chemco. A Chemco executive, who arranged the sales, was convicted of violating export laws. Alcolac's chemicals allegedly made their way to Iraq through Nu Kraft Mercantile Corp., via Jordan. In 1989, Alcolac pleaded guilty to one count of violating U.S. export laws.

Hussein's troops used mustard gas against the Iranians in their war and also against Kurdish civilians at Halabjah in 1988. And during the first Gulf War, hundred of thousands of American soldiers might have been exposed to hazardous levels of poison gas released when coalition jets bombed Iraqi targets. At the time, Czech chemical-detection equipment, the most sophisticated in the world, registered mustard gas and sarin nerve-gas exposure. Gulf War vets were found to be two to three times more likely to have children born with birth defects, according to a study published by the Annals of Epidemiology. Likewise, vets may have higher-than-average rates of cancers, afflicting the brain, nervous and reproductive systems, pancreas, kidneys and lungs.

Of 567,000 American troops who saw duty in the Gulf during the 1991 war, 293,561 — or nearly 52 percent — have now filed medical claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs, said Steven Robinson, executive director of the National Gulf War Resource Center and a Gulf War vet. The VA has granted compensation to 163,000 Gulf War vets, at a cost of \$1.8 billion per year. Robinson also says that at least 11,074 Gulf vets have died since the war.

"We want those companies, especially the American firms who may have broken the export laws, to be criminally prosecuted," said Robinson.

LA Weekly, 21-27 March, 2003

Made in the USA (Part II)
**More on the connection between the U.S., American corporations and Iraq's
weapons programs**
by Jim Crogan

Iraq would never have developed its chemical-, biological- and nuclear-weapons program — or even its conventional missiles — without technology and material support supplied by a phalanx of American and international corporations. It also helped mightily that officials in the first Bush presidency — many of whom now work for George W. Bush — were willing to look the other way or directly assist Saddam Hussein's regime.

Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. government approved 771 licenses for exports of biological agents, high-tech equipment and military items to Iraq, reported Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-Connecticut) in 1991. Those exports were valued at \$1.5 billion, said Gejdenson, who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time.

"The United States spent virtually an entire decade making sure that Saddam Hussein had almost whatever he wanted.... We continued to approve this equipment until just weeks before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait," declared, according to a Congressional transcript.

Gejdenson also told his subcommittee that the State Department refused to impose controls on the export of biological toxins to Iraq until 1989, even though it knew Hussein used chemical weapons against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war as well as Kurdish civilians.

And, he added, the administration of the elder George Bush had lobbied, right up to "July 27, 1990 — six days before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait," against a proposed House amendment that would have restricted agricultural credits to Iraq.

In a 1991 speech on the House floor, Texas Democratic Congressman Henry Gonzalez denounced the billions in financial support given to Hussein with assistance from both the Reagan and Bush administrations. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), an Italian, multinational banking concern with American operations based in New York, delivered more than \$4 billion in loans to Iraq, during the 1980s.

Those loans, unreported to U.S. banking officials, were funneled through BNL's Atlanta branch. The subsequent scandal eventually resulted in the conviction of several BNL employees for fraud.

And yet Gonzalez was able to cite a Federal Reserve document showing that the secretary of state for the first President Bush actually discussed these criminally suspect BNL loans with Saddam Hussein. Investigators also found BNL-related telexes between April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and the State Department in Washington.

Gonzalez also reported that U.S. officials under Reagan and Bush routinely ignored evidence that Iraq was using its weapons of mass destruction. He cited congressional testimony by Paul Freedenberg, the chief export-licensing official at the Department of Commerce during parts of both the Reagan and Bush administrations, to underscore that point.

"In the summer of 1988, a number of licenses were pending with regard to technology transfers to Iraq," testified Freedenberg. "I asked for official guidance with regard to what the licensing policy would be toward Iraq, since by then there was credible evidence of the use of poison gas by the Iraqis against their own people and also against the Iranians."

Freedenberg told Congress that he suggested the "imposition of foreign controls" be used to justify the denial of these export licenses. But the National Security Council told him to treat these exports as "normal trade."

More would be known about corporate and governmental malfeasance except that this information is being kept under wraps. This secrecy even applies to the weapons declarations issued by Iran in 1997 and in December of 2002. Attorney Gary Pitts, who is suing corporations that allegedly helped to arm Iraq, found that there were only three places to get the information: the United Nations, the U.S. government and Iraq.

"The U.N. refused to disclose" either the 1997 or 2002 lists of Iraqi suppliers, said Pitts. And his request to U.S. officials has been stuck in bureaucratic limbo. Pitts finally made a direct appeal to Iraq: "I told them that they should release the list and let the companies share the heat."

To his surprise, Iraq agreed on the condition that Iraqi officials would hand over this information at a press conference. But the Iraqis postponed the meeting indefinitely in the face of increasing tensions. It was then that Pitts sent Scott Ritter, a former U.N. weapons inspector who was serving as a legal consultant, to Baghdad. Because Ritter returned with reams of documentation, Pitts was able to amend and update his lawsuit. Currently, his suit names 68 corporations and individuals, the majority of which are European.

Pitts also has coordinated with British and German law firms to sue some of the European companies named as defendants in his class-action suit, which he filed in the Texas state court system. Through the lawsuit or through an act of Congress, he hopes to tap into the more than \$1 billion in frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. on behalf of his clients, who are some 3,500 sick Gulf War veterans. Pitts originally filed his lawsuit in 1994.

Because the U.N. has guarded the names of Iraq's weapons suppliers, several countries, including Syria, have accused the U.S. of spearheading a cover-up to protect Iraq's corporate suppliers.

The Weekly contacted the Syrian and Iraqi missions for comment. The Syrian mission declined to elaborate. But an assistant to the Hussein government's U.N. ambassador, who identified himself as Osama, declined to release the names of the suppliers. "Those names are confidential," he said. "And we don't even have a copy of the declaration here in New York, so I couldn't give them to you anyway."

A representative of the U.N.'s weapons-inspection team, who spoke on condition of anonymity, denied the U.S. had pressured anyone. "The decision to

'sanitize' the list of names was made by the permanent members in consultation with us. We felt it was necessary to protect their names, so UNMOVIC [the U.N. inspection agency] could go back and ask the companies follow-up questions. It's like journalists protecting their sources," the source added.

Also speaking on a not-for-attribution basis, a spokesperson for the U.S. United Nations delegation denied the U.S. had pressured anyone to withhold suppliers' names: "We wanted them released," the spokesperson said. "It was the Europeans who demanded they be kept secret."

The corporate entities were subsequently listed in a German newspaper, but the disclosure got little play in the United States, despite the presence of an impressive list of American corporate players.

It turns out that the Iraqi declaration also identified three American nuclear-weapons labs as assisting with Iraq's nuclear-weapons program: Los Alamos, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore. A Los Alamos representative refused comment. And Sandia's spokesperson did not return calls. But a representative from Lawrence Livermore told the *Weekly* the reference was to a public conference that several Iraqi scientists attended. "There was no classified material discussed. It was only about conventional explosives and detonations," the spokesperson said. "These were public, scientific papers being discussed. And I think the conference was sometime during the late 1970s."

Former congressional investigator Jeff Hodges remembers it differently. "First, the conference wasn't held in the late 1970s," said Hodges. "It was September 1989. That's less than 14 months before the Gulf War started," he said.

Hodges also pointed out it was the elder Bush's State Department that arranged visas for three participating Iraqi nuclear scientists. "In addition to the information they received from the public papers, the scientists also profited from valuable contacts they made at the conference," he added.

Six months after the conference, American and British customs officers at London's Heathrow Airport arrested operatives working for Iraq's nuclear-weapons research lab.

Of course, history could have taken a completely different turn in 1990. A former U.S. intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, tells the *Weekly* that in July of 1990 his associate, an intelligence operative, was reviewing developments in Iraq with President Bush, Colin Powell (then chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Dick Cheney (then the Secretary of Defense) and Secretary of State James Baker on the looming crisis in the Gulf.

"My friend was the individual used by our government to hand-carry secret intelligence information on Iran's military to Baghdad," recounted the source. "He told Bush and the others that Iraq was moving troops towards the Kuwaiti border. He also told the president he could stop them dead in their tracks by making a public announcement that any attack on Kuwait would be viewed as an attack on the U.S." But the source said that the advice was rejected.

Bush et al. "decided they didn't want to align the U.S. that closely with Kuwait," the former intelligence official said. "But I guess that plan didn't work out too well, did it?"

Companies Being Sued for Ties with Iraq

The following companies are named in the Gulf vets class-action suit, which claims the companies aided Iraq's weapons program. None of these companies has admitted any wrongdoing; some have yet to be served with the lawsuit alleging wrongdoing:

Preussag, a German company, allegedly built a chemical-weapons facility.

Schott Glaswerke, a German company, allegedly provided specialized equipment for chemical plants.

Klockner, a German company, allegedly sold Iraq spare machine parts for its chemical-weapons facilities.

Sigma Aldrich Corp., a German company, allegedly sold biological-weapons equipment.

Chemap A.G., a Swiss company, allegedly sold specialized equipment for Iraq's bioweapons program.

American Type Culture Collection, a U.S. company, supplied biological agents and pathogens to Iraq.

Phillips, now part of ConocoPhillips, an American oil and energy company, allegedly sold chemicals used in the production of mustard gas.

Alcolac International, a U.S. company, allegedly sold chemicals used in the production of mustard gas.

Alfa Laval, a Swedish company, allegedly sold specialized equipment for Iraq's bioweapons program.

Karl Kolb, a German company, allegedly built a chemical-agent factory.

WET, a German company, allegedly sold specialized equipment for Iraq's bioweapons program.

Herberger, a German company, allegedly built bio-weapons facilities.

LA Weekly 21-27 March, 2003

Made in the USA, Part III: The Dishonor Roll
America's corporate merchants of death in Iraq
by Jim Crogan

Saddam Hussein's regime was crushed by the combined military might of American and British forces in a lightning-quick, three-week war. But there's still more work to be done, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon this month.

"We still need to find and secure Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities," said Rumsfeld. "We still must find out everything we can about how the Iraqi regime acquired its capabilities, and the proliferation that took place by countries in the industrialized world."

A glance at his datebook would provide some of the answers. In 1983, Rumsfeld, then a private citizen, traveled to Baghdad to meet with the Iraqi dictator. Rumsfeld delivered President Ronald Reagan's personal message of support to Hussein, who was already three years into his eventual eight-year war with Iran. The American envoy also discussed a proposed joint-venture oil pipeline with the Iraqi leader. That project, also championed by the San Francisco-based Bechtel Group, never materialized, but Rumsfeld's mission underscored the reality that for more than 30 years the economic interests of American industry were firmly embedded into the geopolitical goals of U.S. policymakers.

Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Commerce Department approved at least \$1.5 billion in exports with possible military applications from U.S. companies to Iraq, and the Agriculture Department administered a U.S.-government-guaranteed loan program that provided billions to Iraq. Thanks largely to the first George Bush, American taxpayers unwittingly co-signed for much of the loan money, and the government had to make good on these loans when Iraq later defaulted. Almost all of the transactions were legal under U.S. and international law at the time, even when the transactions either had direct military or dual-use (civilian and military) applications. Over and over again, the deals were encouraged and even abetted by the U.S. government, even after American officials had proof that Iraq was using chemical weapons to kill Iranian troops and subdue Kurdish uprisings. In fact, the Reagan administration and the first Bush administration even provided Hussein's regime with military intelligence during his bloody eight-year war with Iran.

American officials tolerated Hussein's despotism because they viewed his regime as a secular bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalist revolution spawned by the Iranian revolution. That is, until Iraq invaded oil-rich Kuwait in 1990. Most, though not all, of Iraq's commerce with American companies ended after the first Gulf War in 1991.

Now the business cycle is starting all over again. Last week, the Bechtel corporation received a U.S. Agency for International Development contract to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure. The contract, initially worth \$34.6 million, could eventually total nearly \$700 million over the next 18 months. Perhaps Bechtel's institutional knowledge was a plus, given its status as a major player in Hussein's

Iraq — during the time when doing business with Hussein was endorsed by U.S. policy. At the very least, Bechtel's ties to the old regime are not being held against it.

HOW TO NAVIGATE THE LIST:

Click on a company name or U.S. government agency from the list below to go directly to a description of their acknowledged or documented involvement with Iraq. [Go to: <http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php>] in order to do this. Active links found there;]

Some of these businesses are no longer operating. A number of these companies did not respond to the Weekly's calls for comment. All who did denied wrongdoing, even when they confirmed their exports to Iraq. Some companies have since changed hands, and representatives of the new businesses said they had no information on exports by the old firms. Nearly all of the documentation for this list comes from official sources, investigations and multiple interviews with authoritative sources. Some of the source material is presented at the end of the entire list.

Index of American Companies (and international companies with U.S. affiliates):

AT&T
AL HADDAD ENTERPRISES, INC.
ALCOLAC INTERNATIONAL
AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE COLLECTION
ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTS DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
AXEL ELECTRONICS
BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO
BECHTEL GROUP
BREEZEVALE, INC.
CANBERRA INDUSTRIES
CARL SCHENCK AG
CARL ZEISS
CATERPILLAR, INC.
COMTEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
CONSARC
COPELAND INTERNATIONAL, INC.
DATA GENERAL CORP
DEKTOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, INC.
DOW CHEMICAL
DRESSER CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT
DUPONT
E G & G PRINCETON APPLIED RESEARCH
EASTMAN KODAK CO.
ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATES, INC.
ENTRADE INTERNATIONAL, LTD.

EVAPCO
FINNIGAN MAT US
FOXBORO COMPANY
GERBER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
GORMAN-RUPP
HARDINGE BROTHERS
HEWLETT-PACKARD
HIPOTRONICS
HONEYWELL
HUGHES HELICOPTER
IBM
INTERNATIONAL IMAGING SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL AND CONTROL
IONICS
KENNAMETAL, INC.
LEYBOLD VACUUM SYSTEMS
LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO.
LITTON INDUSTRIES
LUMMUS CREST, INC.
MBB HELICOPTER CORP.
MACK TRUCKS, INC.
MAHO AG
MATRIX CHURCHILL CORP.
McNEIL AKRON, INC.
MEMPHIS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
MILLER ELECTRIC
MOUSE MASTER
NCR CORPORATION
NRM CORP.
NORWALK CO.
NU KRAFT MERCANTILE CORP.
PERKIN-ELMER CORP.
PHILLIPS EXPORT
POSI SEAL, INC.
PRESRAY CORP.
PURE AIRE
REDLAKE IMAGING CORP.
REXON TECHNOLOGY CORP.
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.
ROTEC INDUSTRIES, INC.
SACKMAN ASSOCIATES
SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA
SCIENTIFIC DESIGN CO., INC.
SEMETEX
SERVAAS, INC.
SIEMENS CORP.

SIP CORP.
SPECTRAL DATA CORP.
SPECTRA PHYSICS
SPERRY CORP.
SULLAIRE CORP.
SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.
TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.
TEKTRONIX
TELEDYNE WAH CHANG
THERMO JARRELL ASH CORP.
TI COATING
TRADING AND INVESTMENT CORP.
UNION CARBIDE
UNISYS CORP.
VEECO INSTRUMENTS, INC.
WILD MAGNAVOX SATELLITE SURVEY
WILTRON
XYZ OPTIONS, INC.
YORK INTERNATIONAL CORP.
ZETA LABORATORIES

Index of U.S. Government Agencies:

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES

Foreign Companies:

(Number of foreign firms by country — note: Some of these firms receive substantial financial support from their governments):

AUSTRIA: 3
BELGIUM: 7
CHINA: 3
EGYPT: 1
FRANCE: 9
GERMANY: 18
GREAT BRITAIN: 24
INDIA: 1
JAPAN: 5
LUXEMBOURG: 1

NETHERLANDS: 3

PORTUGAL: 1

SINGAPORE: 1 (Note: This company, KIM AL-KHALEEJ, also has links to Dubai.)

SPAIN: 3

SWEDEN: 2

SWITZERLAND: 7

USSR/RUSSIA: 6

Partial Source List:

1992 hearing report and transcripts from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: United States Export Policy Toward Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait.

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro records of letters of credit and loans issued to Iraq and its corporate exporters.

Reports of United Nations weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) provided to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

Information from databases compiled by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit foundation that monitors the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile technology.

News articles and op-eds written by Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project.

Information from Iraq's 1997 Full, Final and Complete Weapons Declaration to the U.N.-UNSCOM, provided by Gary Pitts, a Texas-based attorney suing a number of American and international companies who allegedly supplied Iraq with technology, materials and equipment for its chemical and biological weapons program. Pitts is representing approximately 3,500 Gulf War veterans allegedly suffering from Gulf War syndrome.

Research material and government documents compiled by Washington, D.C.-based National Security Archives, a nonprofit research group.

1995 letter from Dr. David Satcher, then the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to U.S. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Michigan), chair of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Letter detailed shipments of "viruses, retroviruses, bacteria and fungi" to Iraq by the CDC.

1994 United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives — Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s.

Information compiled by the Washington D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public education and policy group.

Information from *Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War* (2001), by Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad.

Congressional testimony of Kenneth Timmerman, author of *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Saddam* (1991).

Information from *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Saddam* (1991), by Kenneth Timmerman.

Congressional statements by Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-Connecticut), Chair of the House Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 1991.

Congressional statements by Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas), 1991, 1992.

Interviews with Gary Pitts.

Interviews with Andreas Zumach, a Swiss-based reporter for the Berlin newspaper *Die Tageszeitung*. Zumach was leaked portions of the 2002 Full, Final and Complete Weapons Declaration (UNMOVIC). Zumach published the list of weapons suppliers in a December 2002 series of articles.

Interviews with Jeff Hodges, a former investigator for the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, chaired in 1991 by Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan).

Interview with Jim Tuite, a former investigator for the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, chaired by U.S. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Michigan).

Interviews with government-based and other sources, who requested anonymity.

Web sites and corporate filings for listed companies.

Various other U.S. congressional hearing reports; congressional testimony; government reports; Department of Commerce records; Department of Agriculture records.

Various state-records databases, including information from various Secretary of State offices and Departments of Corporations.

LA Weekly April 25 - May 1, 2003.

<<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php>>

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April Glaspie - Saddam Hussein Conversation 1990

Sunday, September 23, 1990
Special to *The New York Times*

Go to the original:
<<http://Rense.com/general46/gil.htm>>

Washington, Sept. 22 -- On July 25, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2. Here are excerpts from a document described by Iraqi Government officials as a transcript of the meeting, which also included the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. A copy was provided to *The New York Times* by *ABC News*, which translated from the Arabic. The State Department has declined to comment on its accuracy.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: I have summoned you today to hold comprehensive political discussions with you. This is a message to President Bush. You know that we did not have relations with the U.S. until 1984 and you know the circumstances and reasons which caused them to be severed. The decision to establish relations with the U.S. were taken in 1980 during the two months prior to the war between us and Iran. When the war started, and to avoid misinterpretation, we postponed the establishment of relations hoping that the war would end soon.

But because the war lasted for a long time, and to emphasize the fact that we are a non-aligned country, it was important to re-establish relations with the U.S. And we choose to do this in 1984. It is natural to say that the U.S. is not like Britain, for example, with the latter's historic relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq. In addition, there were no relations between Iraq and the U.S. between 1967 and 1984. One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full understanding of many matters in Iraq. When relations were re-established we hoped for a better understanding and for better cooperation because we too do not understand the background of many American decisions. We dealt with each other during the war and we had dealings on various levels. The most important of those levels were with the foreign ministers.

U.S.-Iraq Rifts

We had hoped for a better common understanding and a better chance of cooperation to benefit both our peoples and the rest of the Arab nations. But these better relations have suffered from various rifts. The worst of these was in 1986, only two years after establishing relations, with what was known as Irangate, which happened during the year that Iran occupied the Fao peninsula.

It was natural then to say that old relations and complexity of interests could absorb many mistakes. But when interests are limited and relations are not that old, then there isn't a deep understanding and mistakes could have a negative effect. Sometimes the effect of an error can be larger than the error itself.

Despite all of that, we accepted the apology, via his envoy, of the American President regarding Irangate, and we wiped the slate clean. And we shouldn't unearth the past except when new events remind us that old mistakes were not just a matter of coincidence. Our suspicions increased after we liberated the Fao peninsula. The media began to involve itself in our politics. And our suspicions began to surface anew, because we began to question whether the U.S. felt uneasy with the outcome of the war when we liberated our land. It was clear to us that certain parties in the United States -- and I don't say the President himself -- but certain parties who had links with the intelligence community and with the State Department -- and I don't say the Secretary of State himself -- I say that these parties did not like the fact that we liberated our land. Some parties began to prepare studies entitled: "Who will succeed Saddam Hussein" They began to contact gulf states to make them fear Iraq, to persuade them not to give Iraq economic aid. And we have evidence of these activities.

Iraqi Policy on Oil

Iraq came out of the war burdened with \$40 billion debts, excluding the aid given by Arab states, some of whom consider that too to be a debt although they knew -- and you knew too -- that without Iraq they would not have had these sums and the future of the region would have been entirely different. We began to face the policy of the drop in the price of oil. Then we saw the United States, which always talks of democracy but which has no time for the other point of view. Then the media campaign against Saddam Hussein was started by the official American media. The United States thought that the situation in Iraq was like Poland, Romania or Czechoslovakia. We were disturbed by this campaign but we were not disturbed too much because we had hoped that, in a few months, those who are decision makers in America would have a chance to find the facts and see whether this media campaign had had any effect on the lives of Iraqis. We had hoped that soon the American authorities would make the correct decision regarding their relations with Iraq. Those with good relations can sometimes afford to disagree. But when planned and deliberate policy forces the price of oil down without good commercial reasons, then that means another war against Iraq.

Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic war kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living.

As you know, we gave rivers of blood in a war that lasted eight years, but we did not lose our humanity. Iraqis have a right to live proudly. We do not accept that anyone could injure Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have high standards of living. Kuwait and the U.A.E. were at the front of this policy aimed at lowering Iraq's position and depriving its people of higher economic standards.

And you know that our relations with the Emirates and Kuwait had been good. On top of all that, while we were busy at war, the state of Kuwait began to expand at the expense of our territory. You may say this is propaganda, but I would direct you to one document, the Military Patrol Line, which is the borderline endorsed by the Arab League in 1961 for military patrols not to cross the Iraq-Kuwait border. But go and look for yourselves. You will see the Kuwaiti border patrols, the Kuwaiti farms, the Kuwaiti oil installations -- all built as closely as possible to this line to establish that land as Kuwaiti territory.

Conflicting Interests

Since then, the Kuwaiti Government has been stable while the Iraqi Government has undergone many changes. Even after 1968 and for 10 years afterwards, we were too busy with our own problems. First in the north then the 1973 war, and other problems. Then came the war with Iran which started 10 years ago. We believe that the United States must understand that people who live in luxury and economic security can each an understanding with the United States on what are legitimate joint interests. But the starved and the economically deprived cannot reach the same understanding. We do not accept threats from anyone because we do not threaten anyone. But we say clearly that we hope that the U.S. will not entertain too many illusions and will seek new friends rather than increase the number of its enemies. I have read the American statements speaking of friends in the area. Of course, it is the right of everyone to choose their friends.

We can have no objections. But you know you are not the ones who protected your friends during the war with Iran. I assure you, had the Iranians overrun the region, the American troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons.

I do not belittle you. But I hold this view by looking at the geography and nature of American society into account. Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle. You know that Iran agreed to the cease-fire not because the United States had bombed one of the oil platforms after the liberation of the Fao. Is this Iraq's reward for its role in securing the stability of the region and for protecting it from an unknown flood

Protecting the Oil Flow

So, what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the U.A.E. and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights. I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are mentioned in the memorandum, we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a month or after one year,

but we will take it all. We are not the kind of people who will relinquish their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need, for the U.A.E. and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy, we too are needy.

The United States must have a better understanding of the situation and declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But it should not make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. We clearly understand America's statement that it wants an easy flow of oil. We understand American staying that it seeks friendship with the states in the region, and to encourage their joint interests. But we cannot understand the attempt to encourage some parties to hard Iraq's interests.

The United States wants to secure the flow of oil. This understandable and known. But it must not deploy methods which the United States says it disapproves of -- flexing muscles and pressure. If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you. War and Friendship You can come to Iraq with aircraft and missiles but do not push us to the point where we cease to care. And when we feel that you want to injure our pride and take away the Iraqis' chance of a high standard of living, then we will cease to care and death will be the choice for us. Then we would not care if you fired 100 missiles for each missile we fired.

Because without pride life would have no value. It is not reasonable to ask our people to bleed rivers of blood for eight years then to tell them, "Now you have to accept aggression from Kuwait, the U.A.E., or from the U.S. or from Israel." We do not put all these countries in the same boat. First, we are hurt and upset that such disagreement is taking place between us and Kuwait and the U.A.E.

The solution must be found within an Arab framework and through direct bilateral relations. We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year make it apparent that America did not regard us as friends. Well the Americans are free. When we seek friendship we want pride, liberty and our right to choose. We want to deal according to our status as we deal with the others according to their statuses. We consider the others' interests while we look after our own.

And we expect the others to consider our interests while they are dealing with their own. What does it mean when the Zionist war minister is summoned to the United States now What do they mean, these fiery statements coming out of Israel during the past few days and the talk of war being expected now more than at any other time

* * *

I do not believe that anyone would lose by making friends with Iraq. In my opinion, the American President has not made mistakes regarding the Arabs, although his decision to freeze dialogue with the P.L.O. was wrong. But it appears that this decision was made to appease the Zionist lobby or as a piece of strategy to

cool the Zionist anger, before trying again. I hope that our latter conclusion is the correct one. But we will carry on saying it was the wrong decision.

You are appeasing the usurper in so many ways -- economically, politically and militarily as well as in the media. When will the time come when, for every three appeasements to the usurper, you praise the Arabs just once

APRIL GLASPIE: I thank you, Mr. President, and it is a great pleasure for a diplomat to meet and talk directly with the President. I clearly understand your message. We studied history at school That taught us to say freedom or death. I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the colonialists. Mr. President, you mentioned many things during this meeting which I cannot comment on on behalf of my Government. But with your permission, I will comment on two points. You spoke of friendship and I believe it was clear from the letters sent by our President to you on the occasion of your National Day that he emphasizes --

HUSSEIN: He was kind and his expressions met with our regard and respect.

Directive on Relations

GLASPIE: As you know, he directed the United States Administration to reject the suggestion of implementing trade sanctions.

HUSSEIN: There is nothing left for us to buy from America. Only wheat. Because every time we want to buy something, they say it is forbidden. I am afraid that one day you will say, "You are going to make gunpowder out of wheat."

GLASPIE: I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.

HUSSEIN: But how We too have this desire. But matters are running contrary to this desire.

GLASPIE: This is less likely to happen the more we talk. For example, you mentioned the issue of the article published by the American Information Agency and that was sad. And a formal apology was presented.

HUSSEIN: Your stance is generous. We are Arabs. It is enough for us that someone says, "I am sorry. I made a mistake." Then we carry on. But the media campaign continued. And it is full of stories. If the stories were true, no one would get upset. But we understand from its continuation that there is a determination.

GLASPIE: I saw the Diane Sawyer program on ABC. And what happened in that program was cheap and unjust. And this is a real picture of what happens in the American media -- even to American politicians themselves. These are the methods

the Western media employs. I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media.

Because your appearance in the media, even for five minutes, would help us to make the American people understand Iraq. This would increase mutual understanding. If they American President had control of the media, his job would be much easier.

Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq. You are right. It is true what you say that we do not want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging too high a price for oil.

HUSSEIN: We do not want too high prices for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article which expressed this view. Shifting Price of Oil

TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.

HUSSEIN: Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price. GLASPIE: We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above \$25 because they come from oil-producing states.

HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to \$12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of \$6 billion to \$7 billion is a disaster.

GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us

My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against

Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions. I simply describe the position of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.

HUSSEIN: We do not ask people not to be concerned when peace is at issue. This is a noble human feeling which we all feel. It is natural for you as a superpower to be concerned. But what we ask is not to express your concern in a way that would make an aggressor believe that he is getting support for his aggression. We want to find a just solution which will give us our rights but not deprive others of their rights. But at the same time, we want the others to know that our patience is running out regarding their action, which is harming even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her husband during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents. As a country, we have the right to prosper. We lost so many opportunities, and the others should value the Iraqi role in their protection. Even this Iraqi [the President points to their interpreter] feels bitter like all other Iraqis. We are not aggressors but we do not accept aggression either. We sent them envoys and handwritten letters.

We tried everything. We asked the Servant of the Two Shrines -- King Fahd -- to hold a four-member summit, but he suggested a meeting between the Oil Ministers. We agreed. And as you know, the meeting took place in Jidda. They reached an agreement which did not express what we wanted, but we agreed. Only two days after the meeting, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister made a statement that contradicted the agreement. We also discussed the issue during the Baghdad summit. I told the Arab Kings and Presidents that some brothers are fighting an economic war against us. And that not all wars use weapons and we regard this kind of war as a military action against us. Because if the capability of our army is lowered then, if Iran renewed the war, it could achieve goals which it could not achieve before. And if we lowered the standard of our defenses, then this could encourage Israel to attack us. I said that before the Arab Kings and Presidents. Only I did not mention Kuwait and U.A.E. by name, because they were my guests.

Before this, I had sent them envoys reminding them that our war had included their defense. Therefore the aid they gave us should not be regarded as a debt. We did not more than the United States would have done against someone who attacked its interests. I talked about the same thing with a number of other Arab states. I explained the situation to brother King Fahd a few times, by sending envoys and on the telephone. I talked with brother King Hussein and with Sheik Zaid after the conclusion of the summit. I walked with the Sheik to the plane when he was leaving Mosul. He told me, "Just wait until I get home." But after he had reached his destination, the statements that came from there were very bad -- not from him, but from his Minister of Oil. And after the Jidda agreement, we received some intelligence that they were talking of sticking to the agreement for two months only. Then they would change their policy. Now tell us, if the American President found himself in this situation, what would he do I said it was very difficult for me to talk

about these issues in public. But we must tell the Iraqi people who face economic difficulties who was responsible for that.

Talks with Mubarak

GLASPIE: I spent four beautiful years in Egypt.

HUSSEIN: The Egyptian people are kind and good and ancient. The oil people are supposed to help the Egyptian people, but they are mean beyond belief. It is painful to admit it, but some of them are disliked by Arabs because of their greed.

GLASPIE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they have achieved anything.

HUSSEIN: On this subject, we agreed with President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with us, aided by President Mubarak's efforts. He just telephoned me a short while ago to say the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.

GLASPIE: Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: A protocol meeting will be held in Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.

GLASPIE: May I ask you when you expect Sheik Saad to come to Baghdad

HUSSEIN: I suppose it would be on Saturday or Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak's visits have always been a good omen. Jeff: Have you seen this It'sdynamite. Charlotte

GLASPIE: This is good news. Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: Brother President Mubarak told me they were scared. They said troops were only 20 kilometers north of the Arab League line. I said to him that regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border guards or army, and regardless of how many are there, and what they are doing, assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them. When we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else. There you have good news.

AZIZ: This is a journalistic exclusive.

GLASPIE: I am planning to go to the United States next Monday. I hope I will meet with President Bush in Washington next week. I thought to postpone my trip because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly on Monday.

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ANNEXE

US Company Listing

AT&T

(New York City, New York)

2000 ~ Contracted with Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. to "optimize" Huawei,s products. Between 2000 and 2001, Huawei outfitted Iraq,s air-defense system with fiber-optic equipment, in violation of a U.N. trade embargo.<<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php#top1>>

AL HADDAD ENTERPRISES, INC.

(Formerly based in Nashville, Tennessee ~ defunct)

1984 to 1985 ~ Company sold 60 tons of DMMP, a material used to make sarin gas, to Iraq. Also provided chemical-production equipment to Iraq. In 1984, customs officials at Kennedy International Airport seized another Al Haddad shipment of 1,100 pounds of potassium fluoride, a chemical used in nerve-gas production. Al Haddad was not charged in this attempted transfer of chemicals, which were destined for Iraq,s Ministry of Pesticides. This firm also received letters of credit from BNL (an Italian bank) totaling \$134,988 to sell knives and rubber blankets to Technical Corp. for Special Projects, an Iraqi front company. (Note: See Banca Nazionale del Lavoro entry for information about BNL,s Iraqi loans and letters of credit.)

The firm was owned by Sahib Abd al-Amir al-Haddad, an Iraqi-born, naturalized American citizen. According to corporate records from Tennessee,s

Department of State, Al Haddad operated a number of registered firms, which are all inactive, dissolved or merged out. These firms included Al Haddad Enterprises, Inc.; A. Saleh & S. Al-Haddad, Inc.; and Al-Haddad Bros. Enterprises, Inc. Recent stories in The New York Times and The Tennessean reported that al-Haddad was arrested in Bulgaria in November 2002 while trying to arrange an arms sale to Iraq. At last report, Al-Haddad, 59, was awaiting extradition to Germany, where he is charged with conspiring in the late 1990s to purchase equipment for the manufacture of a giant Iraqi cannon. <<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php#top1>>

ALCOLAC INTERNATIONAL, INC

(Formerly located in Baltimore, Maryland. Company was restructured as Alcolac, Inc., and it,s currently listed as an active Georgia corporation. Company,s assets now owned by French-based firm Rhodia, Inc., with U.S. operations based in Cranberry, New Jersey.)

1988 ~ Allegedly sold more than 300 tons of thiodiglycol (precursor material used to make mustard gas) via Nu Kraft Mercantile Corporation, which, according to congressional testimony and media reports, shipped the material to Jordan and then on to Iraq, through Iraq,s Industrial Procurement Company. In the same period, Alcolac also shipped thiodiglycol to Iran and pleaded guilty in 1988 to one count of export violations for its Iranian shipments. Alcolac is currently one of the corporate defendants in a Texas civil suit filed on behalf of some 3,500 Gulf War vets allegedly suffering from Gulf War syndrome. The suit initially named 64 American and international companies that allegedly provided Iraq with materials used to develop chemical and biological weapons. However, a number of those companies will likely be sued in European courts, and the current number of defendants is in flux. Ronald Welsh, the attorney representing Alcolac in that suit, denied any company wrongdoing in connection with Iraq and added that he had no "personal knowledge" of any Alcolac shipments of thiodiglycol to Saddam Hussein,s regime. But U.N. weapons-inspector reports, included in a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing on U.S. export policy toward Iraq, identified shipments of thiodiglycol that were sent to Iraq by Alcolac.

A spokesman for the company that now owns Alcolac emphasized that the "alleged illegal infractions" occurred before Alcolac was obtained by the current ownership.<<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php#top1>>

AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE COLLECTION

(Manassas, Virginia)

1985 to 1989 ~ ATCC is a nonprofit that provides biological products, technical services and educational programs to private industry, government and academia. It sent to Iraq some 70 shipments of deadly germs, which included anthrax bacteria, E. coli bacteria, salmonella bacteria, bacillus megaterium (which causes

meningitis), bacillus subtilus and bacillus cereus (which are strains of anthrax), brucella abortus (which causes influenza), brucella melitensis (a bacteria that attacks major organs), clostridium botulinum (a source of botulism), clostridium perfringens (which causes lung failure), clostridium tetani (which causes muscle rigidity), and Francisella tularensis (which causes tularemia).

ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTS DISTRIBUTORS, INC.

(Formerly based in Norcross, Georgia)

Date unknown ~ Sold \$12,161,502 worth of carbide cutting tools to Iraq,s State Machinery Trading Co., a procurement front for military materials and supplies, according to records introduced at a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing. The transaction was financed by a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank).

In 1992, company president Nash Rehmann told the Atlanta Constitution that the order was destined for the Huteen Establishment, a weapons factory outside of Baghdad. Rehmann elaborated on the transaction in an interview with the Weekly. "I got approval from the Commerce Department for the sale," he said. Rehmann also noted that he,d testified before a federal grand jury investigating the BNL loan scandal. (See listing for Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.) "I told them about my sale. They investigated me to see if I was involved in anything illegal, and I was cleared of any wrongdoing by government investigators," he added. "I have nothing to hide, because I did nothing wrong." Rehmann said he closed the company around the time of the first Gulf War.

AXEL ELECTRONICS

(A former division of General Signal that was based in Jamaica, New York. Axel,s operations were later sold off and absorbed into other corporate entities.)

1987 ~ Provided \$84,000 worth of capacitors capable of powering a firing set for a nuclear weapon to Iraq,s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). Hussein Kamel, one of Saddam Hussein,s son-in-laws, ran MIMI. In 1995, Kamel and his brother, also a Hussein son-in-law, left Iraq in 1995 and moved to Jordan. There they briefed U.N. weapons inspectors on Iraq,s programs to build weapons of mass destruction, handing over crates of documents. Six months later Kamel, his brother and their families returned to Iraq for a promised amnesty. However, Saddam,s daughters were forced to divorce their husbands. Then, Kamel and his brother, along with their father, sister and her children, were executed.)

BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO

(An Italian international bank owned by the Italian government with U.S. headquarters in New York and a branch in Atlanta, Georgia; current U.S. operations are located in Los Angeles, New York City and Chicago.)

1988 to 1989 ~ Authorized \$2.16 billion in loans to Iraq, a portion of which Iraq used for various weapons programs. A portion of the BNL loans to Iraq was guaranteed through the U.S. Agriculture Department,s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). U.S. taxpayers ended up paying the cost of those loans (and some of these weapons programs) because the CCC had guaranteed repayment. BNL also issued approximately 2,500 letters of credit to Iraqi exporters totaling approximately \$800 million. After Iraq defaulted on approximately \$850 million in international loans, BNL filed a claim for more than \$450 million against the U.S. government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In 1995, the federal government agreed to pay the bank \$400 million to settle the claims. Iraq is liable for reimbursing the U.S. Treasury, but repayment is considered unlikely.

The transactions funded by these BNL letters of credit and loans were almost certainly completed, said Jim Tuite, a former investigator for the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, in an interview with the Weekly. Some of the transactions were legally questionable from the start. In 1989, federal agents raided the BNL Atlanta branch. Six BNL employees eventually pleaded guilty to charges connected with off-the-books BNL loans to Iraq. The judge in the case also criticized the American policy of encouraging trade with Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. The court found that this policy created a business climate that encouraged BNL,s illegal activity.

From 1985 to 1991, the period of the BNL loans, the company,s paid "Consulting Board for International Policy" included former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who also was, during that same time frame, a member of the President,s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

BECHTEL GROUP

(San Francisco, California)

1988 to August 1990 ~ Until the invasion of Kuwait, the company served as engineering consultant for a \$2 billion Iraqi petrochemical complex, known as Petrochemical Complex 2, near Baghdad. Bechtel,s contracts were with Iraq,s Technical Corp. for Special Projects, an Iraqi front company for military-related projects. Bechtel, a privately owned, multinational corporation, has just won a U.S. Agency for International Development contract to rebuild Iraq,s infrastructure. The contract, won without traditional competitive bidding, starts at \$34.6 million and could eventually rise to nearly \$700 million.

Bechtel,s ties with former and current U.S. government officials and agencies run deep. George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state under Reagan, Bechtel,s former president, is currently on the company,s board of directors. Former Reagan Defense Secretary Casper Weinburger was Bechtel,s general counsel. Reagan,s head of the Atomic Energy Commission was W. Kenneth Davis, a former Bechtel vice president for nuclear development. Former CIA Director Richard Helms also worked as a Bechtel consultant. President George W. Bush appointed Ross Connelly, former head of Bechtel Investments, as chief operating officer of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Bechtel representatives confirmed the company,s past business dealings with Iraq.

BREEZEVALE, INC.

(Formerly based in Woodbridge, New Jersey)

Date uncertain ~ Received letters of credit totaling more than \$5.9 million (from BNL, an Italian bank) to supply tires and tubes for trucks and earthmovers to the Iraqi Trading Company. It is unclear how that heavy equipment was used. But Iraqi Trading Co. was identified by congressional testimony, researchers and media reports as a front company to purchase materials for Iraq,s military. Company may have ceased operations.

CANBERRA INDUSTRIES

(Meriden, Connecticut)

1986 ~ Canberra Industries and Canberra Elektronik GmbH, in Germany, provided \$30,000 worth of electronic and computer equipment to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. In 2001, Canberra Industries became part of the newly formed \$9 billion Areva Group, created from a merger of two leading companies in the nuclear field. Besides operations in nuclear-related fields, Canberra is now selling Homeland Security technology and equipment.

CARL SCHENCK AG

(A German company, with various North American branches)

1987 ~ Provided more than \$10,000 worth of computers for process control and data evaluation to Saad 16, Iraq,s primary missile research-and-development site.

CARL ZEISS

(A German company with American operations headquartered in Thornwood, New York)

1989 ~ Supplied \$105,000 worth of microcomputers to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, for use with a Zeiss planicomp (digital mapping) system for map-work measurements and calculations of photographic data.

CATERPILLAR, INC.

(Peoria, Illinois)

Date uncertain ~ Sold \$9,902,605 worth of tractors to Iraq. They were used in construction projects involving Iraq,s nuclear and Condor II ballistic-missile programs. Purchase was funded by BNL (an Italian bank), according to records compiled for a 1992 Senate Banking Committee report on U.S. export policies prior to Iraq,s invasion of Kuwait. Caterpillar currently has a number of contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense to supply the military with heavy equipment.

COMTEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.

(Formerly based in Englewood, Colorado)

1988 ~ Provided \$117,000 worth of frequency synthesizers and equipment used to repair and maintain handheld radios of the Civil Defense Group of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, which oversaw the secret police. Also supplied \$161,000 worth of radio transmitters and amplifiers used at base stations to communicate with Civil Defense Group units. (In addition, Iraq received a loan for \$36 million from BNL, an Italian bank, to buy a mobile satellite-tracking system from Comtech.) In 2002 the company reported an accumulated deficit of nearly \$16.5 million. Company may have ceased operations.

CONSARC

(Ranocas, New Jersey)

1989 to 1990 ~ Contracted to supply high-performance furnaces, valued at \$11 million, for making missile parts and melting zirconium, as well as \$575,000 worth of numerical-control equipment for use in high-performance furnace systems. Material sold to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), which was responsible for Iraq,s nuclear-, conventional-, missile and chemical-weapons programs. Hussein Kamel, one of Saddam Hussein,s son-in-laws, ran MIMI. In 1995, Kamel and his brother, also a Hussein son-in-law, left Iraq in 1995 and moved to Jordan. There they briefed U.N. weapons inspectors on Iraq,s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs, handing over crates of documents. Six months later Kamel, his brother and their families returned to Iraq for a promised amnesty. However, Saddam,s daughters were forced to divorce their husbands.

Kamel and his brother, along with their father, sister and her children, were then executed.

COPELAND INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

(Now Copeland Corporation, based in Sidney, Ohio. It,s a subsidiary of Emerson Electric Co., headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri.)

Date uncertain ~ Received letter of credit for \$147,120 from BNL (an Italian bank) to sell air-conditioning compressors to the Iraqi Trading Company, a front group for the Iraqi government. It,s unclear what the compressor was used for, but Iraqi Trading was identified by congressional testimony as a front company to purchase materials for Iraq,s military. A spokesman for Emerson Electric, which owns Copeland,s assets, said he has no information on Posi Seal,s exports to Iraq.

DATA GENERAL CORP.

(Formerly headquartered in Westboro, Massachusetts. The company was purchased by EMC Corp., based in Hopkinton, Massachusetts.)

1989 ~ Supplied \$324,000 worth of computers for mapping and surveying to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

DEKTOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, INC.

(Formerly based in Savannah, Georgia)

1985 ~ Provided more than \$38,000 worth of communication equipment to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, which oversaw the secret police. According to corporate records from Georgia,s Secretary of State Office, this company began operations in 1980 and was "administratively dissolved" in 1995.

DOW CHEMICAL

(Midland, Michigan)

1988 ~ Sold Iraq \$1.5 million worth of pesticides. Iraq also received loans for \$11,497,000 from BNL (an Italian bank) to buy chemicals and plastics from Dow. Critics have claimed these pesticides could have been used in Iraq,s chemical-weapons program. But Dow spokesman Scott Wheeler told the Weekly that none of the pesticides sold to Iraq could be "weaponized." Wheeler also said that Dow Chemical continued to sell "herbicides, fungicides and insecticides" to Iraq until February 2003. All recent sales were evaluated and approved by the U.N. Security Council, and in line with the U.N. trade embargo and sanctions in place since 1991, he added.

DRESSER CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT

(Formerly based in Libertyville, Illinois, the company was purchased by Komatsu America Corp., which is based in Vernon Hills, Illinois, and affiliated with Japan-based Komatsu Industries.)

Date unknown ~ Sold 25 wheel loaders worth \$4,750,530 to Iraq,s State Machinery Trading Co., a procurement front for military supplies and items. The transaction was financed through a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). Information about the transaction came to light during a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing.

DUPONT

(Wilmington, Delaware)

1989 ~ Supplied \$30,000 worth of fluorinated Krytox vacuum-pump oil used in the Iraqi centrifuge program (which produced materials for the nuclear-weapons program) to the Iraqi State Company for Oil Products. Krytox is a lubricating oil used in vacuum pumps where safety is critical. Michelle Reardon, a spokesperson for Dupont, confirmed the sale of Krytox oil but not its dollar value. "In 1989, Dupont was licensed by the U.S. to sell a specialty lubricant to the Iraqi state-run oil company. Two such shipments were authorized by the U.S. and occurred in 1989," said Reardon. "In the ensuing years and under very different relationships between the countries, these shipments were included in reports from Iraq to the United Nations in 1991 and probably the report for 2002."

E G & G PRINCETON APPLIED RESEARCH

(Based in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Company was restructured and eventually sold to Ametek Inc., which is headquartered in Paoli, a suburb of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.)

1989 ~ Provided \$55,000 worth of radio-spectrum analyzers for spectroscopic molecular analysis to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education. Congressional testimony implicated this agency,s involvement in Iraq,s weapons programs. This equipment could have both scientific and military uses. A spokesperson for Ametek, Inc., said that it purchased the restructured E G & G in December 2001 and that Ametek has no information about E G & G,s past business dealings with Iraq.

EASTMAN KODAK CO.

(Rochester, New York)

1989 ~ Supplied more than \$172,000 worth of equipment to analyze high-speed manufacturing processes for missile-development programs to Iraq,s

Ministry of Defense. A Kodak spokesperson declined to discuss the company's business dealings with Iraq before the first Gulf War, saying he had no knowledge of this reported sale. "Over the past 30 years, all of the company's sales to Iraq have been in full compliance with U.S. and international law," said Gerard Meuchner. He added that he knows of only one sale to Iraq in the last five years, a supply of medical X-ray film.

ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATES, INC.

(Formerly based in West Long Branch, New Jersey)

1987 ~ Shipped \$449,000 worth of advanced hybrid analog computer systems used in wind-tunnel experiments to Germany for shipment to Iraq via two other companies: MBB Helicopter Corp. and a German firm, Gildemeister Projecta AG, to Saad 16, Iraq's primary missile research-and-development site. Company may have ceased operations.

ENTRADE INTERNATIONAL, LTD.

(Formerly based in New York City ~ firm appears to be defunct.)

Date uncertain ~ During the 1980s, this company operated as an American subsidiary of a Turkish company named Enka. According to the Justice Department, company official Yavuz Tezeller allegedly conspired with a bank officer to defraud BNL (an Italian bank) through fraudulent loans and letters of credit. In one allegedly phony deal, Entrade received a BNL letter of credit, according to congressional records, to sell 300 tons of worsted yarn to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Entrade would then present sham orders from Iraq for agricultural or consumer goods to BNL to get financing for military equipment or materials. Investigators were allegedly pressured to limit fallout from the BNL investigation, because the first Bush administration had backed loan guarantees to Iraq. Then Attorney General William Barr would not allow Justice Department lawyers to go to Turkey to interview Tezeller, effectively ending the federal investigation of him.

EVAPCO

(Taneytown, Maryland)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied ion-exchange equipment, dollar amount not specified, for use in Iraq's chemical-weapons program, according to records from U.N. weapons inspectors that were cited in the 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing on U.S. export policy toward Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait.

FINNIGAN MAT US,

(Now called Thermo Finnigan MAT, based in Germany, with various U.S. locations)

1985 to 1988 ~ Manufactured at least two mass spectrometers for Iraq,s nuclear program. U.N. inspectors found the two spectrometers during the 1990s. Company also supplied equipment used for work with gasses and solids in research related to the nuclear-weapons program. And Finnigan provided \$1.14 million worth of computers and mass spectrometers for nuclear research to the University of Mosul, a procurement agent for Saad 16, Iraq,s primary missile research-and-development site.

FOXBORO COMPANY

(Based in Foxboro, Massachusetts, it,s now a subsidiary of Invensys Systems, Inc.)

1985 to 1986 ~ Sold more than \$742,000 worth of computing equipment to the State Company for Oil Products, Baghdad.

GERBER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

(Now known as Gerber Technology, based in Tolland, Connecticut)

1988 ~ Provided more than \$367,000 worth of computers, to program and run computer-controlled milling and turning machine tools to the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), which oversaw Iraq,s nuclear, missile and chemical-weapons programs.
<<http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/23/news-crogan.php#top1>>(return to company index)

GORMAN-RUPP CO.

(Mansfield, Ohio)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied motors found in the first round of U.N. inspections in the 1990s that were used in Iraq,s chemical-weapons program. The company, however, takes issue with this finding, despite documentation from a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing. "We make pumps, not motors," said company president Tom Gorman. "I know about this report. I,ve had discussions with [the weapons inspectors] about it. And we had investigators from either the Commerce Department or Customs come out to our offices and do an investigation. But they couldn,t clear up the confusion either." Gorman claimed that his company was ultimately cleared. "As far as I know, we didn,t sell to Iraq, but something could have slipped through over the last 30 years. Anything is possible," he said.

HARDINGE BROTHERS

(Now known as Hardinge, Inc., based in Elmira, New York)

Date uncertain ~ Manufactured a super-precision turning lathe found by U.N. inspectors at Al Atheer, Iraq,s nuclear-weapons design-and-research center. A lathe would be used in the production of nuclear centrifuges, which are high-speed machines used to separate heavier uranium molecules from lighter ones. U.N. weapons inspectors destroyed the lathe in the first round of inspections.

HEWLETT-PACKARD

(Palo Alto, California)

1985 to 1990 ~ Supplied \$96,000 worth of computers to design and manufacture molds to the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries. Nassr procured Scud-enhancement equipment for the Taji chemical-munitions site. Nassr also procured and produced equipment for Iraq,s nuclear program and artillery plants. In addition, Hewlett-Packard provided more than \$690,000 worth of computer equipment and frequency synthesizers to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), responsible for Iraq,s nuclear-, conventional-, missile and chemical-weapons programs.

Other contracts: \$254,000 worth of frequency synthesizers for developing surveillance radar; \$834,000 worth of computers for engineering applications and cryptographic and related equipment to the Ministry of Oil; \$25,000 worth of electronic-testing and computer-graphics equipment to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, which was responsible for nuclear-weapons research. Also, through German firm Messerschmidt Bolkow Blowm (Iraq,s main missile-technology supplier), sold more than \$600,000 worth of testing and measurement equipment and general-purpose computers for developing and testing radar antennas, radio-spectrum analyzers and optical-fiber cable for use in labs at Saad 16, Iraq,s missile research-and-development center.

Also provided three computers for operating machine tools, which were discovered by U.N. inspectors at Al Rabiya, a manufacturing site for enriched uranium. (Hewlett-Packard also obtained letters of credit from BNL [an Italian bank] totaling \$326,000 to sell computer-systems hardware and software to the Iraqi Trading Company, a front group for the Iraqi government. Iraq, in turn, received a BNL loan for \$142,055 to buy spare parts from Hewlett-Packard.)

HIPOTRONICS

(Brewster, New York)

1989 ~ Sold nine power-supply units worth \$287,000 ~ key equipment used in Iraq,s nuclear-weapons program.

HONEYWELL

(Morristown, New Jersey)

1984 to 1988 ~ Provided more than \$353,000 worth of computers to monitor heating, ventilation and air conditioning to the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), which supervised nuclear-, conventional-, missile and chemical-weapons programs. Also prepared for Iraq a feasibility study and design data for a fuel-air explosive warhead for ballistic missiles.

Honeywell also sold compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraqi Airways, listed by the U.S. Department of Justice as a front company for military procurement. These components could be used for building ballistic missiles. In addition, Honeywell supplied a "process flow controller" used in Iraq,s chemical-weapons program.

Richard Silverman, a spokesman for Honeywell, declined comment on the company,s business dealings with Iraq during the 1980s. "Honeywell has been, and continues to be, in compliance with all U.S. export-control laws and with U.S. sanctions against Iraq," said Silverman.

HUGHES HELICOPTER

(Was based in Culver City, California. The company is now called MD Helicopters, Inc., and is based in Mesa, Arizona, after being sold in 1984 to McDonnell Douglas.)

1983 ~ Supplied Iraq with 60 civilian helicopters, eventually modified for military use. Sale approved by Reagan administration.

IBM

(Armonk, New York)

2000 ~ Provided switches, chips and processing technology to Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., a Chinese maker of communications networks. Between 2000 and 2001, Huawei outfitted Iraq,s air-defense system with fiber-optic equipment in violation of the U.N. embargo. Huawei also bought Commerce Department^approved supercomputers not only from IBM but also Digital Equipment Corporation and Hewlett-Packard.

INTERNATIONAL IMAGING SYSTEMS

(Formerly located in Milpitas, California)

1981 to 1990 ^ Sales to Iraq included \$28,000 worth of electronic-imaging equipment to Iraqi Directorate General for purpose of enhancing satellite photos used in reconnaissance or missile targeting; more than \$295,000 worth of electronic image-enhancement equipment to the Iraqi Space and Astronomy Research Center; \$693,000 worth of infrared image-enhancement equipment for aerial reconnaissance and missile tracking to the University of Mosul, a procurement arm for Saad 16, Iraq,s primary missile research-and-development site. Records from California,s Secretary of State office indicate this company began operations in 1980 and has since been dissolved.

INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL AND CONTROL CORP.

(Formerly located in Lancaster, Pennsylvania ~ company defunct.)

1984 to 1989 ~ ISC supplied, via Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen, cluster-bomb technology and blueprints to build a cluster-bomb factory in Iraq. Cardoen is now on the run from a federal warrant for illegally exporting weapons to Iraq. ISC,s technology and blueprints were allegedly used to build a factory in Iraq to manufacture electronic fuses. James Guerin, now serving a 15-year sentence in federal prison in connection with illegal arms exports and other crimes, founded ISC. Some of the arms shipments made were diverted to Iraq. Before Guerin was exposed ~ he later pleaded guilty in criminal proceedings in 1992 ~ ISC was purchased by Ferranti International, a British company. Ferranti was forced into receivership because of the ensuing financial losses.

Guerin had filled his company with ex-U.S. military and intelligence officers. During the Ford administration, Guerin began illegally selling arms to South Africa as part of an intelligence operation in which the South African military agreed to spy on Soviet ships off its coast. (President Jimmy Carter later terminated the ISC-South African covert operation.) A former deputy CIA director, Admiral Bobby Inman, then head of Naval Intelligence, served as the liaison between Guerin and the U.S. government. And it was publicity about Inman,s connections to Guerin that ultimately cost him the chance to become CIA director.

IONICS

(Watertown, Massachusetts)

Date Uncertain ~ Ionics supplied a water-demineralization plant and pumping station costing \$1,780,000 to the State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE), a front for Iraq,s nuclear-weapons program. Deal was financed with a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). Ionics also supplied SEHEE with a water-desalination plant costing \$1,375,000, financed by a BNL loan. These transactions were documented in a 1992 hearing by the Senate Banking Committee.

KENNAMETAL, INC.

(Latrobe, Pennsylvania)

1987 to 1990 ~ Sold \$900,000 worth of metalworking products to Iraq, including \$81,917 to Al Kadisya State Establishment, a manufacturing program specializing in metallurgy. The Atlanta branch of BNL (an Italian bank) financed the deals. In a written statement, the company acknowledged sales of "approximately \$900,000 of products that were used to tool machines ~ some of those machines ended up in Iraq." But "all of the sales were in full compliance with the laws at the time and had been approved in advance and licensed by the British government," stated Riz Chand, Kennametal,s vice president of Human Resources and Corporate Relations. He also stated that two separate U.S. government reviews "found that Kennametal made no illegal exports and no charges were filed."

LEYBOLD VACUUM SYSTEMS

(A German company with U.S. subsidiary based in Export, Pennsylvania)

1988 to 1989 ~ Sold electron-beam welder, valued at \$880,000, used to assemble centrifuges for enriching uranium and for the repair of military jet engines and rocket cases, to the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries. Welder was shipped via German parent company, Leybold. Also sold a machine valued at \$530,000 to operate the welder. Later installed machinery that doubled the size of the original.

LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO.

(Cleveland, Ohio)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied welding machines via company called Matrix Churchill, which were used to build Iraqi missile factories, according to U.N. inspectors. Received letter of credit for \$840,000 from BNL (an Italian bank) to sell machines and supplies to Al Fao State Establishment, a military industrial facility. The equipment was used for Iraq,s nuclear and Condor II ballistic missile weapons programs. According to the 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing report on U.S. exports to Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait, Lincoln also supplied two welding machines worth \$513,994 (also financed by BNL) to Iraq,s State Machinery Trading Company for use in Iraq,s nuclear and Condor II ballistic-missile weapons programs.

LITTON INDUSTRIES

(Formerly based in Beverly Hills, California. Purchased in 2001 by Northrop Grumman, which is based in Los Angeles, California.)

1984 to 1989 ~ Helped bankroll German firms Gildemeister Projecta AG and Gipro, the main contractor for Saad 16, Iraq,s primary missile research-and-development site. Litton maintained a 14.3 percent share in Gildemeister throughout the life of its contract with Saad 16.

LUMMUS CREST, INC.

(Bloomfield, New Jersey ~ now part of ABB Global, Inc., a Swiss conglomerate with U.S. headquarters in Norwalk, Connecticut.)

1985 to 1989 ~ Provided more than \$250,000 worth of radio-spectrum analyzers. Also provided computers for inventory, quality control, lab analysis and engineering calculations to Iraq,s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). The equipment was used for Iraq,s multibillion-dollar petrochemical complex at Basra to make thiodiglycol, a chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas. Lummus also received letters of credit for \$53,827,776 from BNL (an Italian bank) to sell machinery and supplies to the Technical Corps for Special Projects, an Iraqi front company, according to documentation provided for a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing.

MBB HELICOPTER CORP.

(Formerly located in West Chester, Pennsylvania)

1989 ~ Provided more than \$957,000 worth of compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers to the Iraqi Air Force. According to records from Pennsylvania,s Department of State, this company was registered as a "foreign business corporation." MBB Helicopter Corporation began operations in 1979. Its last Pennsylvania filing was dated 1988. Company may have ceased operations.

MACK TRUCKS, INC.

(Allentown, Pennsylvania ~ Mack Trucks, Inc., is now a subsidiary of AB Volvo, based in Sweden.)

Date uncertain ~ According to a 1992 Senate hearing report, Mack Trucks supplied \$6,038,488 worth of truck parts, tractors, wreckers, trucks with cranes and dumpers to Iraq for use in building its nuclear and Condor II ballistic-missile programs. Deals financed by BNL (an Italian bank).

MAHO AG

(A German company that has become part of the Gildemeister Group, which is based in Bielefeld, Germany. Has various U.S. plants.)

Date uncertain ~ Manufactured three milling machines found by U.N. inspectors, in first round of inspections, to have been used in Iraqi nuclear-weapons program.

MATRIX CHURCHILL CORP.

(Formerly located in Cleveland, Ohio ~ company defunct)

1988 to 1990 ~ Constructed in Iraq a glass-fiber production plant, which made missile rocket-motor casings. Plant built at Nassr State Establishment, was known as Project 3128. And with the company XYZ Options, Matrix Churchill constructed at Al Atheer, Iraq,s nuclear weapons design-and-research center, a \$14 million plant used to produce high-precision tungsten carbide tools for Iraq,s nuclear program. The plant, financed by Italian banking giant Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), was completed in 1990, but later destroyed under first U.N. inspection program. Matrix Churchill, along with other U.S. and European firms, was part of a complicated Iraqi arms-procurement network, controlled by the Iraqi entity TECO or Techcorp, officially called the Technical Corps for Special Projects. TECO was a sub-unit of Iraq,s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. TECO also ran Al-Arabi Trading Co., a front for Iraq,s biological-weapons program. Matrix Churchill also received a letter of credit for \$81 million from BNL to supply machinery and other supplies to TECO and a letter of credit for \$2,345,300 to sell precious metals to Nassr State Enterprises for Mechanical Industries, which procured equipment for Iraq,s missile program.

McNEIL AKRON, INC.

(Now McNeil and NRM Corp., based in Akron, Ohio)

Date uncertain ~ According to a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing on U.S. export policy toward Iraq before the Kuwait invasion, McNeil Akron, Inc. supplied \$1,203,770 worth of tire-manufacturing machines to the Iraqi State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment, a nuclear-weapons program/centrifuge manufacturing procurement front. Deal financed with a loan from BNL (an Italian bank). A company representative said he didn,t have specific information regarding McNeil Akron,s dealings with Iraq, but he believed McNeil Akron probably did do business there before the first Gulf War.

MEMPHIS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

(Atlanta, Georgia; part of the Memphis Group, headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee)

1987 to 1988 ~ Supplied \$4.47 million worth of compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraqi Airways, listed by U.S. Department of Justice as a procurement arm for Iraq,s military.

MILLER ELECTRIC

(Appleton, Wisconsin)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied \$67,192 worth of circuit-card capacitors and an electric welding machine to Iraq's State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries, an organization sometimes used by Iraq as a military-procurement front for its nuclear-weapons program. Deal was financed with a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank).

MOUSE MASTER

(Formerly located in Lilburn, Georgia)

Date uncertain ~ U.N. weapons inspectors in the 1990s reported finding a generator used in chemical weapons program that was supplied by Mouse Master. Company may have ceased operations.

NCR CORPORATION

(Dayton, Ohio)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied \$1,207,036 worth of computers, peripherals and spare parts to Iraq's State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE), a front for Iraq's nuclear-weapons/Big Gun (giant cannon) program. Deal was financed with a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). A company spokesperson said the company "did have a presence inside Iraq from 1984 to September 1990." He added that NCR had received a license from the U.S. government to export technology to Iraq. The company, said spokesman Jeff Dafler, operated in full compliance with all applicable U.S. laws, governing exports to Iraq during that time period.

NRM CORP.

(Formerly located in Akron, Ohio, it is now part of McNeil and NRM Corp., also based in Akron.)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied \$3,310,485 worth of tire-manufacturing machines and \$950,000 worth of presses and accessories to Iraq's State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment, a nuclear-weapons program. Deals were financed with loans from BNL (an Italian bank). Another company, McNeil Akron Inc. (see listing above), bought NRM's assets at a bankruptcy sale in 1992. A McNeil Akron and NRM corporate representative said he had no information regarding the former NRM's exports to Iraq.

NORWALK CO.

(South Norwalk, Connecticut)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied a power and compressor assembly costing \$66,325 to Iraq's State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment, a nuclear-weapons program. Deal was financed with loan from BNL (an Italian bank).

NU KRAFT MERCANTILE CORP.

(Formerly located in Brooklyn, New York)

1988 ~ An alleged front company, this subsidiary (reportedly no more than an empty warehouse) of Brooklyn-based United Steel and Strip Corp., an import/export firm, allegedly transferred to Iraq more than 300 tons of thiodiglycol, which is used to make mustard gas. Allegedly received the illegally exported material from Alcolac International. The thiodiglycol reportedly traveled from Antwerp, Belgium, to Jordan and then on to Iraq. Both Nu Kraft and United Steel and Strip Corp. have apparently ceased operations.

PERKIN-ELMER CORP.

(Formerly based in Norwalk, Connecticut. After company was sold to another corporation, the combined entities were renamed PerkinElmer Corp. It is based in Wellesley, Massachusetts.)

1986 to 1989 ~ Supplied more than \$82,000 worth of electronic and photographic equipment for chemical research to Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission as well as more than \$198,000 worth of computers to the Al Qaqa State Establishment, Iraq's nuclear-weapons-testing program. A company spokesman said he has no information regarding exports to Iraq.

PHILLIPS EXPORT

(Now part of ConocoPhillips, a Houston, Texas-based oil and energy company.)

1983 to 1985 ~ Phillips Export (then part of Phillips Petroleum) sold 500 tons of thiodiglycol, a material used to make mustard gas, to the Iraqi State Enterprise for Pesticide Production, via Dutch firm KBS Holland. Also manufactured a five-ton shipment of thiodiglycol, which allegedly made its way to Iraq via the Spanish firm Cades. Cades claims chemical was destroyed prior to its delivery. Phillips Export/ConocoPhillips is a defendant in a Texas civil suit filed on behalf of some 3,500 Gulf War vets who are allegedly suffering from Gulf War Syndrome. The attorney representing ConocoPhillips in that class-action suit did not respond to the Weekly's call for comment.

POSI SEAL, INC.

(Formerly based in North Stonington, Connecticut; company passed through several owners. Its assets eventually were sold to Emerson Electric Company, based in St. Louis, Missouri.)

Date uncertain ~ Provided a system to fill payloads of projectiles for Iraq,s chemical-weapons program, according to evidence presented in a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing.

PRESRAY CORP.

(Based in Pawling, New York, the company is a subsidiary of the Pawling Corp.)

1988 to 1989 ~ Sold rubber door seals, which can be used in nuclear or chemical facilities to prevent the spread of contaminants, to Iraq,s State Electrical Industries. Vice President Ted Hollander confirmed Pressray,s exports to Iraq. "I,m not happy about it, but yes, we did do business with Iraq before the first Gulf War," said Hollander. He added that Pressray got approval for the sale from the U.S. Department of Commerce. "We actually had two orders to deliver, but the second, larger one was cancelled," he said.

PURE AIRE CORP.

(Formerly located in Charlotte, North Carolina)

Date uncertain ~ Named as chemical-weapons-materials supplier by U.N. weapons inspectors in the first round of inspections in the 1990s. However, inspectors did not specify what Pure Aire materials were found at Iraq,s Muthana weapons facility. Company may have ceased operations.

REDLAKE IMAGING CORP.

(Formerly based in Morgan Hill, California. After various corporate ownership changes, company is now called Redlake MASD, Inc., and is based in San Diego, California. It,s a subsidiary of Roper Industries, headquartered in Duluth, Georgia.)

1990 ~ Supplied more than \$10,000 worth of photographic equipment for scientific research on projectile behavior to the A. M. Daoud Research Center, a weapons-research facility. A spokesperson for Redlake MASD said the current company management has no access to the records of Redlake Imaging Corp.,s exports to Iraq.

REXON TECHNOLOGY CORP.

(Formerly based in New Jersey; company out of business.)

Date uncertain ~ Tried to sell 300,000 worth of artillery fuses to Iraq. The shipment was intercepted and the company prosecuted by the U.S. Justice Department. Company pleaded guilty in 1995 to violating Arms Export Control Act. Company fined \$500,000 and ordered closed by the court.

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.

(Defense-related divisions of Rockwell International were purchased in mid-1990s by Boeing, which is headquartered in Chicago.)

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL COLLINS

(Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Company now known as Rockwell Collins, Inc.)

1985 to 1987 ~ Rockwell International sold \$7,500 worth of navigational and directional finding radar to Iraqi Army Aviation Ministry. Also sold \$86,000 worth of navigational and directional finding radar for airborne communications to Iraqi Airways, listed as a front company for military procurement by the U.S. Justice Department. Company also sold \$114,000 worth of navigational and directional finding radar to the Iraqi Air Force.

Rockwell International Collins sold \$42,000 worth of navigational and directional finding radar for airborne communication to the Iraqi Air Force Aviation Supply. Also sold \$155,000 worth of navigational and directional finding radar for airborne communication, as well as electronic assemblies and integrated circuits to the Iraqi Army Aviation.

The Rockwell entities also sold more than \$128,000 worth of navigational and directional finding radar for airborne communication to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

ROTEC INDUSTRIES, INC.

(Elmhurst, Illinois)

1989 ~ Supplied conveyor-belt systems costing \$18,708,365 to Iraq's State Machinery Trading Company and the Technical Corps for Special Projects. These exports were paid for with a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). The conveyor systems were used for Iraq's nuclear and Condor II ballistic missile weapons programs, according to evidence from a 1992 Senate Banking Committee.

Company officials confirmed the transactions, also noting that Rotec had difficulty collecting its fee from BNL, said president Steven Ledger. The equipment, he noted, was used to move concrete for construction projects. Rotec did business with Iraq from 1980 until Iraq invaded Kuwait. "We still had two people in Iraq when the invasion occurred and we had to get them out after the invasion," said Ledger. "Since our equipment wasn't high technology, or restricted, we didn't have to get any special licenses to sell it." All of Rotec's sales, he said, were legal under existing U.S. law at the time.

Company owner Robert Oury said that Rotec supplied equipment for five construction projects. Four, he said, were dam projects designed to harness waterpower. "We did a lot to help Iraq's people, and we are proud of our contributions," said Oury. Neither Oury nor Ledger had any knowledge their equipment was used on military projects. Rotec's owner also said he supports President Bush's Iraq police. "And now, I think it's time for American business to step up to the plate and deliver," he said. "American business can not only help Iraq rebuild its country, but we can also help Iraq and the U.S. repair their relationship." Rotec, he added, is anxious to resume business dealings in Iraq. And he's hoping the American government's reconstruction efforts will be wide-ranging. "We need to begin a housing initiative in Iraq," he said. "What would be more valuable to the Iraqi people?" he asked. "Building a bridge, an airport or building a hundred houses for the people?"

SACKMAN ASSOCIATES

(Sudbury, Massachusetts)

1989 ~ Sold more than \$93,000 worth of electronic assemblies, integrated circuits and computers to analyze the performance of coatings on rocket and missile cones to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). Company apparently has ceased operations.

SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA

(Atlanta, Georgia)

1987 ~ Sold \$820,000 worth of antenna testers via German firm MBB, for shipment to Saad 16, Iraq's primary missile research-and-development site. Company is currently involved in broadband sales.

SCIENTIFIC DESIGN CO., INC.

(Little Ferry, New Jersey)

1989 ~ Contracted to supply some \$5.74 million in engineering technology and catalyst supplies for an ethylene glycol plant that was to be built by Iraq's State

Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE). It's unclear what the projected plant was ultimately intended to produce, as ethylene glycol has many potential uses. However, evidence suggested that SEHEE was a nuclear-weapons/Super Gun (giant cannon) procurement program. Deal was financed with a loan from BNL (an Italian bank). A company spokesman, in an interview, confirmed the contract, but said that work by Scientific Design ended when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and sanctions were initiated against Iraq. The plant was apparently never completed, said corporate counsel Thomas Towell.

SEMETEX CORP.

(Formerly based in Torrance, California)

1989 ~ Provided more than \$5 million worth of computer equipment for manufacturing transistors, silicon diodes and photovoltaic devices to the Al Mansour factory, which was responsible for supplying the Iraqi rocket-launch site at Karbala, the SCUD-missile enhancement sites Al Hillah and Al Falluja, and a space-launch center at Al-Anbar. Iraq also received a loan for \$7,673,500 from BNL (an Italian bank) to buy technology from Semetex for the fabrication of semiconductors for the State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment, a procurement front for Iraq's nuclear-weapons program. Semetex began operations in 1975. But according to records from California's Secretary of State office, its corporate registration was suspended. Company appears to have ceased operations.

SERVAAS, INC.

(Indianapolis, Indiana)

1988 to 1990 ~ Supplied Iraq with "copper scrap refining machines, tools, parts and technical documents" to build a factory that would have made artillery shells and gun cartridges, according to records introduced at a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing. The work was done by Bridgeport Brass, an Indiana brass mill owned by Servaas.

The \$40,602,000 deal was financed, with U.S. government approval, through a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). The go-between with the Iraqis was Matrix Churchill, a now defunct company that was bought by the Iraqis (see Matrix Churchill entry). Servaas shipped all the material to Iraq, but the first Gulf War halted construction. The U.S. government eventually helped Servaas get full payment on the deal by allowing it to draw from frozen Iraqi funds for the final \$16 million. Company owner Beurt Servaas, a former Indianapolis city councilman, testified before Congress that he had no knowledge that the factory would be producing ammunition. He said he believed the factory was to produce commercial, non-military items.

(return to company index)

SIEMENS CORP.

(A German company with a variety of American operations. Siemens U.S. is based in New York City.)

1989 ~ Supplied \$79,000 worth of computers for testing and control of X-ray diffraction systems to Iraq,s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). Thomas Phillips, a company spokesman, said all of Siemens, transactions with Iraq were "in full compliance with international rules." Siemens, work in Iraq primarily included "energy, transport, intelligence and communications," Phillips told the Weekly. But he declined to discuss specifics.

SIP CORP.

(SIP Corp. is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. Its U.S. subsidiary, American SIP Corp., is based in Hebron, Kentucky.)

Date uncertain ~ Manufactured jig-bore equipment (high-precision milling machines) found by U.N. inspectors to have been used in the Iraqi nuclear-weapons program. A company official acknowledged that SIP probably did business with Iraq in the 1980s. "But I think that Geneva probably handled that business, and the company has not sold any machinery to Iraq since sanctions were imposed following the 1991 Gulf War," said Greg Dunkley, of American SIP.

SPECTRAL DATA CORP.

(Formerly based in Champaign, Illinois)

1985 ~ Provided \$27,000 worth of image processing, display-systems and multi-spectral digital equipment to the University of Mosul, a procurement arm for Iraq,s missile-development program. Company may have ceased operations.

SPECTRA PHYSICS

(Mountain View, California)

1987 ~ Provided \$19,000 worth of lasers and laser-related systems to Salah al Din, a military-electronics factory built by the French, which produced three-dimensional early-warning radars, electronic countermeasures and guidance components. The site also produced equipment for making fuel for nuclear weapons, intended to arm warheads.

SPERRY CORP.

(Merged with Burroughs in 1986 to form Unisys Corp, based in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania.)

1985 to 1986 ~ Supplied \$32,000 worth of computers to Saad 21, a weapons facility. Sperry also sold \$68,000 worth of compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers. These components were on the Department of Commerce list of parts used to build ballistic missiles. In addition, Sperry provided \$6.2 million worth of computers to the Iraqi National Computer Center and more than \$8.7 million worth of computers for a personnel database that was reportedly used for surveillance activities by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, which supervised the secret police. Iraq also received a loan of \$1,351,000 from BNL (an Italian bank) to buy computer hardware and software from Sperry, according to evidence provided for a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing. A Unisys company spokesperson said she had no information concerning Sperry,s exports to Iraq.

SULLAIRE CORP.

(Formerly based in Charlotte, North Carolina)

Dates unknown ~ U.N. weapons inspectors in the first round of inspections after Gulf War I, found a variety of equipment and machinery supplied by Sullaire for use in Iraq,s chemical-weapons program. Items included power-supply units, air filters for drying chemicals, buffer vessels, pressure and temperature regulators, and a refrigerator for air-drying and air compressors. Company may have ceased operations.

SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

(Formerly based in Miami Lakes, Florida. Was part of the now-dissolved Westfield Holdings, Inc., which also was based in Miami Lakes, Florida. Swissco was dissolved in 1991.)

1982 to 1989 ~ Shipped approximately 130 tons of unlicensed zirconium, which could be used as an incendiary additive in 24,000 cluster bombs, to Iraq. In 1995, a federal court convicted Swissco in absentia for conspiracy to export 130 tons of zirconium without the required U.S. export licenses, according to records from the Commerce Department,s Bureau of Industry and Security Export Enforcement Division. The court fined Swissco \$1,309,230 and suspended the company,s export privileges for 10 years. Swissco allegedly worked in concert with Teledyne Wah Chang (an American company) and Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen to ship the zirconium to Cardoen,s bomb-making plant in Chile. According to a Miami Herald report, Cardoen, now on the run from a U.S. federal warrant charging him with illegally exporting munitions, was last seen in 2001, living in Cuba.

TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.

(Concord, Massachusetts)

Date uncertain ~ Supplied \$183,400 worth of equipment and training, including communication security devices to Iraq,s Technical and Scientific Materials Division, a biological-warfare and military-support operation. Deal was financed by a letter of credit from BNL (an Italian bank). Also supplied digital systems and services, costing \$198,400 to the State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment, a nuclear-weapons program. This deal also was financed by a BNL loan.

TEKTRONIX

(Beaverton, Oregon)

1985 to 1990 ~ Alleged sales to Iraq included: more than \$140,000 worth of oscilloscopes, electronic testing equipment, computers and peripherals to various buyers, including the Military Technical College, University of Baghdad, Iraqi National Oil Co. and the National Center for Engineering; more than \$12,000 worth of oscilloscopes used to maintain Iraqi Air Force computers; at least \$50,000 worth of electronic measuring equipment to SOTI, the procurement arm for rocket production, Scud-missile enhancement and space-rocket development; \$80,000 worth of radio-spectrum analyzers sold to the Iraqi Scientific Research Council. The Scientific Research Council, headed by General Amer Rashid al-Obeidi, was an Iraqi procurement front, whose goal was to acquire sensitive technology, computers and scientific equipment it could channel into Iraq,s military-research effort. The Scientific Research Council sponsored a variety of projects, including biological-weapons research, according to a former U.N. weapons inspector. Tektronix also sold a digital oscilloscope, which has nuclear applications, to the German firm Gildemeister, for resale to Saad 16, an Iraqi weapons-manufacturing facility.

In a series of contacts with the Weekly, the company acknowledged some, but not all of the exports listed in other documentation. The company,s reckoning came up with 16 export licenses for exports whose value totaled less than \$250,000. The company also insisted that it scrupulously complied with U.S. export policies and laws, and took the extra precaution of screening exports with U.S. government agencies. Tektronix,s own export policy requires screening all transactions of materials that could have both civilian and military application, said spokesman Doug Babb. "Where the company has no capability to evaluate the end-user directly, as is the case for Iraq, the company must rely on U.S. governmental licensing authorities, which have access to extensive intelligence capabilities." Another company official added that "To our knowledge, no Tektronix products have entered Iraq since the imposition of sanctions a decade ago."

TELEDYNE WAH CHANG

(Company now called Wah Chang and is based in Albany, Oregon. It,s part of Allegheny Technologies, based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.)

1986 ~ Exported more than 130 tons of zirconium, which could be used as an incendiary additive in cluster bombs, to the bomb-making plant in Chile of arms dealer Carlos Cardoen, who allegedly sold illegal weaponry to Iraq. U.S. agents, who were investigating illegal zirconium sales to Iraq, raided the company in March 1992. Wah Chang,s former parent company, Teledyne Industries, Inc., pleaded guilty in 1995 to federal charges of criminal conspiracy, making false statements and violations of the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act. Teledyne paid \$13 million in fines for Wah Chang,s illegal zirconium exports. Teledyne employee Edward Johnson was sentenced to 41 months in prison in connection with these illegal exports. Wah Chang means "great development" in Chinese.

THERMO JARRELL ASH CORP.

(Formerly based in Franklin, Massachusetts, now part of Thermo Electron Corporation, headquartered in Waltham, Massachusetts)

1989 ~ Sold more than \$350,000 worth of spectrometers to measure particles in geological and clinical sample of liquids and solids to the Iraqi Scientific Research Council, a front for the Iraqi military.

TI COATING

(Utica, Michigan)

1989 ~ Supplied more than \$373,000 worth of cutting-tool coating and chemical-vapor deposition blueprints as well as training manuals to apply coating supplies used to cover and protect tool-cutting equipment. Materials went to the Badr Establishment of Mechanical Engineering, responsible for producing aerial bombs, and centrifuges used to produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

The transaction was completely legal, said William Zichichi, the company president and CEO. His company, in fact, received export-license approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce, he said. TI sold the supplies and manuals to XYZ Options, Inc., another Iraqi supplier. XYZ then delivered TI Coating,s materials to the Badr Establishment of Mechanical Engineering. XYZ, Zichichi said, went bankrupt before TI Coating was paid. TI Coating ultimately received a small settlement as part of XYZ,s bankruptcy proceedings, he added.

TRADING AND INVESTMENT CORP.

(Charlotte, North Carolina)

Dates unknown ~ Supplied two shipments of float valves and bearings worth \$352,560 to the Al Hilal Industrial Company, named as a "sometime procurement front" for Iraq,s weapons programs, according to records from a 1992 Senate Banking Committee. The transactions were financed through letters of credit from BNL (an Italian bank).

This export company, owned by Fanar Alghrary, an Iraqi-American, is still active. Alghrary confirmed to the Weekly that his company did sell the two shipments to Al Hilal. But Alghrary disputes the congressional allegation that Al Hilal operated as an Iraqi military-procurement front. "I know about that, and I told [government] investigators that it was B.S.," said Alghrary. "They [Al Hilal] make cooling equipment for buildings. I know them and that,s all I know them doing." Alghrary also stated that 90 percent of his sales to Iraq were to Iraq,s State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing. The U.S. government, he added, approved the sales.

UNION CARBIDE

(Based in Danbury, Connecticut. It merged in 2001 with Dow Chemical Company, headquartered in Midland, Michigan.)

Dates unknown ~ U.N. weapons inspectors in the 1990s identified Union Carbide shipments to Iraq of the chemical Xylene, which was used in Iraq,s chemical-weapons program. A spokesperson for Dow Chemical said he had no information regarding Union Carbide,s exports.

UNISYS CORP.

(Blue Bell, Pennsylvania)

Dates unknown ~ Contracts allegedly included: \$8,000 worth of computers to Saad State Establishment, which was involved with Iraq,s missile research-and-development programs; more than \$2.4 million worth of computers sold to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning; \$2.2 million worth of computers to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, which was responsible for nuclear-, missile- and chemical-weapons program; \$323,000 worth of computers sold to Iraq,s Nuclear Computer Center; \$430,000 worth of computers sold to Saddam State Establishment, a military-procurement agency; at least \$500,000 worth of computers, ostensibly for use in payroll and accounting, to the Ministry of Defense, which oversaw the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) and Saad 16, a weapons-manufacturing facility. Unisys also supplied more than \$8.7 million worth of computers for a personnel database reportedly used by the Ministry of the Interior, which supervised the Iraqi secret police. The database was set up at airports and border-crossing stations.

A written response issued by the company, stated, "Unisys did supply commercial information technology systems to the country of Iraq in the 1980s before the Gulf War, under proper export licenses by the United States government in accordance with the policy governing relations with Iraq at that time. Unisys has not made any such sales to Iraq, since that time." Maureen O'Brien, a company spokesperson, declined to discuss any specifics regarding these exports.

VEECO INSTRUMENTS, INC.

(Woodbury, New York)

1986 ~ Provided \$4,600 worth of computers for use by German firm Interatom GmbH in the manufacturing of Iraqi nuclear-power stations and the construction of photovoltaic plants for SOTI, a procurement arm for Saad 16, Iraq's primary missile production-and-testing site.

WILD MAGNAVOX SATELLITE SURVEY

(A joint venture between Magnavox Survey System, Inc., and Wild Heerbrugg Survey Company. Magnavox Electronics, a consumer-electronics firm based in Atlanta, is now owned by Dutch-based Koninklijke Philips N.V. Wild Heerbrugg, began in Switzerland. Through mergers and acquisitions, it is now part of Swiss-based Leica Holding B.V. Group.)

1988 ~ Supplied more than \$270,000 worth of navigational-, directional-finding radar and airborne-communication equipment to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. This joint venture appears to have ceased operations.

WILTRON

(Now owned by Anritsu Corp., based in Atsugi, Japan, with North American headquarters in Morgan Hill, California)

1987 ~ Shipped scalar network analyzers, capable of testing and developing microwave circuits for missile-guidance radar. Shipments went to Germany for shipment via MBB (a German company) to Saad 16, Iraq's missile research-and-development center. Wiltron also sold \$50,000 of electronic measuring, testing and calibrating equipment.

XYZ OPTIONS INC.

(Formerly located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama ~ company defunct.)

1989 ~ Sold powder press, suitable for the compaction of nuclear fuels to Iraq. XYZ, in partnership with Matrix Churchill Corp. (MCC), also built a \$14 million plant for the production of high-precision tungsten-carbide tools. The contract was

with Iraq,s Badr Establishment of Mechanical Engineering, responsible for producing aerial bombs, and centrifuges used to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. The MCC/XYZ/Badr plant was located at Al Atheer, Iraq,s nuclear weapons design-and-research center, which was destroyed during the first round of U.N. inspections in the 1990s. XYZ also owned CarbiTech of Topeka, Kansas, which trained dozens of Iraqis to manufacture carbide-tipped inserts for machine tools used in nuclear production. In addition, XYZ received letters of credit totaling \$6,826,193 from BNL (an Italian bank) to sell furnaces, machinery, equipment and supplies to the Iraqi State Machinery Trading Company. XYZ obtained equipment for its Iraqi project with MCC from about 25 U.S. vendors and a smaller number of foreign sources. XYX, which went bankrupt, has apparently ceased operations.

YORK INTERNATIONAL CORP.

(York, Pennsylvania)

Date unknown ~ According to records introduced at a 1992 Senate Banking Committee hearing on U.S. export policy toward Iraq before the Kuwait invasion, York exported \$3,250,000 worth of control panels and packaged liquid coolers that were used in Iraq,s nuclear-weapons program. Shipments were financed by BNL (an Italian bank).

ZETA LABORATORIES, INC.

(Formerly based in Santa Clara, California, Zeta ~ now in Morgan Hill, California. After a series of sales, Zeta was purchased by Integrated Defense Technologies, Inc., of Huntsville, Alabama.)

1988 ~ Provided more than \$2.2 million worth of quartz crystals and electronic assemblies for radar systems to Salah Al Din, a military-electronics firm built by French firm Thomson-CSF. Salah Al Din produced radar, electronic countermeasures, inertial-guidance components and equipment for making nuclear-weapons fuel. The equipment was sold to the Iraqi Trading Company, a front used for Iraqi military procurement. Zeta also received a letter of credit for \$1.1 million from BNL (an Italian bank) to sell an oscillator to the Iraqi Trading Company. During this period Zeta also was a contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense, deriving most of its income from those federal contracts.

Zeta is one of several companies that are now part of Integrated Defense Technologies, a developer and provider of advanced electronics and technology products to defense and intelligence industries. IDT,s clients include all branches of the U.S. military. A company spokesman said he has no information regarding the Iraq transactions, which occurred under different corporate ownership.

US Government Agency Listings

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

(Atlanta, Georgia)

1984 to 1993 ~ The CDC shipped a number of "viruses, retroviruses, bacteria and fungi" to Iraq from "October 1, 1984 thru October 13, 1993," stated then-CDC director David Satcher in a 1995 letter to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. According to Satcher, CDC's shipments to Iraq continued two years after the first Gulf War. However, he included no information regarding the post-Gulf War I shipments. The pre-war shipments included:

1985 ~ Three shipments of West Nile virus, two shipments of dengue-fever virus, one shipment of Yersinia pestis (non-virulent plague bacteria), one shipment of Bhanja virus, one shipment of Hazara virus, one shipment of Kemerovo virus, one shipment of Langat virus, one shipment of Sandfly Fever/Naples virus, one shipment of Sandfly Fever/Sicilian virus, one shipment of Sindbis virus, one shipment of Tahyna virus, one shipment of Thogoto virus, five plague-infected mouse-tissue smears and a variety of antigens and antibodies.

1985 ~ Three yeast cultures of candida

1985 ~ Eight vials of antigens (substances that stimulate the production of antibodies) as well as antibodies for ricketts and typhus

1986 ~ Two vials of non-infectious botulinum toxoid

1988 ~ A variety of teaching supplies and CDC procedures manuals

1989 ~ A variety of enterococcus bacteria and one shipment of streptococcus bacteria

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Langley, Virginia)

1982 ~ President Ronald Reagan signed a National Security Council directive ordering the agency to provide Iraq with intelligence-information advice and hardware. The order was enthusiastically carried out by then-CIA Director William Casey (see Bechtel), who supported the sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. CIA also assisted in the sale of non-U.S. weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq.

1984 ~ Agency secretly provided Iraq with instructions on how to calibrate its mustard-gas attacks on Iranian troops.

1986 ~ Agency authorized secret study documenting Iraqi use of chemical weapons.

1988 ~ CIA Director William Webster acknowledged to Congress that Iraq was the largest producer of chemical weapons in the world.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

(Washington, D.C.)

1983 to 1990 ~ Extended billions of dollars worth of loan guarantees to Iraq through the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation. Iraq used some of these funds to buy material, equipment and technology for its chemical-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. After Iraq defaulted on some its loan obligations, the federal government agreed, in 1995, to pay \$400 million to BNL (an Italian bank) to settle claims. Iraq is liable for reimbursing the U.S. treasury, but repayment is considered unlikely.

1992 ~ An Agriculture Department employee shredded documents describing department's role in obtaining \$5.5 billion in U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans to Iraq through BNL, an Italian bank. The shredding was witnessed by a Justice Department paralegal.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

(Washington, D.C.)

1985 to 1990 ~ Approved \$1.5 billion worth of export licenses for shipments of goods with both military and civilian applications to Iraq. According to an Inspector General's report, Commerce officials later tampered with export records to disguise shipments of equipment and technology used by the Iraqi military. Five records alterations pertained to the proposed shipment of more than \$1 billion in trucks originally described as "designed for military use."

1988 ~ Department approved shipments of equipment to upgrade Iraq's Scud-missile program.

1992 ~ Commerce Department inspector general admitted to Congress that department officials altered 66 export licenses for Iraq.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Arlington, Virginia)

1982 ~ President Ronald Reagan ordered department to provide Iraq with intelligence information, advice and hardware.

1983 ~ Private citizen Donald Rumsfeld (currently the secretary of defense) was dispatched to Iraq as the personal envoy of President Reagan. Met with Saddam Hussein and pledged support for regime. Rumsfeld,s trip occurred as U.S. was receiving reports of chemical-weapons use by Iraq. Rumsfeld also carried with him a secret offer of help to Iraq from then-Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

During both the Reagan administration and the first Bush administration (prior to the invasion of Kuwait), the department supported export licenses transferring weapons technology and weapons materials to Iraq.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(Washington, D.C.)

1982 ~ Department removed Iraq from list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

1983 ~ Reagan Secretary of State George Shultz (See Bechtel) successfully lobbied Commerce Department to approve sale of helicopters to Iraq. State Department begins receiving reports of chemical-weapons use by Iraqi military.

1984 ~ Schultz persuaded Representative Howard Berman (D^Los Angeles) to drop his bill returning Iraq to list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

1984 ~ Diplomatic relations reestablished with Iraq.

1986 ~ Reagan sent secret message to Saddam Hussein, advising him to step up his air war on Iran. Message delivered to Hussein through Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by Vice President George Bush.

1988 ~ At the U.N., Schultz downplayed Iraq,s use of chemical weapons on Kurds.

1989 ~ Department supplied visas for three Iraqi nuclear scientists to attend an international detonation conference in Portland, Oregon. This conference discussed nuclear-weapons technology and flyer-plate technology used to control the force and shape of implosive shock waves.

1989 ~ Secretary of State James Baker received memo informing him that Iraq was aggressively developing chemical-, biological- and new missile-weapons programs.

1990 ~ Bush administration approved \$4.8 million in sales of advanced technology to Iraq,s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. MIMI was responsible for Iraq,s nuclear-, missile and chemical-weapons program.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Washington, D.C.)

1983 to 1989 ~ During this period, the NSC, usually with the State Department, successfully lobbied the Commerce Department to approve sales to Iraq of military-related items and items with dual military and civilian use, such as heavy trucks, to Iraq.

1983 ~ Successfully lobbied the Commerce Department to approve the sale of 10 "civilian" Bell helicopters to Iraq in 1983. The helicopters were eventually modified and used in 1988 to spray poison gas on Iranians and possibly the Kurds.

1989 ~ President George Bush signed NSC Directive 26, which established closer ties to Baghdad and provided \$1 billion in agricultural loans.

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES:

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE (University of California, Livermore, California)

LOS ALAMOS (University of California, Los Alamos, California)

SANDIA (Sandia National Laboratories are government-owned but operated under contract by Lockheed Martin, which is based in Fort Worth, Texas)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Washington, D.C.)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Washington, D.C.)

1989, California ~ These three labs in conjunction with the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense organized a quadrennial international detonation conference in Portland, Oregon. There, representatives from these nuclear labs presented information on nuclear-weapons-detonation technology and flyer-plate technology used to control the force and shape of implosive shock waves. Three Iraqi nuclear scientists attended this conference from the Al Qaqaa State Establishment. Al Qaqaa supplied bomb parts for Iraq's nuclear-weapons testing.

Partial Source List:

1992 hearing report and transcripts from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: United States Export Policy Toward Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait.

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro records of letters of credit and loans issued to Iraq and its corporate exporters.

Reports of United Nations weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) provided to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

Information from databases compiled by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit foundation that monitors the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile technology.

News articles and op-eds written by Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project.

Information from Iraq's 1997 Full, Final and Complete Weapons Declaration to the U.N. UNSCOM, provided by Gary Pitts, a Texas-based attorney suing a number of American and international companies who allegedly supplied Iraq with technology, materials and equipment for its chemical and biological weapons program. Pitts is representing approximately 3,500 Gulf War veterans allegedly suffering from Gulf War syndrome.

Research material and government documents compiled by Washington, D.C.-based National Security Archives, a nonprofit research group.

1995 letter from Dr. David Satcher, then the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to U.S. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Michigan), chair of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Letter detailed shipments of "viruses, retroviruses, bacteria and fungi" to Iraq by the CDC.

1994 United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives ~ Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s.

Information compiled by the Washington D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public education and policy group.

Information from *Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War* (2001), by Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad.

Congressional testimony of Kenneth Timmerman, author of *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Saddam* (1991).

Information from *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Saddam* (1991), by Kenneth Timmerman.

Congressional statements by Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-Connecticut), Chair of the House Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 1991.

Congressional statements by Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas), 1991, 1992.

Interviews with Gary Pitts.

Interviews with Andreas Zumach, a Swiss-based reporter for the Berlin newspaper Die Tageszeitung. Zumach was leaked portions of the 2002 Full, Final and Complete Weapons Declaration (UNMOVIC). Zumach published the list of weapons suppliers in a December 2002 series of articles.

Interviews with Jeff Hodges, a former investigator for the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, chaired in 1991 by Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan).

Interview with Jim Tuite, a former investigator for the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, chaired by U.S. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Michigan).

Interviews with government-based and other sources, who requested anonymity.

Web sites and corporate filings for listed companies.

Various other U.S. congressional hearing reports; congressional testimony; government reports; Department of Commerce records; Department of Agriculture records.

Various state-records databases, including information from various Secretary of State offices and Departments of Corporations.

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<<http://ggb.0catch.com>>

<gazettegb@yahoo.fr>